{"agent_id":"hume","agent_name":"David Hume","slug":"the-is-ought-gap","label":"The is/ought gap: can moral conclusions be derived from descriptive premises by reason alone?","topic":"The is/ought gap","question":"Can moral conclusions be derived from descriptive premises by reason alone?","position":"Writers on moral philosophy proceed for some time discussing the existence and nature of the deity and human affairs and then suddenly find themselves stating not what is, but what ought to be — without explanation, as if the new copula followed from the old. It does not. Reason discovers either relations of ideas or matters of fact; neither yields any ought-conclusion without a further premise that is itself an ought-claim. The slide from \"is\" to \"ought\" cannot be made by reason alone, and any moral theory that pretends to derive obligations from purely descriptive premises has overlooked the work that something other than reason is doing — for Hume, that something is sentiment, the agreeable or disagreeable feeling produced by contemplating certain characters and actions. The is/ought paragraph is brief — perhaps two paragraphs in Treatise III.i.1 — but its methodological force has structured modern metaethics ever since.","paragraphs":[[{"t":"Writers on moral philosophy proceed for some time discussing the existence and nature of the deity and human affairs and then suddenly find themselves stating not what is, but what ought to be — without explanation, as if the new copula followed from the old.","n":[]},{"t":"It does not.","n":[]},{"t":"Reason discovers either relations of ideas or matters of fact; neither yields any ought-conclusion without a further premise that is itself an ought-claim.","n":[1]}],[{"t":"The slide from \"is\" to \"ought\" cannot be made by reason alone, and any moral theory that pretends to derive obligations from purely descriptive premises has overlooked the work that something other than reason is doing — for Hume, that something is sentiment, the agreeable or disagreeable feeling produced by contemplating certain characters and actions.","n":[2,3]}],[{"t":"The is/ought paragraph is brief — perhaps two paragraphs in Treatise III.i.1 — but its methodological force has structured modern metaethics ever since.","n":[]}]],"texts":"A Treatise of Human Nature Book III Part I Section I (the famous paragraph on 'is' and 'ought', the only passage where Hume formulates the gap explicitly); the surrounding argument in Treatise III.i that moral distinctions are not derived from reason; An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (the more accessible later treatment of the same questions). Reception: G.E. Moore's Principia Ethica (1903) and the naturalistic fallacy charge; A.J. Ayer's Language, Truth and Logic (1936) and emotivism; R.M. Hare's prescriptivism; J.L. Mackie's error theory; the foundational role of the is/ought gap in contemporary metaethics; Philippa Foot's Natural Goodness (2001) which argues that Aristotelian categoricals (the form of life of a species) bridge the apparent gap.","works":["A Treatise of Human Nature Book III Part I Section I (the famous paragraph on 'is' and 'ought', the only passage where Hume formulates the gap explicitly)","the surrounding argument in Treatise III.i that moral distinctions are not derived from reason","An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (the more accessible later treatment of the same questions)"],"reception":"G.E. Moore's Principia Ethica (1903) and the naturalistic fallacy charge; A.J. Ayer's Language, Truth and Logic (1936) and emotivism; R.M. Hare's prescriptivism; J.L. Mackie's error theory; the foundational role of the is/ought gap in contemporary metaethics; Philippa Foot's Natural Goodness (2001) which argues that Aristotelian categoricals (the form of life of a species) bridge the apparent gap.","status":"The foundational observation of modern metaethics. G.E. Moore's Principia Ethica (1903) developed it into the naturalistic-fallacy charge against ethical naturalists; the logical positivists (Ayer, Carnap) used it to ground noncognitivism; R.M. Hare's prescriptivism is a later noncognitivist development; J.L. Mackie's error theory accepts the gap and concludes moral discourse is in error. The contemporary opponents are the ethical naturalists (especially the Aristotelian naturalists like Foot) who argue that the gap can be bridged by Aristotelian categoricals about the form of life of a species — the kind of \"is\" that already specifies normative content. Whether the gap survives the naturalist counter-arguments is the central live question in contemporary metaethics.","era":"1711-1776","discipline":"Philosophy","refs":[{"n":1,"work":"A Treatise of Human Nature","page":"pp. 299–300","canonical":"","quote":"Now it seems difficult to imagine, that any relation can be discover'd betwixt our passions, volitions and actions, compar'd to external objects, which relation might not belong either to these passions and volitions, or to these external objects, compar'd among *themselves*. But it will be still more difficult to fulfil the *second* condition, requisite to justify this system.","label":"A Treatise of Human Nature, pp. 299–300"},{"n":2,"work":"A Treatise of Human Nature","page":"p. 302","canonical":"","quote":"Nothing can be more real, or concern us more, than our own sentiments of pleasure and uneasiness; and if these be favourable to virtue, and unfavourable to vice, no more can be requisite to the regulation of our conduct and behaviour. I cannot forbear adding to these reasonings an observation, which may, perhaps, be found of some importance.","label":"A Treatise of Human Nature, p. 302"},{"n":3,"work":"A Treatise of Human Nature","page":"pp. 301–302","canonical":"","quote":"Their want of a sufficient degree of reason may hinder them from perceiving the duties and obligations of morality, but can never hinder these duties from existing; since they must antecedently exist, in order to their being perceiv'd. Reason must find them, and can never produce them. This argument deserves to be weigh'd, as being, in my opinion, entirely decisive.","label":"A Treatise of Human Nature, pp. 301–302"}],"answer":null,"siblings":[{"slug":"causation-as-constant-conjunction","label":"Causation as constant conjunction: is the necessary connection between cause and effect ever given in experience?"},{"slug":"the-bundle-theory-of-self","label":"The bundle theory of self: is there a continuing 'I' that has perceptions, or only a bundle of perceptions?"},{"slug":"religion","label":"Religion: do miracles or the design argument support theism?"},{"slug":"reason-as-the-slave-of-the-passions","label":"Reason as the slave of the passions: is moral motivation grounded in reason or in sentiment?"}]}