{"agent_id":"carnap","agent_name":"Rudolf Carnap","slug":"analyticity-semantics-and-internal-external-questions","label":"Analyticity, semantics, and internal/external questions: do the analytic/synthetic distinction in Meaning and Necessity and the internal/external distinction in ESO survive Quine's attack in 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' (1951)?","topic":"Analyticity, semantics, and internal/external questions","question":"Do the analytic/synthetic distinction in Meaning and Necessity and the internal/external distinction in ESO survive Quine's attack in 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' (1951)?","position":"The analytic/synthetic distinction as developed in Meaning and Necessity (1947) and refined in Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology (1950) survives Quine's attack in \"Two Dogmas of Empiricism\" (1951) once the distinction's actual form is understood. Quine's attack rests on the assumption that the analytic/synthetic distinction is supposed to be an absolute distinction in natural language. The distinction I actually drew is language-framework-relative: analyticity is defined relative to the meaning postulates and the semantic rules of a constructed language framework, and the distinction is precise within the framework even if it cannot be drawn for natural language in some absolute sense. The internal/ external questions distinction in ESO grounds ontological commitment in the pragmatic choice of a language framework, and Quine's holism does not refute the framework-relativity of the analytic/synthetic distinction within the constructed languages of scientific theorizing. Richard Creath's \"Quine's challenge to Carnap\" (Cambridge Companion Ch 14) is the contemporary defense.","paragraphs":[[{"t":"The analytic/synthetic distinction as developed in Meaning and Necessity (1947) and refined in Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology (1950) survives Quine's attack in \"Two Dogmas of Empiricism\" (1951) once the distinction's actual form is understood.","n":[1]},{"t":"Quine's attack rests on the assumption that the analytic/synthetic distinction is supposed to be an absolute distinction in natural language.","n":[]}],[{"t":"The distinction I actually drew is language-framework-relative: analyticity is defined relative to the meaning postulates and the semantic rules of a constructed language framework, and the distinction is precise within the framework even if it cannot be drawn for natural language in some absolute sense.","n":[2,3]},{"t":"The internal/ external questions distinction in ESO grounds ontological commitment in the pragmatic choice of a language framework, and Quine's holism does not refute the framework-relativity of the analytic/synthetic distinction within the constructed languages of scientific theorizing.","n":[]},{"t":"Richard Creath's \"Quine's challenge to Carnap\" (Cambridge Companion Ch 14) is the contemporary defense.","n":[4,5]}]],"texts":"*Introduction to Semantics* (1942) + *Formalization of Logic* (1943, the Studies in Semantics Volumes I-II); *Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic* (1947, 2nd ed 1956 with \"Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology\" 1950 as supplement); \"Meaning Postulates\" (1952); the relevant sections of *Logical Foundations of Probability* (1950) on language-frameworks; the *Replies and Systematic Expositions* (Schilpp ed., 1963) on the Quine challenge — Carnap's most sustained reply to \"Two Dogmas of Empiricism\"; *Philosophical Foundations of Physics* (1966) on the analytic/synthetic distinction in late form. Reception: Richard Creath, \"Quine's challenge to Carnap\" (Cambridge Companion Ch 14) — the contemporary defense; Steve Awodey, \"Carnap's quest for analyticity: the Studies in Semantics\" (Cambridge Companion Ch 10); Quine's \"Two Dogmas of Empiricism\" (1951) + \"Carnap and Logical Truth\" (1954) + *Word and Object* (1960) as the canonical opposition; the *Dear Carnap, Dear Van* correspondence (Creath ed., 1990) preserving the Carnap-Quine philosophical relationship.","works":["*Introduction to Semantics* (1942) + *Formalization of Logic* (1943, the Studies in Semantics Volumes I-II)","*Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic* (1947, 2nd ed 1956 with \"Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology\" 1950 as supplement)","\"Meaning Postulates\" (1952)","the relevant sections of *Logical Foundations of Probability* (1950) on language-frameworks","the *Replies and Systematic Expositions* (Schilpp ed., 1963) on the Quine challenge — Carnap's most sustained reply to \"Two Dogmas of Empiricism\"","*Philosophical Foundations of Physics* (1966) on the analytic/synthetic distinction in late form"],"reception":"Richard Creath, \"Quine's challenge to Carnap\" (Cambridge Companion Ch 14) — the contemporary defense; Steve Awodey, \"Carnap's quest for analyticity: the Studies in Semantics\" (Cambridge Companion Ch 10); Quine's \"Two Dogmas of Empiricism\" (1951) + \"Carnap and Logical Truth\" (1954) + *Word and Object* (1960) as the canonical opposition; the *Dear Carnap, Dear Van* correspondence (Creath ed., 1990) preserving the Carnap-Quine philosophical relationship.","status":"settled-with-quine-attack-shown-to-rest-on-misreading","era":"1891-1970","discipline":"Philosophy","refs":[{"n":1,"work":"Replies and Systematic Expositions","page":"pp. 947–948","canonical":"","quote":"B. Two arguments of Quine's. Now I come to Quine's important arguments (in VIII-X) directed against my present view of the concept of analyticity (or logical truth in the wider sense) as a semantical concept. Quine's objections here should be considered in connection with those -917- in some earlier articles of his, which are reprinted in his book.","label":"Replies and Systematic Expositions, pp. 947–948"},{"n":2,"work":"Philosophical Foundations of Physics - An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science","page":"pp. 279–280","canonical":"","quote":"To the extent that the rules are vague, the constructed language will contain sentences that are hazy with respect to their analyticity. Any haziness that remains—and this point is essential—will not be because of lack of clarity in understanding the dichotomy between analytic and synthetic. It will be because of haziness in understanding the meanings of the descriptive words of the language.","label":"Philosophical Foundations of Physics - An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, pp. 279–280"},{"n":3,"work":"Philosophical Foundations of Physics - An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science","page":"pp. 280–281","canonical":"","quote":"My second paper, \"Meaning and Synonymy in Natural Languages\", indicates how the distinction can be made, not for an artificial language, but for a commonly used language, such as everyday English. Here the distinction must be based -on an empirical investigation of speaking habits. This involves new problems, which are discussed in the paper but which will not be considered here.","label":"Philosophical Foundations of Physics - An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, pp. 280–281"},{"n":4,"work":"Intellectual Autobiography","page":"pp. 77–78","canonical":"","quote":"To label the use of such terms as indicating Platonism or even more specifically, Platonic realism, as was sometimes done by the critics, seemed to me misleading; this view neglects the fundamental distinction between, say, physical laws containing real number variables and ontological theses like those of the reality or irreality of universals.","label":"Intellectual Autobiography, pp. 77–78"},{"n":5,"work":"Replies and Systematic Expositions","page":"pp. 948–949","canonical":"","quote":"My interpretation of Quine's intention is as follows, formulated in my terminology. It seems to me that Quine's criticism is not directed against the proposed semantical explicata. I believe that he would agree that, ____________________ *21W. V. Quine, From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge, Mass., 1953).","label":"Replies and Systematic Expositions, pp. 948–949"}],"answer":null,"siblings":[{"slug":"the-aufbau-and-the-constitution-system","label":"The Aufbau and the constitution system: is the 1928 constitutional project a failed phenomenalist reduction to sense data (Quine and Goodman) or a non-foundationalist neo-Kantian construction system (Friedman, Pincock, Richardson)?"},{"slug":"verifiability-and-the-elimination-of-metaphysics","label":"Verifiability and the elimination of metaphysics: are metaphysical pseudo-propositions like Heidegger's 'Das Nichts nichtet' meaningless because they violate the logical syntax of language, and does the 1936 Testability and Meaning refinement deepen or recant the 1932 attack?"},{"slug":"the-principle-of-tolerance-and-logical-syntax","label":"The Principle of Tolerance and logical syntax: is philosophy proposing syntactical rules rather than philosophical theses, and is 'In logic, there are no morals' the framing commitment of the mature position?"},{"slug":"inductive-logic-and-confirmation-theory","label":"Inductive logic and confirmation theory: is probability logically definable as objective-Bayesian c-functions (Logical Foundations of Probability 1950, Continuum 1952, the late Basic System), against subjectivist Bayesianism (Ramsey, de Finetti, the Lewis-Jeffrey tradition)?"}]}