Naturalistic dualism and type-F monism: what is the right positive view about the place of consciousness in nature?

David Chalmers, answered from the texts and cited to the page.

The position in brief

The taxonomy of options after the hard problem is well-defined. Type-A materialism (Dennett, Churchland, Frankish) denies the hard problem and treats consciousness as fully explained by cognitive function. Type-B materialism (Stoljar, Loar, the phenomenal- concept strategy) accepts the hard problem but argues that physicalism survives via a-posteriori identities. Type-C materialism holds that some future extension of the physical will explain consciousness. Type-D dualism is interactionist substance dualism. Type-E dualism is epiphenomenalism — phenomenal properties are real but causally inert. Type-F monism (Russellian monism, panpsychism, panprotopsychism) holds that the intrinsic properties of physical entities are themselves phenomenal or proto-phenomenal, and that consciousness is fundamental and ubiquitous in some form.1234

My default position has been a form of naturalistic dualism — property dualism with phenomenal properties as fundamental natural properties alongside mass, charge, and space-time, governed by psychophysical laws to be discovered. I have become increasingly attracted to type-F monism, in parallel with Galen Strawson and Philip Goff: if the physical sciences describe only the relational and structural properties of matter and leave the intrinsic nature open, and if phenomenal properties are the natural candidates to fill that intrinsic-nature role, then panpsychism or panprotopsychism is no extra ontological cost and may be the most parsimonious non- physicalist option. The choice between type-D, type-E, and type-F is open inquiry; type-A, B, and C are, in my view, mistaken.5

Sources

  1. So in the end, there is no separate space for the type-C materialist. 8. Interlude Are there any other options for the materialist? One further option is to reject the distinctions on which this taxonomy rests.
    Consciousness and Its Place in Nature, p. 124
  2. Another accepts that there is a distinctive phenomenon that generates a distinctive hard problem that goes beyond the easy problems but argues that it can be accommodated within a materialist framework all the same. To a fi rst approximation, the fi rst sort of view corresponds to what I call type-A materialism in chapter 5, while the second sort corresponds to type-B and type-C materialism.
    Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness, p. 29
  3. The central type-B view has never received a definitive statement, but the closest thing to such a statement is given by Levine (1983, 1993) and Loar (1990). Others who appear to endorse physicalism without logical supervenience include Byrne (1993), Flanagan (1992), Hill (1991), Horgan (1984b), Lycan (1995), Papineau (1993), Tye (1995), and van Gulick (1992).
    The Conscious Mind, pp. 136–137
  4. Either way, it is asserted that there is no interesting fact about the mind, conceptually distinct from the functional facts, that needs to be accommodated in our theories. Once we have explained how the functions are performed, that is that.
    Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness, pp. 25–26
  5. But I think these difficulties are solvable; and in any case, to deny the problem because of the difficulties has the flavour of solution by decree. So while I think such arguments need to be taken very seriously, they do little to actually remove the problem.
    Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness, pp. 32–33

Where the argument is made

  • The Conscious Mind (1996) Chapters 4-5 (naturalistic dualism)
  • 'Consciousness and Its Place in Nature' (in Stich & Warfield eds. Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind 2003, reprinted as The Character of Consciousness Chapter 5 and as the lead essay in the 2010 volume)
  • 'The Combination Problem for Panpsychism' (in Brüntrup & Jaskolla eds. Panpsychism: Contemporary Perspectives 2017)
  • 'Idealism and the Mind-Body Problem' (in Seager ed. The Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism 2019)

How the argument was received

The type-A/B/C/D/E/F taxonomy from "Consciousness and Its Place in Nature" (2003) has structured the field's discussion of positive views. The contemporary Russellian monist revival — Strawson's "Realistic Monism" (2006), Goff's Galileo's Error (2019), Coleman, Mørch, Seager — treats type-F as a serious live option distinct from both physicalism and dualism. The combination problem (how do micro-phenomenal properties combine into macro- phenomenal subjects?) is the central open challenge for panpsychism. Naturalistic dualism is still defended in various forms but with less momentum than type-F monism. Type-D substance dualism has few contemporary defenders; type-E epiphenomenalism remains marginal. The debate is live.