J. L. Mackie, answered from the texts and cited to the page.
The 1955 argument stands. Omnipotence, perfect goodness and the existence of evil cannot all be maintained together once the additional premises are made explicit. As for the free will defence: Plantinga's apparatus of individual essences and transworld depravity has not rescued it but made its weakness all too clear, because the concept of an individual essence concedes that a person can be such that he will freely choose in a determinate way, and an omnipotent god choosing among all logically possible essences could have chosen freely-good ones.12 All forms of the free will defence fail, and no plausible theodicy is on offer.345
Then God was not able to create a possible world in which in this situation Curley is offered the bribe and rejects it. Either way, there is at least one possible world which God cannot create, and consideration of other free choices shows that there must be many more. So far so good, and this disposes of Leibniz's lapse. But the crucial step comes next. Plantinga assumes ^° The Nature of Necessity^ pp. 173-89.The Miracle of Theism, Arguments For and Against the Existence of God, p. 178
If there are no unabsorbed evils, then theism is in the clear. But the free will defence was an attempt to reconcile theism with the admitted existence of unabsorbed evils, and it fails to do this. However, Alvin Plantinga has restated this defence with the help of his technical apparatus of possible worlds and individual essences. His argument has at its core a criticism of what he calls 'Leibniz's lapse'.The Miracle of Theism, Arguments For and Against the Existence of God, pp. 177–178
This may, indeed, have some advantages: it would make things more interesting for God, and eliminate the sheer mystery of extra-temporal existence and action. But it abandons important parts of the ordinary religious view. But even this is not the end of the matter.The Miracle of Theism, Arguments For and Against the Existence of God, pp. 180–181
There are circumstances of injustice: situations in which people are led to the extremes of inhumanity by steps each of which seems reasonable or even unavoidable. These circumstances of injustice are, therefore, an important variety of natural evils which are constantly intertwined with moral ones. There is more than Plantinga may have noticed for which his fallen angels would have to be given the discredit.The Miracle of Theism, Arguments For and Against the Existence of God, p. 168
But at the same time all three are essential parts of most theological positions: the theologian, it seems, at once must adhere and cannot consistently adhere to all three.Evil and Omnipotence, Mind 64, p. 3
Contested, and widely reported inaccurately. The received account is that Plantinga refuted Mackie and that Mackie conceded it.