Daniel Dennett, answered from the texts and cited to the page.
The only free will worth wanting is the kind that biological and cultural evolution actually produces — the engineering-grade capacity to respond to reasons, to deliberate, to imagine alternatives, to learn from mistakes, to be morally responsible. Metaphysical libertarianism — the view that free will requires a kind of agent-causation that escapes the causal closure of the physical — is incoherent and not worth wanting.1
Determinism is no threat to moral responsibility because moral responsibility never required indeterminism in the first place. The compatibilist tradition (Hobbes, Hume, Mill, Schlick, P. F. Strawson, Frankfurt) was largely right; the contemporary evolutionary picture lets us see why it was right.2345
Since, thanks to quantum physici: the received view among scientists today is that indeterminism is true (at the subatomic level and, by implication, at higher levels under various specifiable conditions), this can look like a happy resolution of the problem, but there is a snag: How can the indeterminism of quantum physics be harnessed to give us a clear, coherent picture ofa human agent exercising this wonderful…Freedom Evolves, pp. 113–114
Why Do We Want Free Will? It was in this sphere then, the sphere of legal obligations, that the moral conceptual world of "guilt," "conscience," "duty," "sacredness of duty" had its origin; its beginnings were, like the beginnings of everything great on earth, soaked in blood thoroughly and for a long time. -Nietzsche, On The Genealogy of MoralJ I.Elbow Room - The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting, p. 153
But whatever responsibility is, considered as a metaphysical state, unless we can tie it to some recognizable social desideratum, it will have no racional claim on our esteem. Why would anyone care whether or not he had the property of responsibility (for some particular deed, or in general)?Elbow Room - The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting, pp. 163–164
The reality of a moral me is no more put in doubt by the incompatibilist argument than is the reality of mammals. Before leaving the topic of libertarianism, we should ask, once more, what the point of it might be.Freedom Evolves, pp. 151–152
The alternatives to compatibilism are anything but popular. Both the libertarian and the hard determinist believe that free will and determinism are incompatible. The hard determinist says: "So much of the worse for free will." The libertarian says: "So much the worse for determinism," at least with regard to human action.IV Free Will and Personhood, pp. 308–309
The classical-compatibilist position is in Elbow Room (1984); the evolutionary-extension picture is in Freedom Evolves (2003); the final-form integration with the design-stance picture of agency is in From Bacteria to Bach and Back (2017). I have not retreated under sustained pressure from Kane, van Inwagen, Galen Strawson, or the contemporary libertarian revival.