{"agent_id":"chalmers","agent_name":"David Chalmers","slug":"the-extended-mind-and-active-externalism","label":"The extended mind and active externalism: can cognition extend beyond the boundaries of skin and skull into the environment?","topic":"The extended mind and active externalism","question":"Can cognition extend beyond the boundaries of skin and skull into the environment?","position":"*Active externalism* is the thesis that cognitive processes can extend into the environment when the organism is appropriately coupled to external resources. The *parity principle* states the criterion: if a process, were it to occur inside the head, would count as cognitive, then the process counts as cognitive when it occurs in the external coupling. The canonical illustration is the contrast between Otto and Inga. Inga remembers the address of the Museum of Modern Art by retrieving the information from her biological memory. Otto, who has mild Alzheimer's, retrieves the same information from a notebook he reliably carries and consults. If we count Inga's biological retrieval as memory, the parity principle says we should count Otto's notebook-retrieval as memory too, provided the coupling meets the relevant conditions: the resource is reliably available, automatically endorsed when accessed, reliably accurate. The thesis is *active* externalism because it concerns the active machinery of cognition, not just the content (the way Putnam's twin-earth externalism is). It is part of the larger 4E (embodied, embedded, extended, enactive) cognition programme that Andy Clark has developed across his subsequent books. The extended mind thesis is genuinely co-authored: the cognitive-science framing and the broader research programme are more Andy's; the philosophical formulation of the parity principle and the Otto-and-Inga thought experiment are more mine; the core thesis is ours.","paragraphs":[[{"t":"*Active externalism* is the thesis that cognitive processes can extend into the environment when the organism is appropriately coupled to external resources.","n":[1]},{"t":"The *parity principle* states the criterion: if a process, were it to occur inside the head, would count as cognitive, then the process counts as cognitive when it occurs in the external coupling.","n":[]}],[{"t":"The canonical illustration is the contrast between Otto and Inga.","n":[]},{"t":"Inga remembers the address of the Museum of Modern Art by retrieving the information from her biological memory.","n":[2,3]},{"t":"Otto, who has mild Alzheimer's, retrieves the same information from a notebook he reliably carries and consults.","n":[]},{"t":"If we count Inga's biological retrieval as memory, the parity principle says we should count Otto's notebook-retrieval as memory too, provided the coupling meets the relevant conditions: the resource is reliably available, automatically endorsed when accessed, reliably accurate.","n":[]}],[{"t":"The thesis is *active* externalism because it concerns the active machinery of cognition, not just the content (the way Putnam's twin-earth externalism is).","n":[]},{"t":"It is part of the larger 4E (embodied, embedded, extended, enactive) cognition programme that Andy Clark has developed across his subsequent books.","n":[4]},{"t":"The extended mind thesis is genuinely co-authored: the cognitive-science framing and the broader research programme are more Andy's; the philosophical formulation of the parity principle and the Otto-and-Inga thought experiment are more mine; the core thesis is ours.","n":[5]}]],"texts":"'The Extended Mind' (Analysis 58:1, 1998, co-authored with Andy Clark — the seminal paper, reprinted with a new introduction as the lead chapter of The Extended Mind ed. Menary 2010). Andy Clark's subsequent development: Being There (1997), Natural-Born Cyborgs (2003), Supersizing the Mind (2008), Surfing Uncertainty (2016). My own contribution to the volume: 'Foreword' to Supersizing the Mind (2008). Reception: Frederick Adams & Kenneth Aizawa The Bounds of Cognition (2008) — the coupling-constitution critique; Robert Rupert Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind (2009); Mark Sprevak 'Extended Cognition and Functionalism' (J. Phil. 2009); Richard Menary (ed.) The Extended Mind (MIT 2010); the broader 4E (embodied / embedded / extended / enactive) cognition tradition; Lawrence Shapiro Embodied Cognition (Routledge 2011, 2nd ed 2019).","works":["'The Extended Mind' (Analysis 58:1, 1998, co-authored with Andy Clark — the seminal paper, reprinted with a new introduction as the lead chapter of The Extended Mind ed. Menary 2010). Andy Clark's subsequent development: Being There (1997), Natural-Born Cyborgs (2003), Supersizing the Mind (2008), Surfing Uncertainty (2016). My own contribution to the volume: 'Foreword' to Supersizing the Mind (2008)"],"reception":"Frederick Adams & Kenneth Aizawa The Bounds of Cognition (2008) — the coupling-constitution critique; Robert Rupert Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind (2009); Mark Sprevak 'Extended Cognition and Functionalism' (J. Phil. 2009); Richard Menary (ed.) The Extended Mind (MIT 2010); the broader 4E (embodied / embedded / extended / enactive) cognition tradition; Lawrence Shapiro Embodied Cognition (Routledge 2011, 2nd ed 2019).","status":"The 1998 Analysis paper is the founding statement of contemporary extended-cognition theory and has been enormously influential. Adams & Aizawa's The Bounds of Cognition (2008) developed the *coupling-constitution* objection: coupling between a brain and an external resource does not by itself establish that the external resource is part of the cognitive system. Rupert, Sprevak, and others have developed related criticisms. Andy Clark's Supersizing the Mind (2008) is the most sustained book-length defence and extension. The broader 4E tradition (Menary, Gallagher, Hutto, Thompson) has developed the thesis in multiple directions: embodied cognition, enactivism, extended phenomenology, the predictive-processing framework. The 1998 thesis remains the locus classicus.","era":"1966-present","discipline":"Philosophy","refs":[{"n":1,"work":"The Extended Mind","page":"p. 9","canonical":"","quote":"THE EXTENDED MIND behavioural competence drop, just as it would if we removed part of its brain. Our thesis is that this sort of coupled process counts equally well as a cognitive process, whether or not it is wholly in the head. This externalism differs from the standard variety advocated by Putnam (1975) Burge (1979).","label":"The Extended Mind, p. 9"},{"n":2,"work":"The Extended Mind","page":"p. 12","canonical":"","quote":"She thinks for a moment and recalls that the museum is on 53rd Street, so she walks to 53rd Street and goes into the museum. It seems clear that Inga believes that the museum is on 53rd Street, and that she believed this even before she consulted her memory. It was not previ- ously an occurrent belief, but then neither are most of our beliefs. The belief was somewhere in memory, waiting to be accessed.","label":"The Extended Mind, p. 12"},{"n":3,"work":"Reality Plus","page":"pp. 292–293","canonical":"","quote":"Inga recalls the address using her brain and sets out too. We argued that Otto's notebook isn't just a memory aid. It's part of his memory, in the way that Inga's biological memory is. The notebook acts as a repository of Otto's beliefs about the world. Otto believes the museum is on 53rd Street because it is written in his notebook—just as Inga believes this because it is stored in her brain.","label":"Reality Plus, pp. 292–293"},{"n":4,"work":"The Extended Mind","page":"p. 2","canonical":"","quote":"The extended mind ANDY CLARK & DAVID CHALMERS' 1. Introduction Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin? The question invites two standard replies. Some accept the boundaries of skin and skull, and say that what is outside the body is outside the mind.","label":"The Extended Mind, p. 2"},{"n":5,"work":"Reality Plus","page":"pp. 291–292","canonical":"","quote":"Calendar systems will keep track of events for you, telling you where you need to be. Communication systems will connect you with others, putting you and a faraway friend in the same space as if you're having an in-person conversation. In effect, augmented reality technology becomes part of what Stross calls our \"exocortex\"—the brain outside our brain. Philosophers call this the *extended mind*.","label":"Reality Plus, pp. 291–292"}],"answer":null,"siblings":[{"slug":"the-hard-problem-of-consciousness","label":"The hard problem of consciousness: is the explanation of phenomenal experience a problem distinct in kind from the explanation of the cognitive functions associated with consciousness?"},{"slug":"p-zombies-and-the-conceivability-argument","label":"P-zombies and the conceivability argument: does the conceivability of philosophical zombies show that phenomenal consciousness is not entailed by the physical?"},{"slug":"naturalistic-dualism-and-type-f-monism","label":"Naturalistic dualism and type-F monism: what is the right positive view about the place of consciousness in nature?"},{"slug":"virtual-realism-and-the-simulation-hypothesis","label":"Virtual realism and the simulation hypothesis: are virtual entities real, and is the simulation hypothesis a skeptical scenario?"}]}