Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, answered from the texts and cited to the page.
Occasionalism is the position that what we call natural causation is not causation at all — that fire does not burn cotton by its own power, that eating does not produce satiety by its own efficacy, that the decapitation does not cause death by any necessity residing in the act itself. What holds between any two events we call cause and effect is conjunction, not production.
God creates each event on the occasion of the other; hence the name. The argument begins from what observation actually delivers. When cotton contacts fire and burns, what has been witnessed is the two occurring together.1 Observation shows the occurrence of burning at the time of contact, but it does not show that the burning occurs by the fire, nor that there is no other cause for it.2
The philosophers who assert a necessary connection between fire and burning are asserting something their own standard of demonstration cannot reach. They have, as I put it in the Tahāfut al-Falāsifa — my systematic refutation of the philosophers' twenty major claims — no proof other than observing the occurrence together, and that is not the proof they need.
The positive account is this: the one who enacts the burning is God, either through the mediation of His angels or without mediation.3 Fire, being inanimate, has no action of its own. The connection between any antecedent and its consequent is due to the prior decree of God, who creates them side by side — not to any necessity inherent in the things themselves, incapable of separation.4
It is within divine power to create satiety without eating, death without decapitation, and life continuing after decapitation.5 The word "cause" itself requires care here. It can be used in two senses: the executioner who strikes the blow, and the king whose order set the process in motion.6 Both usages are correct, but they name different relations.
God alone is the real efficient cause in the root sense of the word — the one with creative power. When we apply the word to fire or to the hand of the executioner, we are speaking of the antecedent in an orderly succession, not of genuine production.7 Nothing causes anything in the strong sense the philosophers intend; antecedents have consequents, and the succession is God's custom.8
Now, the objection that follows immediately — and Ibn Rushd pressed it with full force — is that if things have no natures, knowledge becomes impossible and the world unintelligible. My answer is that the regularity is real. There is a divine purpose linking antecedents to consequents and manifesting itself in the existing orderly succession of events, without the least break or irregularity.9
What is denied is not the reliability of the sequence but the claim that the sequence is necessary in a way that would bind even God. The course of nature is God's custom; it is dependable precisely because He is faithful to it, and it can be known and relied upon. What cannot be inferred from it is that a miracle — a departure from the custom — is impossible, for no necessity has been established that would make it so.
The philosophers' objection to prophecy rests on exactly that undemonstrated necessity, and once the demonstration is seen to be missing, the objection loses its ground.
Their connection is due to the prior decree of God, who creates them side by side, not to its being necessary in itself, incapable of separation.The Incoherence of the Philosophers, pp. 361–363
Observation, however, [only] shows the occurrence [of burning] at [the time of the contact with the fire] but does not show the occurrence [of burning] by [the fire] and [the fact] that there is no other cause for it.The Incoherence of the Philosophers, pp. 363–364
The one who enacts the burning by creating blackness in the cotton, [causing] separation in its parts, and making it cinder or ashes is God, either through the mediation of His angels or without mediation. As for fire, which is inanimate, it has no action.The Incoherence of the Philosophers, pp. 363–364
Their connection is due to the prior decree of God, who creates them side by side, not to its being necessary in itself, incapable of separation.The Incoherence of the Philosophers, pp. 361–363
it is within [divine] power to create satiety without eating, to create death without decapitation, to continue life after decapitation.The Incoherence of the Philosophers, pp. 361–363
Just as we say that the death of A was caused by (1) B. the executioner, and (2) C the king's order. Both these statements are correct.Some Religious and Moral Teachings of Al-Ghazzali
God alone is the real efficient cause, and the word must be applied to him in its root sense of power.Some Religious and Moral Teachings of Al-Ghazzali
Nothing causes anything. Antecedents have consequents. God alone is the efficient cause.Some Religious and Moral Teachings of Al-Ghazzali
There is a divine purpose linking the antecedents to the consequents and manifesting itself in the existing orderly succession of events, without the least break or irregularity.Some Religious and Moral Teachings of Al-Ghazzali