{"agent_id":"husserl","agent_name":"Edmund Husserl","slug":"embodiment-leib-vs-k-rper","label":"Embodiment, Leib vs. Körper: is the lived body structurally distinct from the body considered as object, or is this distinction collapsible?","topic":"Embodiment, Leib vs. Körper","question":"Is the lived body structurally distinct from the body considered as object, or is this distinction collapsible?","position":"The *lived body* (*Leib*) is structurally distinct from the *physical body* (*Körper*) considered as object. The lived body is not given in the same way as other objects in the perceptual field. It is the *zero-point of orientation* (the here from which all other heres are measured), the subject of *kinaesthetic sensations* (the felt sense of one's own movement), the *organ of will* (the 'I can' as the formal expression of bodily capacity), and the bearer of localized sensations (the touched-touching structure of tactile experience). When I look at my hand, the same body is given doubly — as physical object in the visual field and as lived organ of the touch — and the doubling is constitutive, not illusory.","paragraphs":[[{"t":"The *lived body* (*Leib*) is structurally distinct from the *physical body* (*Körper*) considered as object.","n":[1]},{"t":"The lived body is not given in the same way as other objects in the perceptual field.","n":[2]},{"t":"It is the *zero-point of orientation* (the here from which all other heres are measured), the subject of *kinaesthetic sensations* (the felt sense of one's own movement), the *organ of will* (the 'I can' as the formal expression of bodily capacity), and the bearer of localized sensations (the touched-touching structure of tactile experience).","n":[3,4]}],[{"t":"When I look at my hand, the same body is given doubly — as physical object in the visual field and as lived organ of the touch — and the doubling is constitutive, not illusory.","n":[]}]],"texts":"Ideas II §§35-42 on the body as zero-point of orientation, kinaesthesis, the I-can; §§54-60 on the personalistic attitude and the body as bearer of the soul; §§43-47 on the constitution of psychic reality through the body; Cartesian Meditations §44 on the primordial sphere and the lived body. Reception: Edith Stein, On the Problem of Empathy (1917); Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (1945) — the locus classicus of phenomenological embodiment; Emmanuel Levinas's later work on the body and sensibility; Donn Welton, ed., The Body: Classic and Contemporary Readings (1999); Taylor Carman, Merleau-Ponty (2008) on the philosophical lineage; Elizabeth Behnke's essays on kinaesthetic phenomenology; Shaun Gallagher, How the Body Shapes the Mind (2005) on the cognitive-science extension.","works":["Ideas II §§35-42 on the body as zero-point of orientation, kinaesthesis, the I-can","§§54-60 on the personalistic attitude and the body as bearer of the soul","§§43-47 on the constitution of psychic reality through the body","Cartesian Meditations §44 on the primordial sphere and the lived body"],"reception":"Edith Stein, On the Problem of Empathy (1917); Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (1945) — the locus classicus of phenomenological embodiment; Emmanuel Levinas's later work on the body and sensibility; Donn Welton, ed., The Body: Classic and Contemporary Readings (1999); Taylor Carman, Merleau-Ponty (2008) on the philosophical lineage; Elizabeth Behnke's essays on kinaesthetic phenomenology; Shaun Gallagher, How the Body Shapes the Mind (2005) on the cognitive-science extension.","status":"*Ideas II* was drafted between 1912 and 1928 but published only posthumously in 1952. Its analyses of the lived body shaped Merleau-Ponty's *Phenomenology of Perception* (1945) decisively and through that text the entire phenomenological tradition of embodiment. Modern readers (Welton, Carman, Behnke, Gallagher, Stoller) continue the analysis. The cognitive-science extension (Gallagher, Thompson, Varela's Embodied Mind tradition) takes up the *Leib*-*Körper* distinction as a starting point for empirical research.","era":"1859-1938","discipline":"Philosophy","refs":[{"n":1,"work":"Ideas II","page":"p. 171","canonical":"","quote":"Hence when we approach the constitution of the natural Object, \"man,\" we may not already presuppose his Body as a fully constituted material thing but instead must at first pursue what is already constituted prior to, or correlative with, material nature, as regards the psychophysical subject. And here, as before, let us first try to see how far we can advance in a Solipsistic consideration.","label":"Ideas II, p. 171"},{"n":2,"work":"The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology","page":"p. 150","canonical":"","quote":"How the consciousness originates through which my living body nevertheless acquires the ontic validity of one physical body among others, and how, on the other hand, certain physical bodies in my perceptual field come to count as living bodies, living bodies of \"alien\" ego-subjects—these are now necessary questions.","label":"The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, p. 150"},{"n":3,"work":"Ideas II","page":"pp. 173–174","canonical":"","quote":"And thus, my Body's entering into physical relations (by striking, pressing, pushing, etc.) with other material things provides in general not only the experience of physical occur- Tences, related to the Body and to things, but also the experience of specifically Bodily occurrences of the type we call sensings. Such occurrences are missing in \"merely\" material things.","label":"Ideas II, pp. 173–174"},{"n":4,"work":"Thing and Space, Lectures of 1907","page":"p. 343","canonical":"","quote":"The Body is \"not yet\" consti- SUBJECTIVE SELF-MOVEMENT AND OBJECTIVE CORPOREAL MOVEMENT 335 tuted here. Therefore, the question then is: how does the lived experience of the J move (Lam the subject of free sequences of sensations of movement) change into the apprehension: my corporal Body is a moving body just like any other, and the I move has the significance of an Objective, corporeal movement?","label":"Thing and Space, Lectures of 1907, p. 343"}],"answer":null,"siblings":[{"slug":"anti-psychologism-and-the-autonomy-of-logic","label":"Anti-psychologism and the autonomy of logic: are the laws of logic ideal and apodictic, or are they psychological regularities?"},{"slug":"intentionality-and-the-noesis-noema-structure","label":"Intentionality and the noesis-noema structure: is the noema an intensional sense in the Fregean manner, or the object itself in its mode of givenness?"},{"slug":"the-transcendental-reduction-and-transcendental-idealism","label":"The transcendental reduction and transcendental idealism: does the epoché yield a constituting subjectivity that grounds the world, or does it lose the world it brackets?"},{"slug":"inner-time-consciousness-retention-protention-and-the-absolu","label":"Inner time-consciousness, retention/protention, and the absolute flow: does the privilege of the living present rest on a metaphysics of presence that retention itself undermines?"},{"slug":"intersubjectivity-and-the-fifth-cartesian-meditation","label":"Intersubjectivity and the Fifth Cartesian Meditation: does the analogical apperception of the Other avoid solipsism, or did Husserl never escape the transcendental ego?"},{"slug":"the-lifeworld-the-crisis-of-european-sciences-and-the-husser","label":"The lifeworld, the Crisis of European Sciences, and the Husserl-Heidegger break: does the late phenomenology recover the meaning-foundation of science, or is it a relapse into philosophical anthropology that Heidegger's existential analytic surpasses?"}]}