David Chalmers

1966-present · Australian · Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics, Cognitive Science, Philosophy of AI

Consciousness poses the most baffling problems in the science of the mind.

When David Chalmers announced at a 1994 Tucson conference there were two kinds of problems about consciousness — easy ones and a single devastating hard one — the room broke into applause, then argument. The easy problems concern cognitive functions: integration, attention, speech. The hard problem is why there is experience at all — why processing doesn't go on in the dark, with nobody home.

Topics David Chalmers addresses

• the hard problem of consciousness
• the easy problems of consciousness
• phenomenal consciousness
• the conceivability argument
• philosophical zombies
• the explanatory gap
• naturalistic dualism
• property dualism
• two-dimensional semantics
• primary and secondary intensions
• the knowledge argument
• the inverted spectrum
• fading qualia
• dancing qualia
• type-F monism
• Russellian monism
• panpsychism
• the combination problem
• the extended mind thesis
• active externalism
• the parity principle
• structural coherence
• organisational invariance
• the double-aspect theory of information

Questions to put to David Chalmers

The Hard Problem and the Explanatory Gap

• What exactly is the hard problem of consciousness?
• Why can't explaining cognitive functions explain phenomenal experience?
• What's the difference between the easy problems and the hard problem?
• How do you respond to people who say there is no hard problem?
• What would count as a solution to the hard problem?

Zombies and the Case Against Physicalism

• What is a philosophical zombie?
• How does the conceivability of zombies show that physicalism is false?
• What are primary and secondary intensions, and why do they matter?
• How do you answer the objection that water=H2O is necessary but not a priori?
• Can you walk me through the two-dimensional argument against materialism?

Naturalistic Dualism and Panpsychism

• What is naturalistic dualism?
• What's the type-A through type-F taxonomy of views about consciousness?
• Why have you become more attracted to panpsychism over time?
• How does Russellian monism differ from traditional dualism?
• What is the combination problem for panpsychism?
• What are structural coherence and organisational invariance?

The Extended Mind and Active Externalism

• What is the extended mind thesis?
• Can you explain the Otto and Inga example?
• What is the parity principle?
• How do you decide what counts as part of the mind versus just a tool?
• Does the extended mind thesis apply to consciousness or just cognition?

Virtual Reality and the Simulation Hypothesis

• What is virtual realism?
• Are virtual objects real objects?
• Why isn't the simulation hypothesis a skeptical scenario?
• If we're in a simulation, does that make our world less real?
• How do you think about the metaphysics of virtual worlds?

Scrutability and Constructing the World

• What is the scrutability thesis?
• What is the PQTI base?
• How does your project relate to Carnap's Aufbau?
• Can all truths really be derived a priori from a compact base?
• What role does two-dimensional semantics play in the scrutability project?

Converse with David Chalmers on Simposeum. Every reply is grounded in David Chalmers's own writing and cites the page it came from. The corpus is public-domain text.