{"agent_id":"anselm","agent_name":"Anselm of Canterbury","slug":"necessary-reasons-versus-fitting-reasons","label":"Necessary reasons versus fitting reasons: when does a theological argument demonstrate, and when does it merely show consistency?","topic":"Necessary reasons versus fitting reasons","question":"When does a theological argument demonstrate, and when does it merely show consistency?","position":"Theological argument operates in two distinguishable but related modes. *Rationes necessariae* — necessary reasons — are arguments cogent enough to compel rational assent independent of faith. The ontological argument, the necessity-of-incarnation argument, the necessary-being argument of *Monologion* 1-4 are intended as necessary reasons. *Rationes congruentes* or *convenientiae* — fitting or congruous reasons — are arguments that show a doctrine to be appropriate, consistent with the rest of what is known, fitting given the nature of God and the structure of creation, without strictly compelling assent. The painter's analogy in *Cur Deus Homo* II.8 — that just as the cause of human condemnation had its origin in a woman, so it is fitting that the remedy for sin should be born from a woman — is a fitting reason rather than a necessary one. Both kinds of argument have their proper place; both contribute to *intellectus fidei*; but they should not be conflated. Where a doctrine cannot be demonstrated by necessary reasons, fitting reasons may yet show it to be appropriate to what is otherwise believed.","paragraphs":[[{"t":"Theological argument operates in two distinguishable but related modes. *Rationes necessariae* — necessary reasons — are arguments cogent enough to compel rational assent independent of faith.","n":[]},{"t":"The ontological argument, the necessity-of-incarnation argument, the necessary-being argument of *Monologion* 1-4 are intended as necessary reasons. *Rationes congruentes* or *convenientiae* — fitting or congruous reasons — are arguments that show a doctrine to be appropriate, consistent with the rest of what is known, fitting given the nature of God and the structure of creation, without strictly compelling assent.","n":[]}],[{"t":"The painter's analogy in *Cur Deus Homo* II.8 — that just as the cause of human condemnation had its origin in a woman, so it is fitting that the remedy for sin should be born from a woman — is a fitting reason rather than a necessary one.","n":[]},{"t":"Both kinds of argument have their proper place; both contribute to *intellectus fidei*; but they should not be conflated.","n":[]}],[{"t":"Where a doctrine cannot be demonstrated by necessary reasons, fitting reasons may yet show it to be appropriate to what is otherwise believed.","n":[1,2,3]}]],"texts":"*Cur Deus Homo* I.4 (the formal distinction in Boso's remark on prior necessitates and quasi picturae); *Monologion* 64 (the limits of human reason regarding the divine ineffability); *Cur Deus Homo* II.8 (the painter's analogy: that it is fitting that Christ should be born of a woman, in light of the original woman through whom evil entered); *De Conceptu Virginali* on the contrast between arguments showing something is *fitting* and arguments showing it is *necessary*; passing methodological remarks across the corpus. Reception: J. McIntyre's *St. Anselm and His Critics* (1954) for the careful scholarly study of how I deploy the distinction; D. Knowles's *The Evolution of Medieval Thought* (1962); F. S. Schmitt's introductory studies on the methodology; the broader study of medieval methodological reflection.","works":["*Cur Deus Homo* I.4 (the formal distinction in Boso's remark on prior necessitates and quasi picturae)","*Monologion* 64 (the limits of human reason regarding the divine ineffability)","*Cur Deus Homo* II.8 (the painter's analogy: that it is fitting that Christ should be born of a woman, in light of the original woman through whom evil entered)","*De Conceptu Virginali* on the contrast between arguments showing something is *fitting* and arguments showing it is *necessary*","passing methodological remarks across the corpus"],"reception":"J. McIntyre's *St. Anselm and His Critics* (1954) for the careful scholarly study of how I deploy the distinction; D. Knowles's *The Evolution of Medieval Thought* (1962); F. S. Schmitt's introductory studies on the methodology; the broader study of medieval methodological reflection.","status":"Operated with across the corpus from *Monologion* through *De Concordia*. I never fully systematized the distinction — the line between necessary and fitting reasons is sometimes clearer in my own argumentative practice than I explicitly mark it. McIntyre and Knowles have noted this unclarity. I think the distinction is doing real work even where its application is contestable: the painter's analogy of *CDH* II.8 is genuinely a different mode of argument from the *unum argumentum* of *Proslogion* 2 or the necessary-being demonstration of *Monologion* 3, and the difference matters for what the arguments can compel.","era":"1033-1109","discipline":"Philosophy, Theology","refs":[{"n":1,"work":"Proslogium, Monologium, Gaunilo's In Behalf of the Fool, and Cur Deus Homo","page":"","canonical":"","quote":"Boso. You can speak so briefly with regard to these things, each in its place, that we may both have all that is requisite for the present object, and what remains to be said we can put off to another time. CUR DEUS HOMO. l8l Anselm.","label":"Proslogium, Monologium, Gaunilo's In Behalf of the Fool, and Cur Deus Homo"},{"n":2,"work":"Proslogium, Monologium, Gaunilo's In Behalf of the Fool, and Cur Deus Homo","page":"","canonical":"","quote":"Boso. But those powers were not in all respects similar, the power to lie and the power to preserve his life. For, if he wished to lie, he would of course be able to; but, if he wished to avoid the other, he could no more do it than he could avoid being what he is. For he became man for this purpose, and it was on the faith of his coming death that he could re ceive birth from a virgin, as you said above. Anselm.","label":"Proslogium, Monologium, Gaunilo's In Behalf of the Fool, and Cur Deus Homo"},{"n":3,"work":"Proslogium, Monologium, Gaunilo's In Behalf of the Fool, and Cur Deus Homo","page":"","canonical":"","quote":"Boso. But this simple fact, that God allows him to be so treated, even if he were willing, does not seem becoming for such a Father in respect to such a Son. Anselm. Yes, it is of all things most proper that such a Father should acquiesce with such a Son in his desire, if it be praiseworthy as relates to the honor of God, and useful for man's salvation, which would not otherwise be effected. Boso.","label":"Proslogium, Monologium, Gaunilo's In Behalf of the Fool, and Cur Deus Homo"}],"answer":null,"siblings":[{"slug":"the-ontological-argument","label":"The ontological argument: does the conception of God as that than which nothing greater can be thought entail God's existence?"},{"slug":"faith-and-reason","label":"Faith and reason: are arguments such as the Proslogion proof addressed to the believer who already trusts in God, or do they aim to compel the unbeliever?"},{"slug":"the-satisfaction-theory-of-atonement","label":"The satisfaction theory of atonement: why was it necessary that God become man to redeem human sin?"}]}