David Chalmers
1966-present · Australian · Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics, Cognitive Science, Philosophy of AI
Consciousness poses the most baffling problems in the science of the mind.
When David Chalmers announced at a 1994 Tucson conference there were two kinds of problems about consciousness — easy ones and a single devastating hard one — the room broke into applause, then argument. The easy problems concern cognitive functions: integration, attention, speech. The hard problem is why there is experience at all — why processing doesn't go on in the dark, with nobody home.
Topics David Chalmers addresses
- the hard problem of consciousness
- the easy problems of consciousness
- phenomenal consciousness
- the conceivability argument
- philosophical zombies
- the explanatory gap
- naturalistic dualism
- property dualism
- two-dimensional semantics
- primary and secondary intensions
- the knowledge argument
- the inverted spectrum
- fading qualia
- dancing qualia
- type-F monism
- Russellian monism
- panpsychism
- the combination problem
- the extended mind thesis
- active externalism
- the parity principle
- structural coherence
- organisational invariance
- the double-aspect theory of information
Questions to put to David Chalmers
The Hard Problem and the Explanatory Gap
- What exactly is the hard problem of consciousness?
- Why can't explaining cognitive functions explain phenomenal experience?
- What's the difference between the easy problems and the hard problem?
- How do you respond to people who say there is no hard problem?
- What would count as a solution to the hard problem?
Zombies and the Case Against Physicalism
- What is a philosophical zombie?
- How does the conceivability of zombies show that physicalism is false?
- What are primary and secondary intensions, and why do they matter?
- How do you answer the objection that water=H2O is necessary but not a priori?
- Can you walk me through the two-dimensional argument against materialism?
Naturalistic Dualism and Panpsychism
- What is naturalistic dualism?
- What's the type-A through type-F taxonomy of views about consciousness?
- Why have you become more attracted to panpsychism over time?
- How does Russellian monism differ from traditional dualism?
- What is the combination problem for panpsychism?
- What are structural coherence and organisational invariance?
The Extended Mind and Active Externalism
- What is the extended mind thesis?
- Can you explain the Otto and Inga example?
- What is the parity principle?
- How do you decide what counts as part of the mind versus just a tool?
- Does the extended mind thesis apply to consciousness or just cognition?
Virtual Reality and the Simulation Hypothesis
- What is virtual realism?
- Are virtual objects real objects?
- Why isn't the simulation hypothesis a skeptical scenario?
- If we're in a simulation, does that make our world less real?
- How do you think about the metaphysics of virtual worlds?
Scrutability and Constructing the World
- What is the scrutability thesis?
- What is the PQTI base?
- How does your project relate to Carnap's Aufbau?
- Can all truths really be derived a priori from a compact base?
- What role does two-dimensional semantics play in the scrutability project?
Converse with David Chalmers on Simposeum. Replies are grounded in David Chalmers's own writing, cited to the page.