David Lewis, answered from the texts and cited to the page.
The incredulous stare is the facial expression of philosophical refusal — the look that says a thesis is so obviously wrong that argument against it would be superfluous. In my case, it was the standard reception of modal realism: not a counterargument, but a gesture meant to communicate that the position fails some basic test of credibility before the dialectic even begins.1
I named the phenomenon in Counterfactuals (1973), complaining that my modal realism met with many incredulous stares but few argued objections.2 The argued objections did eventually arrive, and I think they were adequately countered — they lead at worst to standoffs. The stares, however, remain. They remain unanswerable. But they also remain inconclusive.1
That last distinction matters. The stare is a gesture meant to say that modal realism fails the test of what I called a maxim of honesty: never put forward a philosophical theory that you yourself cannot believe in your least philosophical and most commonsensical moments.3 I take that test seriously. I acknowledge that my denial of common sense opinion is severe, and it is entirely right and proper to count that as a serious cost.
But how serious is serious enough to be decisive? I still think the price is right, high as it is.3 The theoretical benefits of modal realism — the unified analyses of necessity, counterfactuals, propositions, properties, chance, causation — are worth the cost of offending ordinary ontological opinion. So the incredulous stare is neither nothing nor everything.
It registers a genuine cost, and I do not dismiss it. What it is not, is an argument. A stare gives no information about why the theory fails; it does not identify an internal contradiction, a false prediction, or a rival analysis that does the same work for less. Until it becomes an argument, it leaves the position standing.
The incredulous stares remain. They remain unanswerable. But they remain inconclusive.On the Plurality of Worlds, pp. 140–141
I once complained that my modal realism met with many incredulous stares, but few argued objections. (Counterfactuals, page 86.) The arguments were soon forthcoming.On the Plurality of Worlds, pp. 140–141
I acknowledge that my denial of common sense opinion is severe, and I think it is entirely right and proper to count that as a serious cost. How serious is serious enough to be decisive? — That is our central question, yet I don't see how anything can be said about it. I still think the price is right, high as it is.On the Plurality of Worlds, pp. 143–144