Demosthenes, answered from the texts and cited to the page.
Chaeronea was the day everything the Philippics had warned against finally arrived at once. Philip had seized Elateia — the pass was open, central Greece was his to traverse — and the question was whether Thebes would stand with us or with him.1 I was sent to Thebes. The alliance was made, over the active opposition of Philip's own envoys. Euboea, Megara, Corinth sent forces; the allies won early successes and refortified Phocian towns.2
Then they divided their forces. Philip defeated each division separately, destroyed Amphissa, and late in the summer of 338 met the combined Athenian and Theban army on the plain of Chaeronea.3 The allies were routed. I was among those who fled. What followed: Philip garrisoned Thebes, restored his partisans there, established a council of three hundred, and put his enemies to death or drove them into exile.4
Athens he treated differently — he released our prisoners without ransom and sent Antipater and Alexander with the ashes of our dead to offer terms.5 We lost our possessions on the Hellespont and in the Chersonese; we promised to join his league for the invasion of Persia. We kept Salamis, Samos, Delos.6 The Assembly chose me to deliver the funeral oration over those who fell.7
Now — was the defeat a refutation of the policy? The critics say yes. I say they have not done the arithmetic. At Marathon Athens fielded ten thousand heavy infantry fighting for her existence; at Chaeronea, fighting for her independence, scarcely twelve thousand.8 A few more men, a little better discipline and generalship, and the scale turns the other way.
Philip could not have beaten Sparta, Thebes, and Athens united; he was more than a match for two of them, with his improved phalanx and his cavalry.9 What I was able to effect with the scanty means at my command — the Theban alliance made against every expectation, the allied successes before the armies divided — shows what might have been accomplished if my warnings had been attended to earlier.10
The defeat was a political error accumulated over decades: mercenaries unpaid and undisciplined, the Social War bleeding our best allies at precisely the moment Philip was reducing Thessaly and Phocis, no national force prepared for the moment he could carry war into Attica.11 That error belongs to the years before the Philippics, not to the policy I argued in them.
Disunion, mutual jealousies, want of foresight — these left no chance against a man who was constantly augmenting his forces and preparing long beforehand for the blow he finally struck.12 I told Athens what that blow would be. She was not ready when it came. Those are two different failures, and only one of them is mine.
Philip was appointed. And immediately afterwards, having collected a force and crossed the Pass, ostensibly on his way to the territory of Cirrha, he bids a long farewell to the Cirrhaeans and Locrians, and seizes Elateia.The Public Orations, Vol 2
Demosthenes was immediately dispatched to Thebes, where he succeeded, by what appear to have been liberal and judicious proposals, in making an alliance between Thebes and Athens, in spite of the attempts of Philip's envoys to counteract his influence. Euboea, Megara, Corinth, and other members of the league also sent help.The Public Orations, Vol 2
The allies at first won some successes and refortified some of the Phocian towns, but afterwards unfortunately divided their forces, and so enabled Philip to defeat the two divisions separately, and to destroy Amphissa... Late in the summer of 338, the decisive battle was fought at Chaeroneia, and resulted in the total rout of the allies.The Public Orations, Vol 2
Philip placed a Macedonian garrison in Thebes, restored his exiled friends to power there, established a Council of Three Hundred, and (through them) put to death or banished his enemies.The Public Orations, Vol 2
Philip released them without ransom, and sent Antipater and Alexander (with the ashes of the Athenian dead) to offer terms of peace.The Public Orations, Vol 2
she lost all her possessions on the Hellespont and in the Chersonese, and promised to join the league which Philip intended to form for the invasion of Persia.The Public Orations, Vol 2
Demosthenes was selected by the Assembly to deliver the funeral oration upon those who fell at Chaeroneia.The Public Orations, Vol 2
At Marathon, where Athens fought for her existence, her heavy-armed were 10,000. At Tanagra and at Chaeronea, where she fought for her independence, they were scarcely 12,000.Against Timocrates, Aristogiton and Aphobus
Philip could not have conquered an army of 40,000 Spartans; nor could he have beaten Sparta, Thebes, and Athens, united together; but he was more than a match for only two of them, with his improved phalanx, and powerful force of cavalry and light troops.Against Timocrates, Aristogiton and Aphobus
We see what he was able to effect even with the scanty means at his command. From the struggle at Chaeronea, as well as from the partial success of the Athenians in the Lamian war, it is apparent what might have been accomplished if the orator's warnings had been duly attended to.Against Timocrates, Aristogiton and Aphobus
The people were indisposed to military service; their discipline became still more relaxed; they hired mercenaries over whom they had little control, and whom they did not pay with regularity... This mattered less while the war was carried on at a distance. But when Philip, having reduced Thessaly and Phocis, was in a condition to carry the war into Attica, then was felt the want of that foresight, which should have provided long beforehand a national force capable of repelling invasion.Against Timocrates, Aristogiton and Aphobus
Disunion, mutual jealousies, want of foresight, and narrow policy, left no chance against a man who possessed large military resources, and was constantly augmenting and improving them, extending his influence and alliances, and preparing long beforehand for the blow which he finally struck.Against Timocrates, Aristogiton and Aphobus