The anger of God: must a God who loves the good also be angry with the wicked, or does divine wrath make God a passionate man writ large?

Lactantius, answered from the texts and cited to the page.

Lactantius answers

A God who loves the good must be angry with the wicked, and the necessity is one of logic before it is one of piety. In things that are opposed, a mind must be moved to both sides or to neither. He who loves the good also hates the wicked, and he who does not hate the wicked does not love the good, because the love of the good springs from the hatred of the wicked and the hatred springs from the love.1

No one loves life who does not hate death, and no one desires light who does not shun darkness; the two are bound together by nature, so that the one cannot stand without the other.2 This is why Epicurus, who took away both anger and kindness, is more consistent than the Stoics, who kept kindness and dropped anger. They retain the better half of the matter, but they have not seen what holds it up.

Take the master with a good servant and a bad one. If he honours both alike, or hates both alike, he is unjust and a fool. He sets the good over his household and chastises the bad, so that fear may restrain the one sort and honour draw on the other.3 And what is true of him cannot be less true of God. The Stoics reasoned wrongly from the start.

They said that because God is not liable to anger, he cannot be moved by kindness. They should have said that because he is plainly moved by kindness, he must also be liable to anger. It is absurd to overturn what is certain by what is doubtful, when the doubtful is more easily confirmed by the certain.4 Now, you ask whether this makes God a man writ large.

It does not, and the reason lies in what anger belongs to him and what does not. Epicurus argues that if God is moved to favour and to anger, he must also fear and desire and suffer the rest of human weakness. That does not follow. Fear has its matter in man, who lies open to violence and loss; God is liable to no want, no injury, no pain and no death, and so has nothing to fear.

Desire arises in man because he is frail and mortal and needs offspring to carry on his race; God has no female beside him and no need of succession, since he will live for ever.5 The affections that spring from weakness, desire, fear, avarice, grief and envy, are vicious, and he is free of them. But anger towards the wicked, regard towards the good and pity towards the afflicted belong to virtue and are worthy of the divine power; these he has, and they are just and true.6

And consider what the denial of them would cost. Take away his anger and the laws will be despised, audacity alone will reign, and no one will be safe unless he is the strongest; the whole earth will be laid waste as by a common robbery. Because the wicked expect punishment and the good hope for favour, virtue has its place and crimes are rarer.7

Even the anger contains a showing of kindness, for it rises to destroy the pestilent and guilty for the sake of all good men.8 Nor is he injurious who punishes the injurious. If he were, our laws would be injurious and every judge who sentences a convicted criminal; but the judge who punishes the wicked guards the safety of the good, and God, when he opposes evil, does the same.9

I would not have you imagine a sudden passion. A man's anger is often unjust and must be curbed; God's anger has always a cause and is governed by his will, which is why it is called just.

The position in brief

If God is not angry with the wicked, he does not love the righteous; love of the good and hatred of the wicked are one motion seen from two sides.10 Epicurus took away both and was at least consistent; the Stoics kept kindness and dropped anger and reasoned from the uncertain to undo the certain. God's anger is not a man's: it is just, it is never without cause, it is ruled by him and not ruling, and it is appeased by amendment of life, not by incense. Take it away and the fear of God goes, and with it religion, and with religion justice and the life of cities.11121314

Sources

  1. he who loves the good also hates the wicked, and he who does not hate the wicked does not love the good; because the loving of the good arises from the hatred of the wicked, and the hating of the wicked has its rise from the love of the good.
    On the Anger of God
  2. There is no one who loves life without a hatred of death, nor who is desirous of light, but he who avoids darkness. These things are so connected by nature, that the one cannot exist without the other.
    On the Anger of God
  3. If any master has in his household a good and a bad servant, it is evident that he does not hate them both, or confer upon both benefits and honours; for if he does this, he is both unjust and foolish.
    On the Anger of God
  4. For they ought not to have reasoned thus: Because God is not liable to anger, therefore He is not moved by kindness; but in this manner: Because God is moved by kindness, therefore He is also liable to anger.
    On the Anger of God
  5. The affection of fear has a subject-matter in man, but it has none in God.... But this desire has no place in God, because frailty and death are far removed from Him
    On the Anger of God
  6. as to those which belong to virtue,--that is, anger towards the wicked, regard towards the good, pity towards the afflicted,--inasmuch as they are worthy of the divine power, He has affections of His own, both just and true.
    On the Anger of God
  7. Thus all the earth will be laid waste, as it were, by a common robbery. But now, since the wicked expect punishment, and the good hope for favour, and the afflicted look for aid, there is place for virtues, and crimes are more rare.
    On the Anger of God
  8. Thus even in anger itself there is also contained a showing of kindness.
    On the Anger of God
  9. it follows that God, when He opposes the evil, is not injurious; but he himself is injurious who either injures an innocent man, or spares an injurious person that he may injure many.
    On the Anger of God
  10. Thus, he who loves the good also hates the wicked, and he who does not hate the wicked does not love the good; because the loving of the good arises from the hatred of the wicked, and the hating of the wicked has its rise from the love of the good. There is no one who loves life without a hatred of death, nor who is desirous of light, but he who avoids darkness.
    On the Anger of God
  11. But if anger is unbecoming to a man, provided he be of wisdom and authority, how much more is so foul a change unbecoming to God! And if man, when he has authority and power, inflicts widespread injury through anger, sheds blood, overthrows cities, destroys communities, reduces provinces to desolation, how much more is it to be believed that God, since He has power over the whole human race, and over the universe…
    On the Anger of God
  12. Thus, he who is not subject to anger is plainly uninfluenced by kindness, which is the opposite feeling to anger. Now, if there is neither anger nor kindness in Him, it is manifest that there is neither fear, nor joy, nor grief, nor pity. For all the affections have one system, one motion, which cannot be the case with God.
    On the Anger of God
  13. But if God takes no trouble, nor occasions trouble to another, why then should we not commit crimes as often as it shall be in our power to escape the notice of men and to cheat the public laws?
    On the Anger of God
  14. But, however, though philosophers and poets, and those, in short, who worship the gods, often acknowledge the Supreme God, yet no one ever inquired into, no one discussed, the subject of His worship and honours; with that persuasion, in truth, with which, always believing Him to be bounteous and incorruptible, they think that He is neither angry with any one, nor stands in need of any worship.
    On the Anger of God

Where the argument is made

  • On the Anger of God (c. 314), especially 2-6 against Epicurus, whose God neither loves nor is angry, and the Stoics, whose God is kind but not angry, with the conclusion of ch. 6 that God is angry "since He is moved by kindness"
  • 7-12 on fear as the foundation of religion and of human society
  • 13 on the argument ascribed to Epicurus, that God either wishes to take away evils and cannot or can and will not, and its answer
  • 16-21 on just anger, its control, and "the anger of mortals ought to be mortal"
  • 22-23 on the Sibyls' witness to judgment
  • Institutes II.17 announcing the treatise
  • VI.14-19 on the passions as given for use and governed, against Stoic apatheia

How the argument was received

His case against the philosophers' impassible God, and the text that Christian doctrines of divine impassibility have had to answer or explain away.