{"agent_id":"moore","agent_name":"G.E. Moore","slug":"a-defence-of-common-sense","label":"A Defence of Common Sense: are common-sense propositions more certain than any philosophical premise that would deny them?","topic":"A Defence of Common Sense","question":"Are common-sense propositions more certain than any philosophical premise that would deny them?","position":"Common-sense propositions are more certain than any philosophical premise that would deny them. The 1925 Defence lists a series of truisms Moore claims to know with certainty: \"I have a body, which has existed continuously for many years; the earth has existed for many years past; I have at various times had many different experiences and continue to have them now; I am not the only person who has had experiences.\" The claim is not that we can prove these truisms; it is that they are more certain than any philosophical premise that would deny them. If a philosophical argument concludes that \"I do not know that I have a body,\" the right response is not to accept the conclusion but to reject one of the premises — since the conclusion is more incredible than any premise that could lead to it. The epistemological structure: certainty propagates from the more certain to the less certain, and the truisms of common sense are at the ceiling of certainty, while the premises of philosophical skepticism are nowhere near. Moore acknowledged he did not claim to know HOW he knows the truisms; the *analysis* question (what is the analysis of \"I know p\"?) is harder than the *truth* question (do I know p?) and the 1925 essay is silent on the analysis. Wittgenstein's On Certainty (1969) extends the position: Moore's truisms function as \"hinge propositions\" on which our practices of doubt and certainty depend.","paragraphs":[[{"t":"Common-sense propositions are more certain than any philosophical premise that would deny them.","n":[]},{"t":"The 1925 Defence lists a series of truisms Moore claims to know with certainty: \"I have a body, which has existed continuously for many years; the earth has existed for many years past; I have at various times had many different experiences and continue to have them now; I am not the only person who has had experiences.\" The claim is not that we can prove these truisms; it is that they are more certain than any philosophical premise that would deny them.","n":[1,2,3,4]}],[{"t":"If a philosophical argument concludes that \"I do not know that I have a body,\" the right response is not to accept the conclusion but to reject one of the premises — since the conclusion is more incredible than any premise that could lead to it.","n":[]},{"t":"The epistemological structure: certainty propagates from the more certain to the less certain, and the truisms of common sense are at the ceiling of certainty, while the premises of philosophical skepticism are nowhere near.","n":[]}],[{"t":"Moore acknowledged he did not claim to know HOW he knows the truisms; the *analysis* question (what is the analysis of \"I know p\"?) is harder than the *truth* question (do I know p?) and the 1925 essay is silent on the analysis.","n":[]},{"t":"Wittgenstein's On Certainty (1969) extends the position: Moore's truisms function as \"hinge propositions\" on which our practices of doubt and certainty depend.","n":[5]}]],"texts":"'A Defence of Common Sense' (1925, in Philosophical Papers 1959 and Selected Writings); Some Main Problems of Philosophy (1953 posthumous, lectures from 1910-11) on common-sense and philosophical doubt; 'Four Forms of Scepticism' (in Philosophical Papers); 'Certainty' (in Philosophical Papers, in Selected Writings). Reception: Ludwig Wittgenstein On Certainty (posthumous 1969), the major engagement and modification; Norman Malcolm 'Defending Common Sense' (Philosophical Review 1949); Barry Stroud The Significance of Philosophical Skepticism (Oxford 1984); Crispin Wright on Mooreanism in epistemology; James Pryor 'The Skeptic and the Dogmatist' (Nous 2000); Annalisa Coliva Moore and Wittgenstein: Scepticism, Certainty, and Common Sense (Palgrave 2010); Thomas Baldwin G.E. Moore (1990) Chapter IX.","works":["'A Defence of Common Sense' (1925, in Philosophical Papers 1959 and Selected Writings)","Some Main Problems of Philosophy (1953 posthumous, lectures from 1910-11) on common-sense and philosophical doubt","'Four Forms of Scepticism' (in Philosophical Papers)","'Certainty' (in Philosophical Papers, in Selected Writings)"],"reception":"Ludwig Wittgenstein On Certainty (posthumous 1969), the major engagement and modification; Norman Malcolm 'Defending Common Sense' (Philosophical Review 1949); Barry Stroud The Significance of Philosophical Skepticism (Oxford 1984); Crispin Wright on Mooreanism in epistemology; James Pryor 'The Skeptic and the Dogmatist' (Nous 2000); Annalisa Coliva Moore and Wittgenstein: Scepticism, Certainty, and Common Sense (Palgrave 2010); Thomas Baldwin G.E. Moore (1990) Chapter IX.","status":"The Defence of Common Sense is one of the central texts of twentieth-century anti-skeptical epistemology. Wittgenstein's On Certainty (1969) is the major extension and modification. Stroud's The Significance of Philosophical Skepticism (1984) is the central post-war engagement, arguing the Moorean response fails to engage the skeptic's actual concern. Contemporary Mooreans (Pryor, Wright, Coliva) defend modified versions; the dogmatist-vs-conservativist debate runs through the contemporary epistemology literature. The position remains contested but live.","era":"1873-1958","discipline":"Philosophy","refs":[{"n":1,"work":"EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL RELATIONS","page":"p. 118","canonical":"","quote":"My first point, then, may be said to be that (2), together with all its implications, some of which I shall expressly mention, is true. (1) I begin, then, with my list of truisms, every one of which (in my own opinion) I know, with certainty, to be true. The propositions to be included in this list are the following: There exists at present a living human body, which is my body.","label":"EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL RELATIONS, p. 118"},{"n":2,"work":"EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL RELATIONS","page":"pp. 119–120","canonical":"","quote":"This truism also (in my own opinion) I know, with certainty, to be true; and it is as follows: In the case of very many (I do not say all) of the human beings belonging to the class (which includes myself) defined in the following way, i.e., as human beings who have had human bodies, that were born and lived for some time upon the earth, and who have, during the lifetime of those bodies, had many different…","label":"EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL RELATIONS, pp. 119–120"},{"n":3,"work":"Some Main Problems of Philosophy","page":"p. 133","canonical":"","quote":"The only way, then, of deciding between my opponent's argument and mine, as to which is the better, is by deciding which premiss is known to be true. My opponent's premiss is that Hume's principles are true; and unless this premiss not merely is true, but is absolutely known to be so, his argument to prove that I do not know of the existence of this pencil cannot be conclusive.","label":"Some Main Problems of Philosophy, p. 133"},{"n":4,"work":"SENSE-DATA","page":"p. 85","canonical":"","quote":"The only way, then, of deciding between my opponent's argument and mine, as to which is the better, is by deciding which premiss is known to be true. My opponent's premiss is that Hume's principles are true; and unless this premiss not merely is true, but is absolutely known to be so, his argument to 73 prove that I do not know of the existence of this pencil cannot be conclusive.","label":"SENSE-DATA, p. 85"},{"n":5,"work":"Lectures on Philosophy","page":"pp. 60–61","canonical":"","quote":"I should explain that by \"know\" I mean \"know for certain\"— wh. is tautological. And one thing is clear at once that \"know\" not = believe truly; for I certainly do either know or believe that Nature is real, & if Nature were real & know = believe truly, it would follow that I *know*. This is a point often not seen.","label":"Lectures on Philosophy, pp. 60–61"}],"answer":null,"siblings":[{"slug":"the-refutation-of-idealism","label":"The Refutation of Idealism: does the idealist formula 'esse is percipi' confuse the act of perception with its object?"},{"slug":"the-naturalistic-fallacy","label":"The Naturalistic Fallacy: is goodness a simple, indefinable, non-natural property, with any naturalist reduction committing a fallacy?"},{"slug":"ideal-utilitarianism-the-principle-of-organic-unities","label":"Ideal Utilitarianism + the Principle of Organic Unities: are friendship and aesthetic experience the highest intrinsic goods?"},{"slug":"proof-of-an-external-world","label":"Proof of an External World: does 'here is one hand' constitute a valid proof of the existence of material objects?"},{"slug":"sense-data-theory-the-paradox-of-analysis","label":"Sense-data theory + the paradox of analysis: are sense-data the immediate objects of perception, and how can a correct conceptual analysis be informative?"}]}