What is the duty of inquiry according to Clifford?

William Kingdon Clifford, answered from the texts and cited to the page.

William Kingdon Clifford answers

A shipowner was about to send an emigrant-ship to sea. He knew she was old, not over-well built, and had often needed repairs. Doubts had been suggested to him that she might not be seaworthy. Those doubts preyed upon him — and then, before she sailed, he succeeded in overcoming them. He told himself she had weathered many storms before; he put his trust in Providence; he dismissed what he called ungenerous suspicions about the builders.

In such ways he acquired a sincere and comfortable conviction that his vessel was thoroughly safe, watched her departure with a light heart, and collected his insurance money when she went down in mid-ocean and told no tales.¹ What shall we say of him? That he was verily guilty of the death of those men. The sincerity of his conviction cannot help him, because he had no right to believe on such evidence as was before him — he had acquired his belief not by honestly earning it in patient investigation, but by stifling his doubts.²

The fault is in the manner of acquisition, not in the outcome. Had the ship arrived safely, he would be no less guilty, only luckier. Now the objection will be made that a man whose belief is so fixed he cannot think otherwise should at least be judged only on his actions. I grant that even then he retains a choice about the action the belief suggests, and cannot escape the duty of investigating on the ground of the strength of his convictions.³

But this concession is not sufficient to close the matter. It is not possible to sever the belief from the action it suggests so cleanly as to condemn one without condemning the other; a man who holds a strong belief on one side of a question cannot investigate it with the fairness he would bring if he were truly in doubt.⁴ Nor is any belief, however trifling, a private possession.

Every new addition to the aggregate of beliefs we carry modifies the structure of the whole, lays a stealthy train in our inmost thoughts, and may some day explode into overt action and leave its stamp upon our character forever.⁵ More than that: our words, our phrases, our forms and modes of thought are common property, an heirloom which every succeeding generation inherits as a precious deposit and a sacred trust — and into this, for good or ill, is woven every belief of every man who has speech of his fellows.⁶

The credulous man does not merely endanger himself; he degrades the common fabric of inquiry on which all of us depend. The duty of inquiry, then, is this: it is wrong to believe anything on insufficient evidence, and the wrong consists in the manner of believing — in the willful stifling of doubt, the deliberate working of oneself into a comfortable conviction that the evidence does not warrant.

I cannot believe that any falsehood whatever is necessary to morality; the sense of right grew up among healthy men and was fixed by the practice of comradeship, and it has never had help from phantoms and falsehoods, and never can want any.⁷

Sources

1. He acquired a sincere and comfortable conviction that his vessel was thoroughly safe and seaworthy; he watched her departure with a light heart, and benevolent wishes for the success of the exiles in their strange new home that was to be; and he got his insurance-money when she went down in mid-ocean and told no tales.

   The Scientific Basis of Morals and Other Essays, incl. The Ethics of Belief

2. He had acquired his belief not by honestly earning it in patient investigation, but by stifling his doubts. And although in the end he may have felt so sure about it that he could not think otherwise, yet inasmuch as he had knowingly and willingly worked himself into that frame of mind, he must be held responsible for it.

   Lectures and Essays Vol II, ed. Pollock

3. even when a man's belief is so fixed that he cannot think otherwise, he still has a choice in regard to the action suggested by it, and so cannot escape the duty of investigating on the ground of the strength of his convictions

   The Scientific Basis of Morals and Other Essays, incl. The Ethics of Belief

4. No man holding a strong belief on one side of a question, or even wishing to hold a belief on one side, can investigate it with such fairness and completeness as if he were really in doubt and unbiased; so that the existence of a belief not founded on fair inquiry unfits a man for the performance of this necessary duty.

   The Scientific Basis of Morals and Other Essays, incl. The Ethics of Belief

5. No real belief, however trifling and fragmentary it may seem, is ever truly insignificant; it prepares us to receive more of its like, confirms those which resembled it before, and weakens others; and so gradually it lays a stealthy train in our inmost thoughts, which may some day explode into overt action, and leave its stamp upon our character forever.

   The Scientific Basis of Morals and Other Essays, incl. The Ethics of Belief

6. Our words, our phrases, our forms and processes and modes of thought, are common property, fashioned and perfected from age to age; an heirloom which every succeeding generation inherits as a precious deposit and a sacred trust to be handed on to the next one... Into this, for good or ill, is woven every belief of every man who has speech of his fellows.

   The Scientific Basis of Morals and Other Essays, incl. The Ethics of Belief

7. I cannot believe that any falsehood whatever is necessary to morality. It cannot be true of my race and yours that to keep ourselves from becoming scoundrels we must needs believe a lie. The sense of right grew up among healthy men and was fixed by the practice of comradeship. It has never had help from phantoms and falsehoods, and it never can want any.

   Lectures and Essays Vol II, ed. Pollock