Daniel Kahneman, answered from the texts and cited to the page.
Expected utility is a fine account of what a rational agent should do and a poor account of what people do.12 We set out to describe the preferences people actually have, not to justify them.34
The present paper describes several classes of choice problems in which preferences systematically violate the axioms of expected utility theory. In the light of these observations we argue that utility theory, as it is commonly interpreted and applied, is not an adequate descriptive model and we propose an alternative account of choice under risk. 2.Prospect Theory, An Analysis of Decision under Risk, pp. 2–3
Economists adopted expected utility theory in a dual role: as a logic that prescribes how decisions should be made, and as a description of how Econs make choices. Amos and | were psychologists, however, and we set out to understand how Humans actually make risky choices, without assuming anything about their rationality.Thinking, Fast and Slow
Assume that the exact scientific estimate of the consequences of the programs are as follows: If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. [72 percent] If Program B is adopted, there is 113 probabil- ity that 600 people will be saved, and 213 probability that no people will be saved. 128 percent] Which of the two programs would you favor? SCIENCh, VOL.The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, p. 2
These features of laboratory gambling complicate the interpretation of the results and restrict their generality. By default, the method of hypothetical choices emerges as the simplest procedure by which a large number of theoretical questions can be investigated.Prospect Theory, An Analysis of Decision under Risk, pp. 4–5
The descriptive claim is largely won; its scope and the size of loss aversion remain argued.