Persons, Minds & Selves

From Descartes's certainty that he exists to Parfit's doubt that identity matters: nine thinkers on persons, minds and selves.

A course on the thought of Metaphysics.

Course outline

  1. Descartes: The One Thing Doubt Cannot Touch — René Descartes doubts everything a deceiver could falsify, finds that his own existence survives every doubt, and concludes that he is a thinking thing distinct from his body.
  2. Ryle: The Ghost in the Machine — Gilbert Ryle argues that Descartes' picture of a hidden mind steering a body is a category mistake: talk of a mind is talk of how a person does things, not of a second thing inside.
  3. Locke: What Makes You the Same Person — John Locke argues that you stay the same person because the same consciousness reaches back to your past deeds, not because you keep the same soul or the same matter, and that 'person' is a word for…
  4. Hume and Nāgārjuna: Looking for the Self — Hume looks inward and finds only perceptions, Nāgārjuna argues that the self has no being apart from what it depends on, and we weigh what giving up the self would cost.
  5. Nagel and Dennett: What It Is Like to Be a Bat — Thomas Nagel argues that every objective fact about a bat would still leave out what it is like to be one, and Daniel Dennett replies that research can tell us a great deal.
  6. Chalmers: The Hard Problem — David Chalmers separates explaining what the brain does from explaining why any of it is felt, and uses an imagined zombie twin to argue that the physical facts leave the facts of experience open.
  7. Parfit: Does Identity Matter? — Derek Parfit uses the teletransporter, a row of small surgical changes and a brain divided between two brothers to argue that what matters in survival is Relation R, not being the same person.
  8. The Self, Assembled and Set Aside — The course's pictures of the self are set side by side, each is shown to carry a mystery of its own, and the reader tests them on something they say about themselves.

Works read in this course

  • Descartes, Meditations — methodic doubt, the cogito, the real distinction of mind and body
  • Ryle, The Concept of Mind (1949) — the ghost in the machine; category mistake
  • Locke, Essay II.27 'Of Identity and Diversity' — person, consciousness, the prince and the cobbler
  • Hume, Treatise I.iv.6 'Of Personal Identity' — the bundle; no impression of a self
  • Nagarjuna, Mulamadhyamakakarika ch.18 — examination of self (atman); emptiness of the self
  • Nagel, 'What Is It Like to Be a Bat?' (1974) — the subjective character of experience
  • Chalmers, The Conscious Mind (1996) — the hard problem; zombies; the explanatory gap
  • Parfit, Reasons and Persons (1984) — reductionism; the teletransporter; identity is not what matters

Terms introduced

category mistake, physicalism, the hard problem, Relation R

Part of the Simposeum course library.