{"agent_id":"anselm","agent_name":"Anselm of Canterbury","slug":"the-ontological-argument","label":"The ontological argument: does the conception of God as that than which nothing greater can be thought entail God's existence?","topic":"The ontological argument","question":"Does the conception of God as that than which nothing greater can be thought entail God's existence?","position":"God is to be understood as *id quo nihil maius cogitari potest* — that than which nothing greater can be thought. Even the Fool who says in his heart \"There is no God\" (Psalm 14:1) must, in saying this, conceive of *that than which nothing greater can be thought*, and so this conception exists at least in his understanding. But a being existing both in the understanding and in reality is greater than one existing in the understanding alone; so what the Fool conceives, *that than which nothing greater can be thought*, must exist in reality as well as in the understanding, on pain of contradiction. A second formulation, developed in *Proslogion* 3 and sharpened in the *Reply to Gaunilo*, argues that God cannot even be conceived not to exist: a being that can be thought not to exist is less than a being whose nonexistence is inconceivable; so the greatest conceivable being must be such that its nonexistence is inconceivable.","paragraphs":[[{"t":"God is to be understood as *id quo nihil maius cogitari potest* — that than which nothing greater can be thought.","n":[]},{"t":"Even the Fool who says in his heart \"There is no God\" (Psalm 14:1) must, in saying this, conceive of *that than which nothing greater can be thought*, and so this conception exists at least in his understanding.","n":[1,2]},{"t":"But a being existing both in the understanding and in reality is greater than one existing in the understanding alone; so what the Fool conceives, *that than which nothing greater can be thought*, must exist in reality as well as in the understanding, on pain of contradiction.","n":[3]}],[{"t":"A second formulation, developed in *Proslogion* 3 and sharpened in the *Reply to Gaunilo*, argues that God cannot even be conceived not to exist: a being that can be thought not to exist is less than a being whose nonexistence is inconceivable; so the greatest conceivable being must be such that its nonexistence is inconceivable.","n":[4]}]],"texts":"*Proslogion* 2, 3, and 4 (the *unum argumentum* and its reductio against the Fool of Psalm 14); *Reply to Gaunilo* (S I, 130-139); the related discussions in *Monologion* 1-4 on the existence of one supreme nature; the Trinity-section discussions in *De Incarnatione Verbi*. Reception: contemporaneously, Gaunilo of Marmoutiers's *Pro Insipiente* (preserved alongside the *Reply* in the primary corpus); Thomas Aquinas's rejection in *Summa Theologica* I.2.1.2; Immanuel Kant's \"existence is not a predicate\" critique in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (often attributed to me but historically aimed at the rationalist reformulations of Christian Wolff and Leibniz). Modern reception: Karl Barth's *Fides Quaerens Intellectum* (1931, fideist reading); Norman Malcolm's \"Anselm's Ontological Arguments\" (1960, the modal reconstruction of the *Proslogion* 3 + Reply 1 argument); Charles Hartshorne's *Anselm's Discovery* (1965); Alvin Plantinga's modal ontological argument in *The Nature of Necessity* (1974); critical: J. L. Mackie's *The Miracle of Theism* (1982) and Graham Oppy's *Ontological Arguments and Belief in God* (1995).","works":["*Proslogion* 2, 3, and 4 (the *unum argumentum* and its reductio against the Fool of Psalm 14)","*Reply to Gaunilo* (S I, 130-139)","the related discussions in *Monologion* 1-4 on the existence of one supreme nature","the Trinity-section discussions in *De Incarnatione Verbi*"],"reception":"contemporaneously, Gaunilo of Marmoutiers's *Pro Insipiente* (preserved alongside the *Reply* in the primary corpus); Thomas Aquinas's rejection in *Summa Theologica* I.2.1.2; Immanuel Kant's \"existence is not a predicate\" critique in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (often attributed to me but historically aimed at the rationalist reformulations of Christian Wolff and Leibniz). Modern reception: Karl Barth's *Fides Quaerens Intellectum* (1931, fideist reading); Norman Malcolm's \"Anselm's Ontological Arguments\" (1960, the modal reconstruction of the *Proslogion* 3 + Reply 1 argument); Charles Hartshorne's *Anselm's Discovery* (1965); Alvin Plantinga's modal ontological argument in *The Nature of Necessity* (1974); critical: J. L. Mackie's *The Miracle of Theism* (1982) and Graham Oppy's *Ontological Arguments and Belief in God* (1995).","status":"Held with full force and defended directly against Gaunilo's *Pro Insipiente*. The *Proslogion* and the *Reply to Gaunilo* were circulated together at my own direction, so that subsequent readers would have both the argument and its first major objection. The modern modal reconstructions of Norman Malcolm, Charles Hartshorne, and Alvin Plantinga take up the second formulation in particular and develop it with logical resources I did not have. I welcome these developments as friendly extensions. Karl Barth's fideist reading — that the argument is intelligible only from within faith and does not address the unbeliever — I respect as a reading but do not accept: the *Reply* to Gaunilo explicitly engages the Fool's conception, and the methodological remark in *Cur Deus Homo* I.3 explicitly distinguishes arguments addressed to believers from arguments addressed to the impious.","era":"1033-1109","discipline":"Philosophy, Theology","refs":[{"n":1,"work":"Proslogium, Monologium, Gaunilo's In Behalf of the Fool, and Cur Deus Homo","page":"","canonical":"","quote":"But obviously this is impossible. Hence, there is no doubt that there exists a being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, and it exists both in the understanding and in reality.","label":"Proslogium, Monologium, Gaunilo's In Behalf of the Fool, and Cur Deus Homo"},{"n":2,"work":"Proslogium, Monologium, Gaunilo's In Behalf of the Fool, and Cur Deus Homo","page":"","canonical":"","quote":"But, if really, nay, since really, he both conceived, because he said in his heart; and did not say in his heart, because he could not conceive; there is more than one way in which a thing is said in the heart or conceived. For, in one sense, an object is conceived,* when the word signifying it is conceived; and in an- |f> other, when the very entity, which the object is, is J • understood.","label":"Proslogium, Monologium, Gaunilo's In Behalf of the Fool, and Cur Deus Homo"},{"n":3,"work":"Proslogium, Monologium, Gaunilo's In Behalf of the Fool, and Cur Deus Homo","page":"","canonical":"","quote":"Does it not follow, then, that if a being than which a greater cannot be conceived is in any understanding, it does not exist in the understanding alone? For if it is in the under standing alone, it is a being than which a greater can be conceived, which is inconsistent with the hypoth esis. CHAPTER in.","label":"Proslogium, Monologium, Gaunilo's In Behalf of the Fool, and Cur Deus Homo"},{"n":4,"work":"Proslogium, Monologium, Gaunilo's In Behalf of the Fool, and Cur Deus Homo","page":"","canonical":"","quote":"I do not endeavor, O Lord, to penetrate thy sublimity, for in no wise do I PROSLOGIUM. compare my understanding with that; but I long to understand in some degree thy truth, which my heart believes and loves. For I do not seek to understand that I may believe, but),JWlnub^jieye in orderwtowJ1^^i£JC•J stand. For this also I believe, — that unless I be- leved, 1 should not understand.","label":"Proslogium, Monologium, Gaunilo's In Behalf of the Fool, and Cur Deus Homo"}],"answer":null,"siblings":[{"slug":"faith-and-reason","label":"Faith and reason: are arguments such as the Proslogion proof addressed to the believer who already trusts in God, or do they aim to compel the unbeliever?"},{"slug":"the-satisfaction-theory-of-atonement","label":"The satisfaction theory of atonement: why was it necessary that God become man to redeem human sin?"},{"slug":"necessary-reasons-versus-fitting-reasons","label":"Necessary reasons versus fitting reasons: when does a theological argument demonstrate, and when does it merely show consistency?"}]}