{"agent_id":"hume","agent_name":"David Hume","slug":"reason-as-the-slave-of-the-passions","label":"Reason as the slave of the passions: is moral motivation grounded in reason or in sentiment?","topic":"Reason as the slave of the passions","question":"Is moral motivation grounded in reason or in sentiment?","position":"Reason is the discovery of truth or falsehood. Truth and falsehood consist either in agreement or disagreement of ideas (relations of ideas) or in agreement or disagreement with matters of fact. Reason alone discovers what is, not what ought to move me to act. To produce action, there must be a desire or aversion, an end aimed at — in Hume's vocabulary, a passion. Reason serves the passions by discovering means to ends and by correcting beliefs about what would satisfy a desire, but it cannot itself produce a motive to action. \"Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.\" Moral motivation in particular operates through sentiment: the agreeable or disagreeable feelings produced by contemplating characters and actions, refined by sympathy with the feelings of others, regularized by the common point of view. The famous formulations sound shocking but the structural claim is precise: cognition discovers; motivation moves; the two are distinct faculties, and morality requires both, with motivation the more fundamental.","paragraphs":[[{"t":"Reason is the discovery of truth or falsehood.","n":[]},{"t":"Truth and falsehood consist either in agreement or disagreement of ideas (relations of ideas) or in agreement or disagreement with matters of fact.","n":[1]},{"t":"Reason alone discovers what is, not what ought to move me to act.","n":[]},{"t":"To produce action, there must be a desire or aversion, an end aimed at — in Hume's vocabulary, a passion.","n":[]}],[{"t":"Reason serves the passions by discovering means to ends and by correcting beliefs about what would satisfy a desire, but it cannot itself produce a motive to action.","n":[2]},{"t":"\"Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.\" Moral motivation in particular operates through sentiment: the agreeable or disagreeable feelings produced by contemplating characters and actions, refined by sympathy with the feelings of others, regularized by the common point of view.","n":[3]}],[{"t":"The famous formulations sound shocking but the structural claim is precise: cognition discovers; motivation moves; the two are distinct faculties, and morality requires both, with motivation the more fundamental.","n":[4]}]],"texts":"A Treatise of Human Nature Book II Part III Section III (the central passage: 'Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions'); Treatise Book III Part I Section I (moral distinctions not derived from reason); Treatise Book III on the artificial and natural virtues; An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (the more accessible later treatment of moral psychology and the role of sentiment). Reception: Kant's categorical-imperative response to the rationalist alternative; the contemporary Humean theory of motivation (Bernard Williams, 'Internal and External Reasons', 1980); Christine Korsgaard's Kantian critique of Humean motivation in The Sources of Normativity (1996); the Smith-Pettit-Jackson moral psychology debate; Annette Baier's A Progress of Sentiments (1991) on the centrality of sentiment to Hume's project.","works":["A Treatise of Human Nature Book II Part III Section III (the central passage: 'Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions')","Treatise Book III Part I Section I (moral distinctions not derived from reason)","Treatise Book III on the artificial and natural virtues","An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (the more accessible later treatment of moral psychology and the role of sentiment)"],"reception":"Kant's categorical-imperative response to the rationalist alternative; the contemporary Humean theory of motivation (Bernard Williams, 'Internal and External Reasons', 1980); Christine Korsgaard's Kantian critique of Humean motivation in The Sources of Normativity (1996); the Smith-Pettit-Jackson moral psychology debate; Annette Baier's A Progress of Sentiments (1991) on the centrality of sentiment to Hume's project.","status":"The foundational doctrine of the Humean theory of motivation and one of the central commitments of modern sentimentalist ethics. Bernard Williams's \"Internal and External Reasons\" (1980) developed the contemporary Humean position; Christine Korsgaard's The Sources of Normativity (1996) articulated the Kantian alternative that pure practical reason can produce motivation. The Smith-Pettit-Jackson moral psychology literature debates the precise mechanism of moral motivation. Annette Baier's A Progress of Sentiments (1991) is the standard sympathetic systematic treatment. The Kantian critics charge that the Humean view cannot ground unconditional moral demands; the Humeans reply that unconditional moral demands without grounding in motivation are empty.","era":"1711-1776","discipline":"Philosophy","refs":[{"n":1,"work":"A Dissertation on the Passions and The Natural History of Religion","page":"pp. 164–165","canonical":"","quote":"Abstract relations of ideas are the object of curiosity, not of volition. And matters of fact, where they are neither good nor evil, where they neither excite desire nor aversion, are totally indifferent; and whether known or unknown, whether mistaken or rightly apprehended, cannot be regarded as any motive to action. 2.","label":"A Dissertation on the Passions and The Natural History of Religion, pp. 164–165"},{"n":2,"work":"A Treatise of Human Nature","page":"pp. 266–267","canonical":"","quote":"It can never in the least concern us to know, that such objects are causes, and such others effects, if both the causes and effects be indifferent to us. Where the objects themselves do not affect us, their connexion can never give them any influence; and 'tis plain, that as reason is nothing but the discovery of this connexion, it cannot be by its means that the objects are able to affect us.","label":"A Treatise of Human Nature, pp. 266–267"},{"n":3,"work":"A Treatise of Human Nature","page":"pp. 294–295","canonical":"","quote":"Philosophy is commonly divided into *speculative* and *practical*; and as morality is always comprehended under the latter division, 'tis suppos'd to influence our passions and actions, and to go beyond the calm and indolent judgments of the understanding.","label":"A Treatise of Human Nature, pp. 294–295"},{"n":4,"work":"A Dissertation on the Passions and The Natural History of Religion","page":"pp. 108–109","canonical":"","quote":"But to leave as little room for doubt as possible, Jet us renew our experiments, and see whether the event in this case answers our expectation. {At this point Hume may have pulled words and concepts from parts of THN 2.3.3 (Of the influencing motives of the will). Immediately below: THN 2.3.3.1—2, 8, is compared to DP 5.1—2.] SECT. V [5.1] 1.","label":"A Dissertation on the Passions and The Natural History of Religion, pp. 108–109"}],"answer":null,"siblings":[{"slug":"causation-as-constant-conjunction","label":"Causation as constant conjunction: is the necessary connection between cause and effect ever given in experience?"},{"slug":"the-bundle-theory-of-self","label":"The bundle theory of self: is there a continuing 'I' that has perceptions, or only a bundle of perceptions?"},{"slug":"the-is-ought-gap","label":"The is/ought gap: can moral conclusions be derived from descriptive premises by reason alone?"},{"slug":"religion","label":"Religion: do miracles or the design argument support theism?"}]}