Is virtue benevolence? Can the whole of morality be reduced to producing the greatest happiness, in man or in God?

Joseph Butler, answered from the texts and cited to the page.

Joseph Butler answers

Benevolence is a great part of virtue, but not the whole of it. Whatever inquiry may be made how far virtue is resolvable into benevolence, it remains that benevolence and the want of it, singly considered, are in no sort the whole of virtue and vice.¹ If they were, our moral understanding would be indifferent to everything but the degrees in which benevolence prevailed, and we should condemn injustice and falsehood on no other account than as an overbalance of misery was foreseen to follow from them.¹

That is not what we find in ourselves. Put the case. A man takes by fraud or violence from another the fruit of his labour, to give it to a third who, he thinks, will have as much pleasure from it as the first would have had, and no bad consequences follow. The action is surely vicious.¹ And were treachery and injustice vicious only as foreseen to produce an overbalance of misery, then whenever a man could procure himself as great an advantage by injustice as the whole foreseen inconvenience to others amounted to, the injustice would not be faulty at all; it would be no more than preferring his own satisfaction to another's in equal degrees.¹

The same holds of the other side. For one stranger to busy himself to get one competitor preferred to another would be impertinent; but such an endeavour on behalf of a friend or benefactor would be virtue, whatever the distant consequences.¹ The fact appears to be that we are constituted so as to condemn falsehood, unprovoked violence and injustice, and to approve benevolence to some preferably to others, abstracted from all consideration of which conduct is likeliest to produce an overbalance of happiness or misery.²

As to God, I will not pretend to know more of his ends than I do. Suppose the Author of nature proposed nothing to himself but the production of happiness, and that his moral character were merely that of benevolence; yet ours is not so. On that supposition his only reason for giving us this approbation of some actions and disapprobation of others must be that he foresaw this constitution would produce more happiness than a temper of mere general benevolence.

But since this is our constitution, falsehood, violence and injustice must be vice in us, and benevolence to some preferably to others virtue.³ Our rule is the faculty he has given us, not a guess at his calculations. There is a practical danger here, and it is why I press the point. Some authors of great and distinguished merit have expressed themselves in a manner that may lead careless readers to imagine the whole of virtue to consist in singly aiming, by their best judgment, at the happiness of mankind in the present state, and the whole of vice in doing what they foresee is likely to produce an overbalance of unhappiness.

No mistake can be conceived more terrible.⁴ Some of the most shocking instances of injustice, adultery, murder, perjury, even persecution, may in many supposable cases have no appearance of producing an overbalance of misery in the present state, and sometimes the contrary appearance.⁴ The happiness of the world is the concern of him who is its Lord and Proprietor; nor do we know what we are about when we promote the good of mankind in any ways but those he has directed, which is to say, in all ways not contrary to veracity and justice.⁴

I do not deny the duty of benevolence within those bounds. From our short views it is greatly uncertain whether a given endeavour will produce an overbalance of happiness upon the whole, since so many and distant things must come into the account. What makes it our duty is that there is some appearance it will, and no positive appearance on the contrary side; and that such endeavour cultivates the most excellent of all virtuous principles, the active principle of benevolence.⁴

The position in brief

We approve justice, veracity and fidelity, and condemn falsehood, injustice and unprovoked violence, in themselves, and not only for their consequences; benevolence is a great part of virtue but not the whole of it.⁵ We are not competent to judge the whole consequences of our actions, and a man who does what is unjust in the expectation of producing more happiness has mistaken his office. God may have the happiness of his creatures as his end; our rule is the moral faculty he has given us.⁶⁷⁸⁹

Sources

benevolence, and the want of it, singly considered, are in no sort the whole of virtue and vice. For if this were the case, in the review of one's own character, or that of others, our moral understanding and moral sense would be indifferent to everything, but the degrees in which benevolence prevailed
The Analogy of Religion, with the Dissertations Of Personal Identity and Of the Nature of Virtue
we are constituted so as to condemn falsehood, unprovoked violence, injustice, and to approve of benevolence to some preferably to others, abstracted from all consideration which conduct is likeliest to produce an overbalance of happiness or misery.
The Analogy of Religion, with the Dissertations Of Personal Identity and Of the Nature of Virtue
since this is our constitution, falsehood, violence, injustice, must be vice in us, and benevolence to some preferably to others, virtue, abstracted from all consideration of the overbalance of evil or good which they may appear likely to produce.
The Analogy of Religion, with the Dissertations Of Personal Identity and Of the Nature of Virtue
The happiness of the world is the concern of him who is the Lord and the Proprietor of it; nor do we know what we are about, when we endeavour to promote the good of mankind in any ways but those which he has directed; that is, indeed, in all ways not contrary to veracity and justice.
The Analogy of Religion, with the Dissertations Of Personal Identity and Of the Nature of Virtue
" The fact, then, appears to be, that we are constituted so as to condemn falsehood, unprovoked violence, injustice, and to approve of benevolence to some preferably to others, abstracted from all consideration which conduct is likeliest to produce an overbalance of happiness or misery.
The Analogy of Religion, with the Dissertations Of Personal Identity and Of the Nature of Virtue
And, if we consider a reasonable creature or moral agent, without regard to the particular relations and circumstances in which he is placed; we cannot conceive any thing else to come in towards determining whether he is to be ranked in a higher or lower class of virtuous beings, but the higher or lower degree in which that principle, and what is manifestly connected with it, prevail in him.
Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel, with the Preface of 1729
And, by the way, this observation may help to determine, what just ness there is in that objection against religion, that it teaches us to be interested and selfish.
The Analogy of Religion, with the Dissertations Of Personal Identity and Of the Nature of Virtue
Now, if human creatures are endued with such a moral nature as we have been explaining, or with a moral faculty, the natural object of which is actions; moral government must consist in rendering them happy and unhappy, in rewarding and punishing them, as they follow, neglect, or depart from the moral rule of action interwoven in their nature, or suggested and enforced by this moral faculty; in rewarding and…
The Analogy of Religion, with the Dissertations Of Personal Identity and Of the Nature of Virtue
But it is only the former of these; namely, how far the assertion in the text holds, and the ground of the pre-eminence assigned to the precept of it, which in strictness comes into our present consideration.
Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel, with the Preface of 1729

Where the argument is made

Dissertation II, Of the Nature of Virtue (1736): the moral faculty approves and disapproves actions in themselves
"benevolence, and the want of it, singly considered, are in no sort the whole of virtue and vice"
that we are constituted to condemn falsehood, unprovoked violence and injustice, and to approve benevolence to friends and benefactors rather than to strangers, abstracted from any reckoning of which conduct will produce an overbalance of happiness
the case of the man who takes the fruit of another's labour by fraud to give it to a third
the warning against men who would do injustice or falsehood for the sake of a supposed greater good
Fifteen Sermons XII, where the common virtues and vices may be traced up to benevolence or the want of it, with its note that we are not competent judges of what is upon the whole for the good of the world, and XV on the ignorance of man
Analogy I.ii-iii and II.iv on God's government as more than bare benevolence and as a scheme imperfectly comprehended

How the argument was received

The first sustained objection to reducing morality to benevolence; read as anti-utilitarian before utilitarianism, and as an argument from our ignorance as much as from our intuitions.