{"agent_id":"husserl","agent_name":"Edmund Husserl","slug":"the-lifeworld-the-crisis-of-european-sciences-and-the-husser","label":"The lifeworld, the Crisis of European Sciences, and the Husserl-Heidegger break: does the late phenomenology recover the meaning-foundation of science, or is it a relapse into philosophical anthropology that Heidegger's existential analytic surpasses?","topic":"The lifeworld, the Crisis of European Sciences, and the Husserl-Heidegger break","question":"Does the late phenomenology recover the meaning-foundation of science, or is it a relapse into philosophical anthropology that Heidegger's existential analytic surpasses?","position":"The crisis of European sciences is the loss of the *lifeworld* (*Lebenswelt*) as the meaning- foundation of all scientific theorizing. The *Galilean mathematization* of nature substituted a mathematical-formal world of idealized objects for the experienced lifeworld from which it derives its sense, and over time came to be taken for the world itself — forgetting the lifeworld as the ground that gave the formalism its sense in the first place. The recovery of the lifeworld as transcendental ground is the late phenomenological task. The break with Heidegger: Heidegger's *Being and Time* (1927) substitutes a hermeneutic ontology of Dasein for the transcendental analysis, proceeding from existing Dasein without first carrying out the reduction; for transcendental phenomenology this is a sophisticated *philosophical anthropology*, not a development of phenomenology, and the marginal notes on *Being and Time* (translated in the Sheehan- Palmer volume) make the disagreement explicit.","paragraphs":[[{"t":"The crisis of European sciences is the loss of the *lifeworld* (*Lebenswelt*) as the meaning- foundation of all scientific theorizing.","n":[]},{"t":"The *Galilean mathematization* of nature substituted a mathematical-formal world of idealized objects for the experienced lifeworld from which it derives its sense, and over time came to be taken for the world itself — forgetting the lifeworld as the ground that gave the formalism its sense in the first place.","n":[1]}],[{"t":"The recovery of the lifeworld as transcendental ground is the late phenomenological task.","n":[]},{"t":"The break with Heidegger: Heidegger's *Being and Time* (1927) substitutes a hermeneutic ontology of Dasein for the transcendental analysis, proceeding from existing Dasein without first carrying out the reduction; for transcendental phenomenology this is a sophisticated *philosophical anthropology*, not a development of phenomenology, and the marginal notes on *Being and Time* (translated in the Sheehan- Palmer volume) make the disagreement explicit.","n":[2,3,4,5]}]],"texts":"Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology §§9-15 on the Galilean mathematization of nature; §§28-34 on the lifeworld; §§38-43 on the various ways into the reduction; §§57-72 on the teleology of European reason; the 1935 Vienna Lecture and the Prague Lectures (Crisis Appendix and supplements); Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology and the Confrontation with Heidegger (Sheehan and Palmer, 1997) — the EB Article drafts (1927-28), the Amsterdam Lectures (1928), Husserl's marginal notes on Being and Time, the 1931 Berlin lecture 'Phenomenology and Anthropology.' Reception: Martin Heidegger's Being and Time (1927); Husserl's marginal notes on Being and Time (in Sheehan and Palmer); Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action (1981) on the lifeworld concept; Jan Patočka's Czech reception of phenomenology and lifeworld; Maurice Merleau-Ponty's late Crisis-engagement (the Visible and the Invisible); Jacques Derrida, Edmund Husserl's Origin of Geometry: An Introduction (1962); Hans Blumenberg, The Genesis of the Copernican World on the lifeworld and modernity.","works":["Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology §§9-15 on the Galilean mathematization of nature","§§28-34 on the lifeworld","§§38-43 on the various ways into the reduction","§§57-72 on the teleology of European reason","the 1935 Vienna Lecture and the Prague Lectures (Crisis Appendix and supplements)","Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology and the Confrontation with Heidegger (Sheehan and Palmer, 1997) — the EB Article drafts (1927-28), the Amsterdam Lectures (1928), Husserl's marginal notes on Being and Time, the 1931 Berlin lecture 'Phenomenology and Anthropology.'"],"reception":"Martin Heidegger's Being and Time (1927); Husserl's marginal notes on Being and Time (in Sheehan and Palmer); Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action (1981) on the lifeworld concept; Jan Patočka's Czech reception of phenomenology and lifeworld; Maurice Merleau-Ponty's late Crisis-engagement (the Visible and the Invisible); Jacques Derrida, Edmund Husserl's Origin of Geometry: An Introduction (1962); Hans Blumenberg, The Genesis of the Copernican World on the lifeworld and modernity.","status":"*Crisis* (drafted 1934-37, partially published 1936) is the unfinished last major work, concerned with the historical sense of European reason and the loss of the lifeworld. The Husserl-Heidegger break unfolds across the 1927-28 Encyclopedia Britannica article collaboration, the 1928 Amsterdam Lectures, and the 1931 Berlin lecture 'Phenomenology and Anthropology'; Husserl's marginal notes on *Being and Time* document the depth of the disagreement. The Habermasian use of the lifeworld concept (*Theory of Communicative Action*, 1981) is selective, foregrounding the intersubjective and communicative dimension at the expense of the transcendental. Patočka's Czech reception develops an asubjective phenomenology that diverges further from the transcendental project. Derrida's introduction to *Origin of Geometry* (1962) is the deconstructive engagement with the late reflection on history and ideality.","era":"1859-1938","discipline":"Philosophy","refs":[{"n":1,"work":"The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology","page":"p. 166","canonical":"","quote":"It is not easy to achieve clarity about what kind of peculiar scientific and hence universal tasks are to be posed under the title \"life-world\" and about whether something philosophically significant will arise here. Even the first attempt to understand the peculiar ontic sense of the life-world, which can be taken now as a narrower, now as a broader one, causes difficulties.","label":"The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, p. 166"},{"n":2,"work":"The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology","page":"pp. 187–189","canonical":"","quote":"Rather than spend our time here, we prefer to move on to a task which is much greater, as will soon be seen—one which in fact encompasses such a doctrine.","label":"The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, pp. 187–189"},{"n":3,"work":"The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology","page":"pp. 453–455","canonical":"","quote":"But in another context that which is \"itself\" given might not be a \"thing\"; it could be an ideal state of affairs, for example in mathematical or logical intuition. 5. The text reads \"prescientific persons,\" which must be a mistake. 6. I.e., the subjective and the objective. Section 35 1.","label":"The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, pp. 453–455"},{"n":4,"work":"The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology","page":"pp. 223–224","canonical":"","quote":"For our part we, who up to now have constantly carried out our systematic reflections within the reorientation of the transcendental epochē, can at any time restore the natural attitude and, within it, inquire after the invariant structures of the life-world.","label":"The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, pp. 223–224"},{"n":5,"work":"Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology and the Confrontation with Heidegger","page":"pp. 379–381","canonical":"","quote":"It has saddened me deeply to hear that you and your wife had to suffer so much because of illness. I reiterate my own and my wife's deeply felt best wishes. Also for the completion of your work. My relation *to you* is clear. Nothing will change my feelings of friendship and my high esteem for you. Your old friend, E. Husserl I urge you to please treat this letter with discretion.","label":"Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology and the Confrontation with Heidegger, pp. 379–381"}],"answer":null,"siblings":[{"slug":"anti-psychologism-and-the-autonomy-of-logic","label":"Anti-psychologism and the autonomy of logic: are the laws of logic ideal and apodictic, or are they psychological regularities?"},{"slug":"intentionality-and-the-noesis-noema-structure","label":"Intentionality and the noesis-noema structure: is the noema an intensional sense in the Fregean manner, or the object itself in its mode of givenness?"},{"slug":"the-transcendental-reduction-and-transcendental-idealism","label":"The transcendental reduction and transcendental idealism: does the epoché yield a constituting subjectivity that grounds the world, or does it lose the world it brackets?"},{"slug":"inner-time-consciousness-retention-protention-and-the-absolu","label":"Inner time-consciousness, retention/protention, and the absolute flow: does the privilege of the living present rest on a metaphysics of presence that retention itself undermines?"},{"slug":"embodiment-leib-vs-k-rper","label":"Embodiment, Leib vs. Körper: is the lived body structurally distinct from the body considered as object, or is this distinction collapsible?"},{"slug":"intersubjectivity-and-the-fifth-cartesian-meditation","label":"Intersubjectivity and the Fifth Cartesian Meditation: does the analogical apperception of the Other avoid solipsism, or did Husserl never escape the transcendental ego?"}]}