The Possible & the Necessary

Six thinkers on what could have been otherwise: the open future, possible worlds, rigid names, and whether other worlds are real.

A course on the thought of Metaphysics.

Course outline

  1. Tomorrow's Sea Battle and the Open Future — Aristotle argues that 'a sea battle will happen tomorrow or it will not' must be true, while neither half is true yet, so what we say today does not fix tomorrow.
  2. Truths of Reason and Truths of Fact — Leibniz divides truths into necessary ones, whose opposite contradicts itself, and contingent ones, whose reasons incline without forcing; van Inwagen asks whether a reason for every truth leaves any…
  3. Possible Worlds and the Best of All — Leibniz holds that God surveyed infinitely many possible worlds and made the best one real, and that the worlds he left unmade are what keep ours from being necessary.
  4. Is Necessity in the World, or in Us? — Kant argues that experience never shows that something must be so, and that geometry gives us truths that add to their concepts yet are known without experience.
  5. Names, Discovery and Necessity — Saul Kripke argues that a name picks out the same thing in every possible situation, so 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' could not have been false, even though astronomers had to find it out by looking.
  6. Are Possible Worlds Real Places? — David Lewis argues that every possible world is as real as ours, that 'actual' only means 'this one', and that the disbelief his view provokes is a price worth paying.
  7. Worlds Without the Worlds — Alvin Plantinga keeps possible worlds but makes them complete ways things might be, only one of which holds, and David Lewis replies that this leaves the word 'possible' unexplained.

Works read in this course

  • Aristotle, De Interpretatione 9 — future contingents, the sea-battle; necessity 'when it is'
  • Leibniz, Monadology / Theodicy — truths of reason vs fact; PSR; possible worlds; the best
  • Kant, Critique of Pure Reason — analytic/synthetic; a priori/a posteriori; the modal postulates
  • Kripke, Naming and Necessity (1980) — rigid designation; the necessary a posteriori; essentialism
  • D. Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds (1986) — modal realism; the incredulous stare; the case from utility
  • Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (1974) — worlds as states of affairs; transworld identity; the modal ontological argument

Terms introduced

necessity, possible world, principle of sufficient reason, rigid designator, modal realism

Part of the Simposeum course library.