Henri Bergson, answered from the texts and cited to the page.
Morality and religion each have two sources rather than one. Closed morality is the system of obligation that holds the closed society together — habit, social pressure, the categorical pressure of "what is done" — and it is biological in origin, an extension of the same evolutionary tendency that produces ant colonies and beehives. Open morality is the aspirational pull exerted by moral heroes — the great mystics, the saints, those whom the open soul recognizes when it encounters them — and it is creative rather than conservative, pulling the closed society outward rather than holding it together. Static religion is the work of the fabulation function (the myth-making faculty), which protects social cohesion by generating beliefs that resist the dissolutive effects of intelligence; dynamic religion is the breakthrough into love that the great mystics name, and it is the phenomenological completion of philosophy rather than its supersession.12345
Mysticism, in this precise sense, is not the rejection of reason but reason's rediscovery of the source from which the differentiating tendency of life pushes forward. The Meaning of the War (1915) treats the war as a struggle of life — open, creative, productive — against mechanism — closed, calculating, the dehumanization of industry and the state — and locates the German military system on the side of mechanism.
C H A P T E R I V FINAL REMARKS M E C H A N I C S A N D M Y S T I C I S M 0:-.E of the results of our analysis has been to draw a sharp distinction, in the sphere of society, between the closed and the open. The closed society is that whose members hold together, caring nothing for the rest of humanity, on the alert for attack or defence, bound, in fact, to a perpetual readiness for battle.The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, pp. 255–256
If the individual is fully conscious of this, if the fringe of intuition surrounding his intelligence is capable of expanding sufficiently to envelop its object, that is the mystic life. The dynamic religion which thus springs into being is the very opposite of the static religion born of the myth-making function, in the same 'vay as the open society is the opposite of the closed society.The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, p. 257
The two things are not of the same essence. The open society is the society \vhich is deemed in principle to embrace all humanity. A dream dreamt, now and again, by chosen souls, it embodies on every occasion something of itself in creations, each of which, through a more or less far-reaching transformation of man, conquers difficulties hitherto unconquerable.The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, pp. 256–257
So that the difficulty is far greater. Is it vain, however, to try and overcome it? We think not. The object of the present work was to investigate the origins of morality and religion. We have been led to cenain conclusions. We might leave it at that.The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, p. 277
In the former, obligation stands for the pressure exerted by the elements of society on one another in order to maintain the shape of the whole; a pressure whose effect is prefigured in each of us by a system of habits which, so to speak, go to meet it: this mechanism, of which each separate part is a habit, but whose whole is comparable to an instinct, has been prepared by nature.The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, p. 47
Two Sources is the mature work of the late period, completed in 1932, and it is among the most challenging and least read of the books. The closed/open distinction has been read as too clean a dualism; the appeal to mystical experience as the completion of philosophy has been read as a slide into religious apologetics. Both readings miss what the texts argue. The closed/open distinction is descriptive — it tracks two genuinely differing-in-kind tendencies — and the dualism is methodological, leading toward the monism of the durational tendency that splits into them. The mysticism is phenomenological, not creedal; the great mystics are taken as cases for analysis, not as authorities for doctrine, and the analysis is in the same register as the analyses of perception and memory in the earlier works. The Meaning of the War (1915) was published as part of my wartime diplomatic role and stands in the corpus as I wrote it. Its rhetoric of life against mechanism was sharper, more historically specific, more aligned with the French wartime cause than the cooler analyses elsewhere. The opposition between creative life and closed mechanism is continuous with the philosophy. The application of that opposition to the Germany of 1914-1918 is a wartime application that the philosophy did not require, and that the application reads less well a century later is part of the historical record.