{"agent_id":"lakatos","agent_name":"Imre Lakatos","slug":"the-popper-relationship-and-the-popper-0-popper-1-popper-2-d","label":"The Popper relationship and the Popper-0/Popper-1/Popper-2 distinction: is Lakatos the sophisticated methodological falsificationist Popper's late work was reaching for, or is the SRP framework a covert subversion of orthodox Popperianism?","topic":"The Popper relationship and the Popper-0/Popper-1/Popper-2 distinction","question":"Is Lakatos the sophisticated methodological falsificationist Popper's late work was reaching for, or is the SRP framework a covert subversion of orthodox Popperianism?","position":"My relationship to Popper is to be understood through the distinction between Popper-0 (naive falsificationism — the strawman position that a single failed prediction refutes a theory; held by no serious philosopher of science though sometimes attributed to Popper himself), Popper-1 (sophisticated methodological falsificationism — the position Popper was reaching for in his Logic of Scientific Discovery and the Postscript volumes, in which theories are appraised across longer historical periods and conventional decisions about basic statements matter), and Popper-2 (the late Popper of Objective Knowledge and the evolutionary epistemology, which I take to be the problematic philosophical extension of the methodology). I am the sophisticated methodological falsificationist Popper-1 was reaching for, with the additional apparatus — hard core, protective belt, positive and negative heuristic, progressive and degenerating problemshifts — that makes the methodology actually applicable to the history of science. The SRP framework is the rigorous development of what sophisticated falsificationism requires, even where it breaks from Popper's own formulations in specific places.","paragraphs":[[{"t":"My relationship to Popper is to be understood through the distinction between Popper-0 (naive falsificationism — the strawman position that a single failed prediction refutes a theory; held by no serious philosopher of science though sometimes attributed to Popper himself), Popper-1 (sophisticated methodological falsificationism — the position Popper was reaching for in his Logic of Scientific Discovery and the Postscript volumes, in which theories are appraised across longer historical periods and conventional decisions about basic statements matter), and Popper-2 (the late Popper of Objective Knowledge and the evolutionary epistemology, which I take to be the problematic philosophical extension of the methodology).","n":[1,2,3,4,5]}],[{"t":"I am the sophisticated methodological falsificationist Popper-1 was reaching for, with the additional apparatus — hard core, protective belt, positive and negative heuristic, progressive and degenerating problemshifts — that makes the methodology actually applicable to the history of science.","n":[]},{"t":"The SRP framework is the rigorous development of what sophisticated falsificationism requires, even where it breaks from Popper's own formulations in specific places.","n":[]}]],"texts":"\"Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes\" (1970, in *Philosophical Papers Vol I*) — sections on Popper-0, Popper-1, Popper-2 and the development of sophisticated methodological falsificationism; \"Popper on Demarcation and Induction\" (1974, in *Philosophical Papers Vol I*); the Popper-Lakatos correspondence (in the Archives, mostly unpublished); the 1973 LSE lectures in *For and Against Method* on the Popperian inheritance; the Worrall + Currie editorial apparatus to *Philosophical Papers Vol I* on Lakatos's relation to Popper. Reception: John Worrall on the orthodox-Popperian inheritance reading; W. W. Bartley III on the late Popper of evolutionary epistemology (Popper-2); Brendan Larvor on the Lakatos-Popper relationship; Paul Feyerabend's 1975 *Against Method* on whether Lakatos remained too close to Popper; John Kadvany's reading of the Popper relationship as the strategic camouflage by which Lakatos introduced Hegelian dialectic into Anglo-American philosophy under Popperian appearance.","works":["\"Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes\" (1970, in *Philosophical Papers Vol I*) — sections on Popper-0, Popper-1, Popper-2 and the development of sophisticated methodological falsificationism","\"Popper on Demarcation and Induction\" (1974, in *Philosophical Papers Vol I*)","the Popper-Lakatos correspondence (in the Archives, mostly unpublished)","the 1973 LSE lectures in *For and Against Method* on the Popperian inheritance","the Worrall + Currie editorial apparatus to *Philosophical Papers Vol I* on Lakatos's relation to Popper"],"reception":"John Worrall on the orthodox-Popperian inheritance reading; W. W. Bartley III on the late Popper of evolutionary epistemology (Popper-2); Brendan Larvor on the Lakatos-Popper relationship; Paul Feyerabend's 1975 *Against Method* on whether Lakatos remained too close to Popper; John Kadvany's reading of the Popper relationship as the strategic camouflage by which Lakatos introduced Hegelian dialectic into Anglo-American philosophy under Popperian appearance.","status":"settled-as-articulated","era":"1922-1974","discipline":"Philosophy","refs":[{"n":1,"work":"I SCIENCE: REASON OR RELIGION","page":"p. 39","canonical":"","quote":"For the naive falsificationist any theory which can be interpreted as experimentally falsifiable, is 'acceptable' or 'scientific'.4 For the sophisticated falsificationist a theory is 'acceptable' or 'scientific' only 1 Agassi; he calls Popper's idea of science 'Scientia negativa' (Agassi {1968]).","label":"I SCIENCE: REASON OR RELIGION, p. 39"},{"n":2,"work":"I SCIENCE: REASON OR RELIGION","page":"pp. 44–45","canonical":"","quote":"While naive falsificationism stresses 'the urgency of replacing a falsified hypothesis by a better one',? sophisticated falsificationism stresses the urgency of replacing any hypothesis by a better one. Falsification cannot, 'compel the theorist to search for a better theory',* simply because falsification cannot precede the better theory.","label":"I SCIENCE: REASON OR RELIGION, pp. 44–45"},{"n":3,"work":"Philosophical Papers Vol I - The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes","page":"pp. 117–118","canonical":"","quote":"The only difference is that while for the latter Marxism might be invoked to explain the discovery of facts, for the former it might be invoked to explain the invention of scientific theories; while the choice of facts (that is, for the falsificationist, the choice of 'potential falsifiers') is primarily determined internally by the theories.","label":"Philosophical Papers Vol I - The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, pp. 117–118"},{"n":4,"work":"For and Against Method - LSE Lectures + Lakatos-Feyerabend Correspondence","page":"pp. 443–458","canonical":"","quote":"Why both Popper and Watkins fail to solve the problem of induction. In F. D'Agostino and I. C. Jarvie (eds.), Freedom and Rationality: Es- says in Honor of John Watkins. Dordrecht: Kluwer.. 1989b. Fix it and be damned: A reply to Laudan. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40:376-88.. 1991. How to deduce theories from phenomena: Newton on scientific method. Mimeo. Yourgrau, W., and W. Chandler. 1968.","label":"For and Against Method - LSE Lectures + Lakatos-Feyerabend Correspondence, pp. 443–458"},{"n":5,"work":"Philosophical Papers Vol I - The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes","page":"p. 140","canonical":"","quote":"Popper's [19574].) Popper's example was the inconsistency between Kepler's laws and the Newtonian theory which set out to explain them.? Conventionalism, of course, had performed this historic role to a great extent before Popper's version of falsificationism. forward.","label":"Philosophical Papers Vol I - The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, p. 140"}],"answer":null,"siblings":[{"slug":"the-methodology-of-scientific-research-programmes","label":"The methodology of scientific research programmes: is the unit of appraisal the research programme rather than the individual theory, against Kuhnian incommensurability, against Feyerabend's anything-goes, and against naive Popperian falsificationism?"},{"slug":"the-method-of-proofs-and-refutations","label":"The method of proofs and refutations: is mathematics fallible, quasi-empirical, and historically developing, with the dialectical method of conjecture-counterexample-lemma-incorporation as the actual logic of mathematical discovery, against Hilbertian-Bourbakian formalism?"},{"slug":"rational-reconstruction-and-the-internal-external-history-di","label":"Rational reconstruction and the internal/external history distinction: is the history of science to be written as the rational reconstruction of the internal logic of research programmes, against Kuhn's sociology-of-knowledge historicism?"},{"slug":"the-hungarian-hegelian-formation","label":"The Hungarian-Hegelian formation: are there 'two Lakatoses' (the Anglo Popperian successor and the buried Hungarian-Hegelian whose Lukácsian-Marxist inheritance shapes the dialectical method of Proofs and Refutations and the historicist architectonic of the SRP framework)?"}]}