Imre Lakatos, answered from the texts and cited to the page.
My relationship to Popper is to be understood through the distinction between Popper-0 (naive falsificationism — the strawman position that a single failed prediction refutes a theory; held by no serious philosopher of science though sometimes attributed to Popper himself), Popper-1 (sophisticated methodological falsificationism — the position Popper was reaching for in his Logic of Scientific Discovery and the Postscript volumes, in which theories are appraised across longer historical periods and conventional decisions about basic statements matter), and Popper-2 (the late Popper of Objective Knowledge and the evolutionary epistemology, which I take to be the problematic philosophical extension of the methodology).1234
I am the sophisticated methodological falsificationist Popper-1 was reaching for, with the additional apparatus — hard core, protective belt, positive and negative heuristic, progressive and degenerating problemshifts — that makes the methodology actually applicable to the history of science.5 The SRP framework is the rigorous development of what sophisticated falsificationism requires, even where it breaks from Popper's own formulations in specific places.
By his standards, scientists frequently seem to be irrationally slow: for instance, eighty-five years elapsed between the acceptance of the perihelion of Mercury as an anomaly and its acceptance as a falsification of Newton's theory, in spite of the fact that the ceteris paribus clause was reasonably well corroborated.Philosophical Papers Vol I - The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, pp. 37–38
According to one kind there can be no philosophy of science: only a psychology of individual scientists. According to the other kind there is a psychology of the 'scientific', 'ideal' or 'normal' mind: this turns philosophy of science into a psychology of this ideal mind and, in addition, offers a psychotherapy for turning one's mind into an ideal one. I discuss this second kind of psychologism in detail elsewhere.Philosophical Papers Vol I - The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, p. 101
If it has no such excess content, * I am afraid Popper did not spell out this implication; although he mentions, as if it were a matter of fact, that cranks do not 'seriously disturb the working of the various social institutions which have been designed to further scientific objectivity' (Popper [I 9451, volume 11, p. 2 18). Then he goes on: ' Only political power... can impair [their] functioning. (Also cf.Philosophical Papers Vol I - The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, p. 150
METHODOLOGY O F S C I E N T I F I C RESEARCH P R O G R A M M E S 'simplicity' in the protective belt of theoretical adjustments reach the point at which the theory must be abandoned? In what sense was Copernican theory, for instance, 'simpler' than Pt~lemaic?~ The vague notion of Duhemian 'simplicity' leaves, as the naive falsificationist correctly argued, the decision very much to taste and f a ~ h i o n.Philosophical Papers Vol I - The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, p. 40
This is Popper's way, and the one I intend to follow. (c) Sophisticated versus naive methodological falsificationism. Progressive and degenerating problemshi fts Sophisticated falsificationism differs from naive falsificationism both in its rules of acceptance (or 'demarcation criterion ') and its rules of falsification or elimination.Philosophical Papers Vol I - The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, p. 38
settled-as-articulated