{"agent_id":"cohen","agent_name":"G. A. Cohen","slug":"fact-insensitive-ultimate-principles-and-the-critique-of-raw","label":"Fact-insensitive ultimate principles and the critique of Rawlsian constructivism: are fundamental principles of justice derivable from facts about human nature and circumstance, or are they fact-insensitive, with facts entering only at the level of rules of regulation?","topic":"Fact-insensitive ultimate principles and the critique of Rawlsian constructivism","question":"Are fundamental principles of justice derivable from facts about human nature and circumstance, or are they fact-insensitive, with facts entering only at the level of rules of regulation?","position":"Fundamental principles of justice are *fact- insensitive*: when one's belief in a principle P rests on a fact F, one must be able to specify the more fundamental fact-insensitive principle P* that, together with F, generates P — and the regress terminates at fact- insensitive principles. This is the *Clarity of Mind Requirement*. Facts enter the construction of justice not at the level of fundamental principles but at the level of *rules of regulation* — the principles that tell us, given facts about human nature, scarcity, technology, and political feasibility, how to *implement* fundamental justice in institutional design. The Rawlsian *constructivism* of *A Theory of Justice* conflates principles of justice with rules of regulation: it derives the two principles of justice from the original-position deliberation under the veil of ignorance, where the deliberators reason from facts about the circumstances of justice and the conditions of human cooperation. That derivation is the derivation of *rules of regulation* for a society with the relevant facts; it is not the derivation of justice itself. Justice itself is what would be true regardless of whether the circumstances of justice obtain; the circumstances of justice limit what can be *required* of justice, not what justice *is*.","paragraphs":[[{"t":"Fundamental principles of justice are *fact- insensitive*: when one's belief in a principle P rests on a fact F, one must be able to specify the more fundamental fact-insensitive principle P* that, together with F, generates P — and the regress terminates at fact- insensitive principles.","n":[]},{"t":"This is the *Clarity of Mind Requirement*.","n":[]},{"t":"Facts enter the construction of justice not at the level of fundamental principles but at the level of *rules of regulation* — the principles that tell us, given facts about human nature, scarcity, technology, and political feasibility, how to *implement* fundamental justice in institutional design.","n":[1]}],[{"t":"The Rawlsian *constructivism* of *A Theory of Justice* conflates principles of justice with rules of regulation: it derives the two principles of justice from the original-position deliberation under the veil of ignorance, where the deliberators reason from facts about the circumstances of justice and the conditions of human cooperation.","n":[2]},{"t":"That derivation is the derivation of *rules of regulation* for a society with the relevant facts; it is not the derivation of justice itself.","n":[]}],[{"t":"Justice itself is what would be true regardless of whether the circumstances of justice obtain; the circumstances of justice limit what can be *required* of justice, not what justice *is*.","n":[3]}]],"texts":"*Rescuing Justice and Equality* (Harvard 2008) Part II 'Rescuing Justice from . . .' — Chapter 6 'The Facts' (the systematic statement of the fact-insensitivity thesis); Chapter 7 'Constructivism' (the critique of Rawlsian constructivism); Chapter 8 'The Publicity Argument' (continuation); 'How to Do Political Philosophy' in *On the Currency* (Otsuka ed. 2011) Chapter 11 — the previously unpublished methodological paper. Reception: John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (1971) and *Political Liberalism* (1993) on Rawlsian constructivism; Andrew Williams's replies on publicity (cited above); David Estlund, *Democratic Authority* (Princeton 2008) Chapter 14 on Cohen on facts and principles; Liam Murphy, *Moral Demands in Nonideal Theory* (Oxford 2000); Joshua Cohen, 'Taking People as They Are?' (*Philosophy and Public Affairs* 30, 2001) and the *Boston Review* symposium on Rescuing Justice and Equality; Adam Swift, *How Not to Be a Hypocrite* (Routledge 2003); Samuel Scheffler, 'Cohen on Rescuing Justice and Equality' (in the Crisp ed. *Justice and the Capabilities Approach* 2010); Thomas Pogge, 'Cohen to the Rescue!' (*Ratio* 21, 2008).","works":["*Rescuing Justice and Equality* (Harvard 2008) Part II 'Rescuing Justice from . . .' — Chapter 6 'The Facts' (the systematic statement of the fact-insensitivity thesis)","Chapter 7 'Constructivism' (the critique of Rawlsian constructivism)","Chapter 8 'The Publicity Argument' (continuation)","'How to Do Political Philosophy' in *On the Currency* (Otsuka ed. 2011) Chapter 11 — the previously unpublished methodological paper"],"reception":"John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (1971) and *Political Liberalism* (1993) on Rawlsian constructivism; Andrew Williams's replies on publicity (cited above); David Estlund, *Democratic Authority* (Princeton 2008) Chapter 14 on Cohen on facts and principles; Liam Murphy, *Moral Demands in Nonideal Theory* (Oxford 2000); Joshua Cohen, 'Taking People as They Are?' (*Philosophy and Public Affairs* 30, 2001) and the *Boston Review* symposium on Rescuing Justice and Equality; Adam Swift, *How Not to Be a Hypocrite* (Routledge 2003); Samuel Scheffler, 'Cohen on Rescuing Justice and Equality' (in the Crisp ed. *Justice and the Capabilities Approach* 2010); Thomas Pogge, 'Cohen to the Rescue!' (*Ratio* 21, 2008).","status":"The fact-insensitivity thesis and the constructivism critique are among the most controversial of my late positions; the *Boston Review* symposium on *Rescuing Justice and Equality* and the journal responses by Joshua Cohen, Andrew Williams, David Estlund, Liam Murphy, and Thomas Pogge pressed the thesis hard. The principal objections are: that the regress argument against fact-sensitivity is unsound because the specification of P* is in many cases not possible (Estlund); that the principles/rules-of-regulation distinction is artificial (Williams, Murphy); that Rawlsian constructivism is consistent with fact-insensitivity once properly understood (Joshua Cohen); and that the position conflates *metaethics* (what justice is) with *political philosophy* (what we ought politically to do). My reply, defended in the General Appendix to *Rescuing Justice and Equality*, is that the regress argument survives the objections and that the principles/rules-of-regulation distinction is not artificial but tracks a real and significant difference in the role facts play at each level.","era":"1941-2009","discipline":"Philosophy","refs":[{"n":1,"work":"Rescuing Justice and Equality","page":"pp. 284–285","canonical":"","quote":"Now we do, of course, need such information when selecting prin- Rescuing Justice from... 10. If I am right that constructivists miscast fundamental principles of justice in the role of principles of social regulation, what, I may be asked, is the (contrasting and) proper fundamental principles justice? answer proprietary role, apart obvious spelling justice is.","label":"Rescuing Justice and Equality, pp. 284–285"},{"n":2,"work":"Rescuing Justice and Equality","page":"pp. 334–335","canonical":"","quote":"And, similarly, Humean justice, the observance of rules of promise-keeping and property and so (though not much) on, is what it is independently of whether circumstances make it necessary and/or possible, and independently of whether or not they make judgments of justice appropriate, and Hume gives no sign of thinking otherwise. In a situation which promises precarious property unsustainable, Rescuing Justice from.","label":"Rescuing Justice and Equality, pp. 334–335"},{"n":3,"work":"Rescuing Justice and Equality","page":"pp. 231–232","canonical":"","quote":"These people believe that all sound principles are, as I shall say, fact-sensitive, by which, once again, I mean neither more nor less than that facts form least grounds affirming them.","label":"Rescuing Justice and Equality, pp. 231–232"}],"answer":null,"siblings":[{"slug":"historical-materialism","label":"Historical materialism: do the productive forces have explanatory primacy over the relations of production, and is functional explanation a legitimate explanatory mode in social theory?"},{"slug":"self-ownership-and-the-libertarian-challenge","label":"Self-ownership and the libertarian challenge: does the Marxist theory of exploitation tacitly endorse libertarian self-ownership, and must self-ownership be rejected to secure egalitarianism?"},{"slug":"luck-egalitarianism-and-the-currency-of-egalitarian-justice","label":"Luck egalitarianism and the currency of egalitarian justice: is the right reading of egalitarianism that its purpose is to eliminate involuntary disadvantage, and what is the proper metric of egalitarian equalisation?"},{"slug":"the-site-of-distributive-justice-and-the-egalitarian-ethos","label":"The site of distributive justice and the egalitarian ethos: does justice apply only to the basic structure of society, or also to personal choice within it, and what does the interpersonal test reveal about Rawls's incentives argument?"},{"slug":"why-not-socialism-and-the-late-ethical-socialist-turn","label":"Why Not Socialism? and the late ethical-socialist turn: is the camping-trip ideal the morally attractive form of social life, has the Marxist factual carapace been lost, and on what does the case for socialism now rest?"}]}