Boethius, answered from the texts and cited to the page.
God's foreknowledge is not a temporal relation. The prisoner's worry — that if God knows what I will do tomorrow, my doing it tomorrow is fixed in advance, and therefore I do not really have freedom about it — confuses two different relations: the temporal relation of past and future, and the cognitive relation of knower and known.1 God exists in eternity, which is not the same as everlasting temporal duration.
Eternity (aeternitas) is the whole, simultaneous, and perfect possession of unlimited life. From eternity, all times — past, present, and future from our temporal perspective — are present at once. God does not know what is for us future before it happens; God knows it from a standpoint where there is no "before" in the relevant sense. Just as my present knowledge of what you are doing now does not constrain your present action — you are doing it freely, and I know it freely — God's eternal knowledge of what you will do tomorrow does not constrain your tomorrow.
The eternity solution dissolves the problem rather than resolving it within the temporal framework. The further question — whether God's knowledge constitutes necessity in some other sense — receives the answer that conditional necessity is compatible with simple contingency: it is necessary that God's knowledge accord with what happens, but what happens happens freely, and God's knowledge tracks rather than determines.2345
In like manner, if providence seeth anything present, that must needs be, although it hath no necessity of nature. But God beholdeth those future things, which proceed from free-will, present. These things, therefore, being referred to the divine sight are necessary by the condition of the divine knowledge, and, considered by themselves, they lose not absolute freedom of their own nature.Consolation of Philosophy and Theological Tractates
Whatever Boethius' interpretation of 'definitely true', it was different from that of Ammonius, and this is not the only aspect of the reply to determinism on which they differed. Ammonius, though familiar with Porphyry, made most use of a later source, his teacher Proclus, and therefore of Iamblichus, who influenced Proclus.On Aristotle's De Interpretatione 1-3, p. 10
Why, therefore, wilt thou have those things necessary which are illustrated by the divine light, since that not even men make not those things necessary which they see?Consolation of Philosophy and Theological Tractates
Whom, since he only vieweth all, You rightly the true Sun may call." III. euenire prouisa codd. meliores. III. Then I complained that I was now in a greater confusion and more doubtful difficulty than before.Consolation of Philosophy and Theological Tractates
For if any man sitteth the opinion which thinketh so must needs be true, and again on the other side, if the opinion that one sitteth be true, he must needs sit. Wherefore, there is necessity in both, in the one of sitting and in the other of truth. But one sitteth not because the opinion is true, but rather this is true because one hath taken his seat.Consolation of Philosophy and Theological Tractates
Consolation V.6 contains the foundational treatment of the prescience problem in Western philosophy. The eternity solution was developed by Aquinas (Summa Theologiae I.14.13) and Anselm and became the standard medieval position. Stump and Kretzmann's 'Eternity' (1981) defends a sophisticated version against contemporary objections; Zagzebski's Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge (1991) presses for refinement; Plantinga's middle knowledge offers a different solution. The timelessness-vs-everlastingness debate runs through contemporary philosophy of religion and engages the Boethian framework directly.