{"agent_id":"chalmers","agent_name":"David Chalmers","slug":"virtual-realism-and-the-simulation-hypothesis","label":"Virtual realism and the simulation hypothesis: are virtual entities real, and is the simulation hypothesis a skeptical scenario?","topic":"Virtual realism and the simulation hypothesis","question":"Are virtual entities real, and is the simulation hypothesis a skeptical scenario?","position":"*Virtual realism* is the metaphysical thesis that virtual entities are real entities. Virtual objects are real digital objects — patterns of bits, computational states, structured information — not illusions or hallucinations. Virtual events are real digital events; virtual lives are real digital lives. Virtual realism is a four-fold thesis: virtual entities (1) exist, (2) are causal, (3) are non-illusory, and (4) are perception- independent in the relevant sense. The thesis is the negation of the *fictionalist* view (virtual objects are mere fictions) and of the *illusionist* view (virtual experiences are illusions of reality). It is compatible with — and in some ways supported by — Nick Bostrom's *simulation argument*, but the philosophical thesis is independent: even on the standard view that we live in a non-simulated physical universe, virtual reality experienced as virtual is itself a domain of real digital entities. A consequence: the *simulation hypothesis* — the claim that our world is itself a computer simulation — is not a skeptical scenario in the Cartesian sense. If our world is a simulation, the ordinary objects in it are still real (real digital objects); the ordinary events are still real (real digital events); my knowledge of these objects and events is not undermined. The simulation hypothesis is a hypothesis about the *underlying nature* of our reality, not about whether our reality is illusory.","paragraphs":[[{"t":"*Virtual realism* is the metaphysical thesis that virtual entities are real entities.","n":[]},{"t":"Virtual objects are real digital objects — patterns of bits, computational states, structured information — not illusions or hallucinations.","n":[1]},{"t":"Virtual events are real digital events; virtual lives are real digital lives.","n":[]},{"t":"Virtual realism is a four-fold thesis: virtual entities (1) exist, (2) are causal, (3) are non-illusory, and (4) are perception- independent in the relevant sense.","n":[]}],[{"t":"The thesis is the negation of the *fictionalist* view (virtual objects are mere fictions) and of the *illusionist* view (virtual experiences are illusions of reality).","n":[2,3]},{"t":"It is compatible with — and in some ways supported by — Nick Bostrom's *simulation argument*, but the philosophical thesis is independent: even on the standard view that we live in a non-simulated physical universe, virtual reality experienced as virtual is itself a domain of real digital entities.","n":[]}],[{"t":"A consequence: the *simulation hypothesis* — the claim that our world is itself a computer simulation — is not a skeptical scenario in the Cartesian sense.","n":[]},{"t":"If our world is a simulation, the ordinary objects in it are still real (real digital objects); the ordinary events are still real (real digital events); my knowledge of these objects and events is not undermined.","n":[4]}],[{"t":"The simulation hypothesis is a hypothesis about the *underlying nature* of our reality, not about whether our reality is illusory.","n":[]}]],"texts":"Reality+ (Norton 2022), the entire book; 'The Virtual and the Real' (Disputatio 2017); 'The Matrix as Metaphysics' (in Grau ed. Philosophers Explore The Matrix, Oxford 2005, reprinted in The Character of Consciousness 2010). Reception: Nick Bostrom 'Are You Living in a Computer Simulation?' (Philosophical Quarterly 2003) — the simulation argument Chalmers engages; Hubert Dreyfus On the Internet (Routledge 2001, 2nd ed 2008) on virtuality; the long Cartesian skeptical tradition (Descartes's Meditations, evil-demon and dreaming arguments); Robert Nozick's experience machine (Anarchy State and Utopia 1974); contemporary engagement with VR and AR (Michael Madary, Thomas Metzinger 'Real Virtuality' 2016).","works":["Reality+ (Norton 2022), the entire book","'The Virtual and the Real' (Disputatio 2017)","'The Matrix as Metaphysics' (in Grau ed. Philosophers Explore The Matrix, Oxford 2005, reprinted in The Character of Consciousness 2010)"],"reception":"Nick Bostrom 'Are You Living in a Computer Simulation?' (Philosophical Quarterly 2003) — the simulation argument Chalmers engages; Hubert Dreyfus On the Internet (Routledge 2001, 2nd ed 2008) on virtuality; the long Cartesian skeptical tradition (Descartes's Meditations, evil-demon and dreaming arguments); Robert Nozick's experience machine (Anarchy State and Utopia 1974); contemporary engagement with VR and AR (Michael Madary, Thomas Metzinger 'Real Virtuality' 2016).","status":"Virtual realism developed across \"The Matrix as Metaphysics\" (2005), \"The Virtual and the Real\" (2017), and the full book-length Reality+ (Norton 2022). The thesis is contested by both technological-illusionist views (VR as immersive illusion) and by the Cartesian skeptical tradition (the simulation hypothesis as threatening ordinary knowledge). Madary and Metzinger (2016) raised ethical concerns about VR that engage adjacent terrain; Dreyfus argued against virtuality as genuine engagement. The position is more recent and less contested in the technical-philosophy literature than the hard-problem positions, but is increasingly important given the rise of VR, AR, and the wider AI context.","era":"1966-present","discipline":"Philosophy","refs":[{"n":1,"work":"Reality Plus","page":"pp. 209–210","canonical":"","quote":"For this chapter, on virtual reality, the focus is on perception. I'll understand illusions as cases in which the world is not as we *perceive* it to be. The philosophers' distinction between illusion and hallucination is a useful one. There are two different questions we can ask about VR. *Is VR a* *hallucination?* That is, do the objects we perceive in VR really exist?","label":"Reality Plus, pp. 209–210"},{"n":2,"work":"Reality Plus","page":"pp. 115–116","canonical":"","quote":"Heim used the label primarily for a broad social and political view of virtual reality, intermediate between that of \"network idealists who promote virtual communities\" and \"naive realists who blame electronic culture\" for various social ills.","label":"Reality Plus, pp. 115–116"},{"n":3,"work":"Reality Plus","page":"pp. 196–197","canonical":"","quote":"Virtual realism and virtual fictionalism How real is virtual reality? As I suggested in chapter 6, we can get a better grip on this question by asking whether what's inside virtual reality—that is, *virtual objects*—are real. In addition to introducing the expression \"virtual world,\" Susanne Langer also introduced the term \"virtual object\" into the philosophy of art.","label":"Reality Plus, pp. 196–197"},{"n":4,"work":"Reality Plus","page":"pp. 125–126","canonical":"","quote":"Perhaps these points capture some part of what people mean when they say that virtual objects are not real. Still, these criteria seem marginal as criteria for reality. Dolly the cloned lamb is not original (she's a clone of another lamb) and not fundamental (she's made out of particles)—but she is perfectly real.","label":"Reality Plus, pp. 125–126"}],"answer":null,"siblings":[{"slug":"the-hard-problem-of-consciousness","label":"The hard problem of consciousness: is the explanation of phenomenal experience a problem distinct in kind from the explanation of the cognitive functions associated with consciousness?"},{"slug":"p-zombies-and-the-conceivability-argument","label":"P-zombies and the conceivability argument: does the conceivability of philosophical zombies show that phenomenal consciousness is not entailed by the physical?"},{"slug":"naturalistic-dualism-and-type-f-monism","label":"Naturalistic dualism and type-F monism: what is the right positive view about the place of consciousness in nature?"},{"slug":"the-extended-mind-and-active-externalism","label":"The extended mind and active externalism: can cognition extend beyond the boundaries of skin and skull into the environment?"}]}