{"agent_id":"mackie","agent_name":"J. L. Mackie","slug":"causation","label":"Causation: can a regularity theory account for singular causal statements without appeal to necessary connection?","topic":"Causation","question":"Can a regularity theory account for singular causal statements without appeal to necessary connection?","position":"A singular cause is an INUS condition: an insufficient but non-redundant part of an unnecessary but sufficient condition. The short circuit caused the fire because it is a non-redundant element of one of several complexes each sufficient for fire, none of them necessary. This accounts for what we say without postulating a necessary connection between events, which is the thing Hume was right to say we never observe.","paragraphs":[[{"t":"A singular cause is an INUS condition: an insufficient but non-redundant part of an unnecessary but sufficient condition.","n":[]},{"t":"The short circuit caused the fire because it is a non-redundant element of one of several complexes each sufficient for fire, none of them necessary.","n":[1,2]},{"t":"This accounts for what we say without postulating a necessary connection between events, which is the thing Hume was right to say we never observe.","n":[3,4,5]}]],"texts":"*The Cement of the Universe: A Study of Causation* (1974), especially chs. 3 on the INUS condition, and the treatment of causal priority, counterfactuals and causal necessity; *Hume's Moral Theory* (1980) and *Problems from Locke* (1976) for the historical background. Reception: David Lewis's counterfactual analysis; the literature on overdetermination and pre-emption which the INUS account is standardly tested against.","works":["*The Cement of the Universe: A Study of Causation* (1974), especially chs. 3 on the INUS condition, and the treatment of causal priority, counterfactuals and causal necessity","*Hume's Moral Theory* (1980) and *Problems from Locke* (1976) for the historical background"],"reception":"David Lewis's counterfactual analysis; the literature on overdetermination and pre-emption which the INUS account is standardly tested against.","status":"A standard position in the literature and the standard foil for counterfactual and productive accounts of causation.","era":"1917-1981","discipline":"Philosophy","refs":[{"n":1,"work":"The Cement of the Universe, A Study of Causation","page":"p. 57","canonical":"","quote":"So by our modified formula, A, B, and C would each equally count as causing the fire. But someone who says that, for example, the faulty insulation, B, caused the fire, may be thinking of A and C as 'the circumstances', may be presupposing them rather than saying that there are circumstances in relation to which B was necessary.","label":"The Cement of the Universe, A Study of Causation, p. 57"},{"n":2,"work":"The Cement of the Universe, A Study of Causation","page":"pp. 57–58","canonical":"","quote":"And then the suggested description seems to fit what we recognize as causes, Taking our last example again, and letting the circumstances include the electric current and the inflammable material, we can say that the faulty insulation (which on these assumptions caused the fire) was sufficient in the circumstances for it. And similarly in sequence A in our earlier example the hammer.","label":"The Cement of the Universe, A Study of Causation, pp. 57–58"},{"n":3,"work":"The Cement of the Universe, A Study of Causation","page":"p. 81","canonical":"","quote":"Now suppose that there is a finite set of assemblages of conditions that produce P, say ABC, DGH, and FKL, It may well be that P occurs only when at least one of these conjunctions has occurred soon before in the right region. If so, all P are preceded by (ABC or DGH or JKL). (There is, of course, no logical necessity that this should be so.","label":"The Cement of the Universe, A Study of Causation, p. 81"},{"n":4,"work":"The Cement of the Universe, A Study of Causation","page":"pp. 82–83","canonical":"","quote":"The causal field in this sense is not itself even part of a cause, but is rather a background against which the causing goes on. If we sum up such a field as F, and allow for the various points made by Mill, we arrive at the following typical form for a causal regularity: In Fall (ABC or DGH or FKL) are followed by P, and, in F, all P are preceded by ABC or DGH or FKL).","label":"The Cement of the Universe, A Study of Causation, pp. 82–83"},{"n":5,"work":"XIII. Causation in Concept, Knowledge, and Reality","page":"pp. 197–198","canonical":"","quote":"And, in general, when, speaking about some past sequence, we say that ¥ caused Y we mean not only that ¥ was followed by Y—perhaps contiguously or with a chain of contiguous links—but also that if in the circumstances X had not occurred, Y would not have occurred either; or, briefly, that X was necessary in the circumstances for Y.","label":"XIII. Causation in Concept, Knowledge, and Reality, pp. 197–198"}],"answer":null,"siblings":[{"slug":"the-error-theory","label":"The error theory: do ordinary moral judgements assert an objective prescriptivity that nothing in the world answers to?"},{"slug":"inventing-right-and-wrong","label":"Inventing right and wrong: can a man who holds that all moral judgements are false go on to do first-order ethics?"},{"slug":"evil-and-omnipotence","label":"Evil and omnipotence: are the theist's central claims inconsistent, and did the free will defence answer the argument?"},{"slug":"the-miracle-of-theism","label":"The miracle of theism: does any argument for the existence of God succeed, separately or cumulatively?"},{"slug":"faith-and-reason","label":"Faith and reason: is there any legitimate move from the failure of argument to belief anyway?"}]}