Epictetus, answered from the texts and cited to the page.
The question every student brings to this school, sooner or later. Let me put it plainly. There are things in your power and things that are not. In your power: assent, desire, aversion, impulse — the movements of your own soul, the use you make of impressions. Not in your power: the body, property, reputation, the actions of others, what Caesar thinks of you, whether your children live.
This is not a subtle distinction. It is the first thing, the thing on which everything else rests. Now look at what the body actually is. Is it yours in any secure sense? It is the slave of fever, of gout, of ophthalmia, of the tyrant, of fire, of iron — of everything stronger than itself.1 How then can anything belonging to the body be free from hindrance?
It cannot. And what is not free from hindrance cannot be the good, because the good, as every one of you already pre-conceives it, is something that flows easily, that is happy, that is not impeded.1 You seek it in the wrong place entirely. But here is what no man can take from you. Can anyone compel you to assent to what appears false? No man.
Can anyone compel you to refuse assent to what appears true? No man.2 There is, then, something in you that is naturally free — and it is precisely there, in desire, aversion, assent, the movement of the will, that you must seek the good.2 Wretched men, work out this, take care of this, seek for good here.1 The man who understands this lives with a light heart.
Poverty? Come, and you will see what poverty is when it finds someone who can act the part well.3 Caesar? Zeno was not anxious going to meet Antigonus, because Antigonus had no power over anything Zeno valued, and Zeno did not care for the things over which Antigonus had power.4 That is the whole doctrine made visible in a single scene: the man whose good is internal cannot be threatened by the man whose power is only external.
The error — the one error that produces every form of distress — is to place your good in what is not in your power, as though it were yours. If you do that, you must be hindered, impeded, a slave to whoever controls the things you desire and fear.5 You become impious, because you blame God for what befalls you; unjust, because you always claim more than belongs to you; abject, because nothing is secure.5
The dichotomy is not a theoretical puzzle. It is a diagnosis of the unphilosophical life, and the cure is the daily work of learning to tell the difference — not once, not in the abstract, but every morning, with every impression that comes.
Do you possess the body then free or is it in servile condition?... it is the slave of fever, of gout, ophthalmia, dysentery, of a tyrant, of fire, of iron, of every thing which is stronger... What kind of a thing do you imagine the good to be? That which flows easily, that which is happy, that which is not impeded.Discourses with the Encheiridion and Fragments
And who is able to compel you to assent to that which appears false? No man. And who can compel you not to assent to that which appears true? No man. By this then you see that there is something in you naturally free.Discourses with the Encheiridion and Fragments
Wretched men, work out this, take care of this, seek for good here.Discourses with the Encheiridion and Fragments
when Zeno was going to meet Antigonus, he was not anxious, for Antigonus had no power over any of the things which Zeno admired; and Zeno did not care for those things over which Antigonus had power.Discourses with the Encheiridion and Fragments
if he thinks that his good and his interest are in externals and in things which are not in the power of his will, he must of necessity be hindered, be impeded, be a slave to those who have the power over the things which he admires (desires) and fears; and he must of necessity be impious because he thinks that he is harmed by God, and he must be unjust because he always claims more than belongs to him; and he must of necessity be abject and mean.Discourses with the Encheiridion and Fragments