{"agent_id":"hume","agent_name":"David Hume","slug":"religion","label":"Religion: do miracles or the design argument support theism?","topic":"Religion","question":"Do miracles or the design argument support theism?","position":"Two related lines of argument run through the philosophy of religion. On miracles: a miracle is by definition a violation of the laws of nature, which laws are established by uniform experience. The proof against any particular miracle is therefore as complete as any argument from experience can be. The proof for it must rest on testimony, and the credit of testimony is itself an empirical matter, calibrated by experience. No testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle unless the testimony be of such a kind that its falsehood would be more miraculous than the fact it endeavors to establish. This standard is virtually never met. On natural theology: the design argument infers from apparent design in nature to a designing intelligence. The Dialogues, modeled on Cicero, work systematically through the difficulties. The analogy is weak: human design produces artifacts of bounded scale, while the universe is unbounded. The argument proves at most that the cause or causes of order in the universe bear some remote analogy to human intelligence — not that they are infinite, perfect, single, or moral. The problem of evil compounds the difficulty: from the world we observe, we cannot infer a benevolent omnipotent designer. The Natural History of Religion completes the picture: the historical development of religion is a sociological process driven by fear, hope, and the human propensity to anthropomorphize, not a progression toward theological truth.","paragraphs":[[{"t":"Two related lines of argument run through the philosophy of religion.","n":[]},{"t":"On miracles: a miracle is by definition a violation of the laws of nature, which laws are established by uniform experience.","n":[]},{"t":"The proof against any particular miracle is therefore as complete as any argument from experience can be.","n":[]},{"t":"The proof for it must rest on testimony, and the credit of testimony is itself an empirical matter, calibrated by experience.","n":[]}],[{"t":"No testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle unless the testimony be of such a kind that its falsehood would be more miraculous than the fact it endeavors to establish.","n":[1]},{"t":"This standard is virtually never met.","n":[]},{"t":"On natural theology: the design argument infers from apparent design in nature to a designing intelligence.","n":[]},{"t":"The Dialogues, modeled on Cicero, work systematically through the difficulties.","n":[]}],[{"t":"The analogy is weak: human design produces artifacts of bounded scale, while the universe is unbounded.","n":[]},{"t":"The argument proves at most that the cause or causes of order in the universe bear some remote analogy to human intelligence — not that they are infinite, perfect, single, or moral.","n":[]},{"t":"The problem of evil compounds the difficulty: from the world we observe, we cannot infer a benevolent omnipotent designer.","n":[]}],[{"t":"The Natural History of Religion completes the picture: the historical development of religion is a sociological process driven by fear, hope, and the human propensity to anthropomorphize, not a progression toward theological truth.","n":[2,3,4]}]],"texts":"An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding Section X 'Of Miracles' (the central treatment of testimony for miracles); Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (the systematic three-speaker treatment of natural theology, especially Parts II-VIII on the design argument and IX-XII on the cosmological argument and the problem of evil); The Natural History of Religion (Four Dissertations, 1757 — the historical-anthropological account of the development of religion). Reception: the foundational role of the miracles essay in modern philosophy of religion; J.L. Mackie's The Miracle of Theism (1982) which extends Hume's arguments; Earman's Hume's Abject Failure (2000) which critiques the miracles argument; contemporary defenders (Swinburne) and critics (Mackie, Sober) of the design argument; Plantinga's reformed epistemology as a response to the broader Humean challenge to natural theology.","works":["An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding Section X 'Of Miracles' (the central treatment of testimony for miracles)","Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (the systematic three-speaker treatment of natural theology, especially Parts II-VIII on the design argument and IX-XII on the cosmological argument and the problem of evil)","The Natural History of Religion (Four Dissertations, 1757 — the historical-anthropological account of the development of religion)"],"reception":"the foundational role of the miracles essay in modern philosophy of religion; J.L. Mackie's The Miracle of Theism (1982) which extends Hume's arguments; Earman's Hume's Abject Failure (2000) which critiques the miracles argument; contemporary defenders (Swinburne) and critics (Mackie, Sober) of the design argument; Plantinga's reformed epistemology as a response to the broader Humean challenge to natural theology.","status":"The foundational sustained critique of natural theology in modern philosophy. The miracles essay structures contemporary epistemology of testimony in religion (J.L. Mackie's The Miracle of Theism extends it; John Earman's Hume's Abject Failure attempts a Bayesian refutation). The Dialogues remain the most influential single work of philosophy of religion since Aquinas. The contemporary debate runs between defenders of natural theology (Richard Swinburne's Bayesian design argument, William Lane Craig's kalam revival) and Hume-line critics (Mackie, Sober, the broadly secular philosophy of religion mainstream). Plantinga's reformed epistemology is a different kind of response, sidestepping natural theology entirely. The Dialogues' structural argument against design has not been displaced.","era":"1711-1776","discipline":"Philosophy","refs":[{"n":1,"work":"An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding","page":"p. 32","canonical":"","quote":"But in order to encrease the probability against the testimony of witnesses, let us suppose, that the fact, which they affirm, instead of being only marvellous, is really miraculous; and suppose also, that the testimony considered apart and in itself, amounts to an entire proof; in that case, there is proof against proof, of which the strongest must prevail, but still with a diminution of its force, in proportion to…","label":"An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, p. 32"},{"n":2,"work":"Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion","page":"p. 16","canonical":"","quote":"Nor would any of human race merit his favour, but a very few, the philosophical Theists, who entertain, or rather indeed endeavour to entertain, suitable notions of his Divine perfections: As the only persons entitled to his compassion and indulgence would be the philosophical Sceptics, a sect almost equally rare, who, from a natural diffidence of their own capacity, suspend, or endeavour to suspend, all judgement…","label":"Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, p. 16"},{"n":3,"work":"An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding","page":"p. 33","canonical":"","quote":"In the infancy of new religions, the wise and learned commonly esteem the matter too inconsiderable to deserve their attention or regard. And when afterwards they would willingly detect the cheat, in order to undeceive the deluded multitude, the season is now past, and the records and witnesses, which might clear up the matter, have perished beyond recovery.","label":"An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, p. 33"},{"n":4,"work":"A Treatise of Human Nature","page":"pp. 427–428","canonical":"","quote":"Thus you may judge of the Candor of the whole Charge, when you see the assigning of *one Kind of Evidence* for a Proposition, instead of *another*, is called denying that Proposition; that the invalidating only *one Kind* of Argument for the Divine Existence is called *positive Atheism*; nay, that the weakning only of *one individual Argument* of that Kind is called rejecting that *whole Species of* *Argument*, and…","label":"A Treatise of Human Nature, pp. 427–428"}],"answer":null,"siblings":[{"slug":"causation-as-constant-conjunction","label":"Causation as constant conjunction: is the necessary connection between cause and effect ever given in experience?"},{"slug":"the-bundle-theory-of-self","label":"The bundle theory of self: is there a continuing 'I' that has perceptions, or only a bundle of perceptions?"},{"slug":"the-is-ought-gap","label":"The is/ought gap: can moral conclusions be derived from descriptive premises by reason alone?"},{"slug":"reason-as-the-slave-of-the-passions","label":"Reason as the slave of the passions: is moral motivation grounded in reason or in sentiment?"}]}