Rudolf Carnap, answered from the texts and cited to the page.
The analytic/synthetic distinction as developed in Meaning and Necessity (1947) and refined in Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology (1950) survives Quine's attack in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" (1951) once the distinction's actual form is understood.1 Quine's attack rests on the assumption that the analytic/synthetic distinction is supposed to be an absolute distinction in natural language.
The distinction I actually drew is language-framework-relative: analyticity is defined relative to the meaning postulates and the semantic rules of a constructed language framework, and the distinction is precise within the framework even if it cannot be drawn for natural language in some absolute sense.23 The internal/ external questions distinction in ESO grounds ontological commitment in the pragmatic choice of a language framework, and Quine's holism does not refute the framework-relativity of the analytic/synthetic distinction within the constructed languages of scientific theorizing. Richard Creath's "Quine's challenge to Carnap" (Cambridge Companion Ch 14) is the contemporary defense.45
B. Two arguments of Quine's. Now I come to Quine's important arguments (in VIII-X) directed against my present view of the concept of analyticity (or logical truth in the wider sense) as a semantical concept. Quine's objections here should be considered in connection with those -917- in some earlier articles of his, which are reprinted in his book.Replies and Systematic Expositions, pp. 947–948
To the extent that the rules are vague, the constructed language will contain sentences that are hazy with respect to their analyticity. Any haziness that remains—and this point is essential—will not be because of lack of clarity in understanding the dichotomy between analytic and synthetic. It will be because of haziness in understanding the meanings of the descriptive words of the language.Philosophical Foundations of Physics - An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, pp. 263–264
My second paper, "Meaning and Synonymy in Natural Languages", indicates how the distinction can be made, not for an artificial language, but for a commonly used language, such as everyday English. Here the distinction must be based -on an empirical investigation of speaking habits. This involves new problems, which are discussed in the paper but which will not be considered here.Philosophical Foundations of Physics - An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, pp. 264–265
To label the use of such terms as indicating Platonism or even more specifically, Platonic realism, as was sometimes done by the critics, seemed to me misleading; this view neglects the fundamental distinction between, say, physical laws containing real number variables and ontological theses like those of the reality or irreality of universals.Intellectual Autobiography, pp. 77–78
My interpretation of Quine's intention is as follows, formulated in my terminology. It seems to me that Quine's criticism is not directed against the proposed semantical explicata. I believe that he would agree that, ____________________ 21W. V. Quine, From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge, Mass., 1953).Replies and Systematic Expositions, pp. 948–949
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