Bernard Williams

1929-2003 · British · Ethics, Philosophy of Action, Political Philosophy, History of Philosophy

In ethics, reflection can destroy knowledge.

By the 1970s, analytical moral philosophy had settled into a confident contest between utilitarianism and Kantian deontology, and Bernard Williams spent his career dismantling both. Urbane, ironic, devastating in argument, he was widely regarded as the most important moral philosopher of his generation — fundamentally pessimistic about theoretical projects dominating the field.

Topics Bernard Williams addresses

  • the integrity objection
  • Jim and the Indians
  • George the chemist
  • the morality system
  • morality, the peculiar institution
  • thick concepts
  • thin concepts
  • internal vs external reasons
  • the subjective motivational set
  • sound deliberative route
  • moral luck
  • constitutive and circumstantial luck
  • the Gauguin case
  • one thought too many
  • agent-relative reasons
  • the categorical and the blame system
  • reflection can destroy knowledge
  • the radical contingency of the ethical
  • confidence rather than knowledge
  • the absolute conception of reality
  • truth and truthfulness
  • accuracy and sincerity
  • vindicatory genealogy
  • the State of Nature genealogy

Questions to put to Bernard Williams

The Integrity Objection and Utilitarianism

  • What exactly is the integrity objection to utilitarianism?
  • In the Jim and the Indians case, why isn't it obvious that Jim should shoot the one to save nineteen?
  • What's wrong with George the chemist taking the weapons research job if it prevents someone worse from getting it?
  • How is your critique different from just saying utilitarianism sometimes gives the wrong answer?
  • Can sophisticated consequentialism accommodate your worries about integrity and projects?

Morality, the Peculiar Institution

  • What do you mean by calling morality 'the peculiar institution'?
  • What's the difference between thick concepts like 'cruel' and thin concepts like 'wrong'?
  • How can reflection destroy knowledge?
  • Why do you think the modern morality system has crowded out richer ethical thought?
  • What would ethics look like if we escaped the morality system?

Internal Reasons and Motivation

  • What's the difference between internal and external reasons?
  • Why can't there be reasons for action that bind me regardless of what I actually want?
  • What counts as a sound deliberative route from my motivational set?
  • How is your view different from saying people only have reason to do what they already desire?
  • What's wrong with Kant's idea that pure reason alone can motivate action?

Moral Luck and Impartiality

  • How can morality depend on luck if we can't control what happens by luck?
  • In the Gauguin case, does whether he was justified really depend on whether his paintings turned out to be great?
  • What did you mean by 'one thought too many' in the drowning wife case?
  • Why is it wrong to justify saving my wife by appealing to a universal principle that permits partiality?
  • What kinds of luck affect moral evaluation?

Truth, Genealogy, and the Absolute Conception

  • What's the difference between accuracy and sincerity as virtues?
  • How can you vindicate truthfulness without grounding it in metaphysical truth?
  • What do you mean by the absolute conception of reality?
  • Why does science admit an absolute conception but ethics doesn't?
  • What's the difference between vindicatory and debunking genealogy?

Political Realism and the Basic Legitimation Demand

  • What's the difference between political realism and moralism in political philosophy?
  • What exactly is the Basic Legitimation Demand?
  • How is your view different from saying might makes right in politics?
  • What's wrong with Rawls's original position as a way of justifying political arrangements?
  • Can the Basic Legitimation Demand actually distinguish legitimate from illegitimate states?

Converse with Bernard Williams on Simposeum. Replies are grounded in Bernard Williams's own writing, cited to the page.