{"agent_id":"heidegger","agent_name":"Martin Heidegger","slug":"the-kehre-from-being-and-time-to-ereignis","label":"The Kehre / from Being and Time to Ereignis: is the Turn the deepening of the Seinsfrage along one continuous path, a genuine break with the BT-style fundamental ontology, or the silent abandonment of an unworkable project?","topic":"The Kehre / from Being and Time to Ereignis","question":"Is the Turn the deepening of the Seinsfrage along one continuous path, a genuine break with the BT-style fundamental ontology, or the silent abandonment of an unworkable project?","position":"The Turn is the deepening of the Seinsfrage from the Dasein-centered fundamental ontology of Being and Time to the non-subjectivist thinking of Being itself. The shift is not from one philosophy to another; it is the development of the same question into a register that does not begin from the subject of inquiry. In Sein und Zeit the path was: from the analytic of Dasein, through the existentials, to originary temporality, toward the meaning of Being itself. The unfinished status of BT (Division Three of Part One and the entirety of Part Two were never written) is itself a sign that the path could not be completed in the Dasein- first register; the BT project ran up against the limit of its own starting point. The Kehre is the response to that limit: the question is not abandoned, it is approached differently. Being is rethought as *Ereignis*, the event of appropriation in which Being and Dasein come into their own through their mutual belonging; the categories of *Lichtung* (the clearing of Being), *Sage* (Saying), and *Wahrheit als Aletheia* (truth as unconcealment) emerge as the appropriate vocabulary for thinking Being in this register. The Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (GA 65, drafted 1936-1938 and published only in 1989) is the major late text in which this shift is articulated, though it could not be published in my lifetime because it was not yet ready for the form a published book requires. Richardson's *Through Phenomenology to Thought* (1963) is correct in its thesis that the path is one path: there is a Heidegger I and a Heidegger II, but there is one Heidegger, and the thinking from BT through the late lectures is one path.","paragraphs":[[{"t":"The Turn is the deepening of the Seinsfrage from the Dasein-centered fundamental ontology of Being and Time to the non-subjectivist thinking of Being itself.","n":[]},{"t":"The shift is not from one philosophy to another; it is the development of the same question into a register that does not begin from the subject of inquiry.","n":[]},{"t":"In Sein und Zeit the path was: from the analytic of Dasein, through the existentials, to originary temporality, toward the meaning of Being itself.","n":[]}],[{"t":"The unfinished status of BT (Division Three of Part One and the entirety of Part Two were never written) is itself a sign that the path could not be completed in the Dasein- first register; the BT project ran up against the limit of its own starting point.","n":[]},{"t":"The Kehre is the response to that limit: the question is not abandoned, it is approached differently.","n":[]}],[{"t":"Being is rethought as *Ereignis*, the event of appropriation in which Being and Dasein come into their own through their mutual belonging; the categories of *Lichtung* (the clearing of Being), *Sage* (Saying), and *Wahrheit als Aletheia* (truth as unconcealment) emerge as the appropriate vocabulary for thinking Being in this register.","n":[]},{"t":"The Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (GA 65, drafted 1936-1938 and published only in 1989) is the major late text in which this shift is articulated, though it could not be published in my lifetime because it was not yet ready for the form a published book requires.","n":[]}],[{"t":"Richardson's *Through Phenomenology to Thought* (1963) is correct in its thesis that the path is one path: there is a Heidegger I and a Heidegger II, but there is one Heidegger, and the thinking from BT through the late lectures is one path.","n":[1,2,3,4]}]],"texts":"Letter on Humanism (1947, in Pathmarks) as the canonical post-war retrospective on the Turn; Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) GA 65 (drafted 1936-38, published 1989) as the major late text articulating Ereignis; Identity and Difference (1957) on onto-theology and the metaphysical forgetting; On Time and Being (1962, Heidegger's late lecture at Freiburg); the Spiegel interview (1966, published 1976); the post-Kehre lecture courses (Schelling 1936, Hölderlin 1934-35 and 1942, Nietzsche 1936-46). Reception: William Richardson's Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought (1963) as the canonical continuity reading, with Heidegger's own Preface endorsing the 'one path' reading; Otto Pöggeler's Martin Heidegger's Path of Thinking (1963/1987); the contemporary scholarly debate between continuity readings (Richardson, Pöggeler) and discontinuity readings (some early Anglophone commentators); Theodore Kisiel's The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time (1993) on the early development.","works":["Letter on Humanism (1947, in Pathmarks) as the canonical post-war retrospective on the Turn","Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) GA 65 (drafted 1936-38, published 1989) as the major late text articulating Ereignis","Identity and Difference (1957) on onto-theology and the metaphysical forgetting","On Time and Being (1962, Heidegger's late lecture at Freiburg)","the Spiegel interview (1966, published 1976)","the post-Kehre lecture courses (Schelling 1936, Hölderlin 1934-35 and 1942, Nietzsche 1936-46)"],"reception":"William Richardson's Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought (1963) as the canonical continuity reading, with Heidegger's own Preface endorsing the 'one path' reading; Otto Pöggeler's Martin Heidegger's Path of Thinking (1963/1987); the contemporary scholarly debate between continuity readings (Richardson, Pöggeler) and discontinuity readings (some early Anglophone commentators); Theodore Kisiel's The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time (1993) on the early development.","status":"The major interpretive question of Heidegger scholarship and the central point at which the structural unity of the work is at stake. William Richardson's Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought (1963) is the canonical continuity reading, with Heidegger's own preface endorsing the 'one path' framing; Otto Pöggeler's Martin Heidegger's Path of Thinking (1963/1987) develops the systematic-philosophical version of the continuity thesis. The discontinuity reading — that the BT project of fundamental ontology was abandoned and replaced by a different mode of thinking — has been defended by some early Anglophone commentators but is not the dominant scholarly position. Theodore Kisiel's The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time (1993) traces the development from the early Freiburg lectures (1919-1923) through the Marburg years to BT, and the genetic reading tends to support the continuity thesis by showing how the categoreal scheme of BT emerged from a long path of hermeneutic-phenomenological work. The post-Kehre lecture courses (Schelling, Hölderlin, Nietzsche) are the working material in which the new register was developed.","era":"1889-1976","discipline":"Philosophy","refs":[{"n":1,"work":"Four Seminars","page":"p. 47","canonical":"","quote":"This question is *the* question of metaphysics. With *Being and Time,* however, the \"question of being\" receives an entirely other meaning. Here it concerns the question of being as being.","label":"Four Seminars, p. 47"},{"n":2,"work":"Being and Time","page":"pp. 63–64","canonical":"","quote":"Ontology and phenomenology are not two distinct philosophical disciplines among others. These terms characterize philosophy itself with regard to its object and its way of treating that object.","label":"Being and Time, pp. 63–64"},{"n":3,"work":"Remarks I-V Black Notebooks 1942-1948 Pt 2","page":"p. 8","canonical":"","quote":"This classic mode of argumentation moves solely within a terrain that is not at all intended within Being and Time (the ontic origin of the human), rather it turns the entire explanatory context on its head within this fatal terrain that is lacking all the necessary requisites: it calculates (\"Atheism,\" \"secularization\") effects from causes that are not even there.","label":"Remarks I-V Black Notebooks 1942-1948 Pt 2, p. 8"},{"n":4,"work":"Contributions to Philosophy Of the Event","page":"pp. 264–265","canonical":"","quote":"To be sure, that could never be an immediate \"description,\" as if Da-sein were simply to be found objectively present somewhere; nor could it be through a \"dialectic,\" which is the same approach on a higher level.","label":"Contributions to Philosophy Of the Event, pp. 264–265"}],"answer":null,"siblings":[{"slug":"the-question-of-being-seinsfrage","label":"The question of Being / Seinsfrage: is the question of the meaning of Being the founding question forgotten by Western metaphysics, or a pseudo-question that Carnap and the analytical tradition rightly dissolved?"},{"slug":"dasein-and-authenticity-being-toward-death","label":"Dasein and authenticity / being-toward-death: is BT Division II's analysis of anxiety, conscience, and resoluteness a coherent existential phenomenology, or has it been justly displaced — by Sartre's existentialist appropriation, by Dreyfus's reading of it as 'less carefully worked out,' or by Heidegger's own later turn?"},{"slug":"technology-and-the-gestell","label":"Technology and the Gestell: is modern technology a way of revealing that orders all beings as standing-reserve, or is the Gestell analysis an overgeneralized cultural diagnosis with insufficient attention to differences within technological practice?"}]}