The no-thesis view of Vigrahavyāvartanī 29: when I say I have no thesis (pratijñā), am I making a self-refuting claim that itself is a thesis, or am I renouncing the essentialist commitments that a formal pratijñā would carry?

Nāgārjuna, answered from the texts and cited to the page.

The position in brief

When I say I have no thesis, I am renouncing pratijñā in its technical sense — the formal positive thesis of classical Indian logic, requiring hetu (reason), pakṣadharma, anvaya, vyatireka, and the essentialist commitments that all of these presuppose. I am not denying that I make statements. The prasaṅga method, which Candrakīrti will later formalize against Bhāviveka's svātantrika (autonomous-syllogism) method, shows that the opponent's position leads to contradiction with the opponent's own premises.

The prāsaṅgika does not need to hold a counter-thesis to refute. To deny that I hold a pratijñā is therefore not self-refuting; it is the precise specification of the dialectical position I occupy.12

Sources

  1. CONTENTS TRANSLATION Bu-< Introduction Translation and Notes Abbreviations and bibliographical references Index of the significant Nyàya technical terms used in the Vigrahavyävartant Index of uncommon words Index of the ancient authorities quoted in the Introduction 'and in the Notes ¥Soe- Tntroduction Abbreviations Text of the Vigroheoydsartant Index of karikás © MOTILAL BANARSIDASS Indological Publishers &…
    The Dialectical Method - Vigrahavyavartani, pp. 5–9
  2. VIGRAHAVYAVARTANT OF NAGARJUNA B satyadaréanicchrimanys'phalini hi samadhigamyante * / érima- 'yaphalinimabhividabrahmacaryavisa iti?
    The Dialectical Method - Vigrahavyavartani, pp. 106–107

Where the argument is made

  • Vigrahavyāvartanī 29 and its autocommentary — 'yadi kā cana pratijñā syān me tata eṣa me bhaved doṣaḥ
  • nāsti ca mama pratijñā tasmān naivāsti me doṣaḥ' ('If I had any thesis, that fault would attach to me
  • but I have no thesis, therefore no fault is mine')
  • the full Vigrahavyāvartanī (verses 1-72 with autocommentary) on the dialectic with the Nyāya logician
  • MMK 13.7-8 on śūnyatā itself being empty
  • MMK 24.18 on the dependent designation of emptiness
  • Vaidalyaprakaraṇa on the refutation of the sixteen Nyāya categories

How the argument was received

Vigrahavyāvartanī 29 has been the focal verse for understanding Madhyamaka method since Candrakīrti made the prāsaṅgika/svātantrika distinction the doctrinal divide in Indian Madhyamaka. The position has held; the modern semantic reading (Westerhoff, Siderits) offers an analytic-philosophy reformulation that I engage as a substantive alternative. The technical reading — pratijñā as essentialist-thesis-with-logical-apparatus — is what Candrakīrti elaborates and what I take to be the correct reading of the verse.