Wilfrid Sellars
1912-1989 · American · Philosophy of Mind, Epistemology, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Science, Kantian Philosophy
The aim of philosophy, abstractly formulated, is to understand how things in the broadest possible sense of the term hang together in the broadest possible sense of the term.
Wilfrid Sellars grew up inside philosophy — his father was a prominent American philosopher — and studied at Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar before spending most of his career at Pittsburgh. There he anchored what his students — Robert Brandom and John McDowell among them — would call the "Pittsburgh school," one of analytic philosophy's most consequential lineages.
Topics Wilfrid Sellars addresses
- the myth of the given
- the space of reasons
- psychological nominalism
- the manifest image
- the scientific image
- the synoptic vision
- the Jonesian myth
- picturing and language-world isomorphism
- scientific realism on theoretical entities
- inner episodes as theoretical posits
- the logic of looks
- sense-datum theories and their ambiguity
- does empirical knowledge have a foundation?
- the framework of persons
- categorial frameworks
- inferentialism and semantics
- knowledge as placement in normative space
- thoughts as inner-speech analogues
- sensations as theoretical posits
- impressions and ideas
- the logic of private episodes
- intentionality and aboutness
- sensory consciousness
- methodological vs philosophical behaviorism
Questions to put to Wilfrid Sellars
The Myth of the Given and the Space of Reasons
- What exactly is the Myth of the Given that you're attacking?
- Why can't there be non-inferential cognitive states that ground knowledge?
- What do you mean by the space of reasons?
- How is knowing something different from just being in a certain mental state?
- If there's no Given, how does empirical knowledge get started?
- What's wrong with the idea that I can just directly see that something is red?
Psychological Nominalism and Awareness
- What is psychological nominalism?
- How can all awareness of universals be mediated by language?
- Don't babies see colors before they learn words for them?
- What's the difference between sensing and being aware of a sensation?
- How do you respond to the objection that nominalism makes abstract entities disappear?
The Manifest Image and the Scientific Image
- What's the difference between the manifest image and the scientific image?
- Why does the scientific image have ontological priority?
- If science tells us what's real, what happens to persons and intentions?
- What do you mean by the synoptic vision?
- How do the two images hang together without one just replacing the other?
- Why is understanding how things hang together the aim of philosophy?
The Jonesian Myth and Inner Episodes
- What's the point of the myth about Jones introducing thoughts and sensations?
- Are you saying thoughts are just inner speech?
- How can sensations be theoretical posits if I'm directly aware of my own pain?
- What's wrong with the Cartesian view that I know my own mind immediately?
- How does your view differ from behaviorism about the mental?
- If thoughts are theoretical posits, how do we learn to report our own thoughts?
Picturing, Reference, and Sellarsian Kantianism
- What do you mean when you say language pictures the world?
- How is picturing different from the inferential relations between concepts?
- Why can't inferentialism alone explain how language connects to reality?
- What's Kantian about your transcendental project in Science and Metaphysics?
- How do categorial frameworks structure our experience?
- What role does productive imagination play in your account?
Scientific Realism and Theoretical Entities
- Why should we believe theoretical entities like electrons are real?
- How do you respond to instrumentalism about scientific theories?
- What makes the scientific image more than just a useful tool for prediction?
- How does scientific realism fit with your Kantianism about categories?
- What's at stake for you in defending the reality of theoretical entities?
Converse with Wilfrid Sellars on Simposeum. Replies are grounded in Wilfrid Sellars's own writing, cited to the page.