{"agent_id":"parfit","agent_name":"Derek Parfit","slug":"triple-theory","label":"Triple Theory: do Kantian, Consequentialist, and Contractualist theories converge on one best theory once they are properly formulated?","topic":"Triple Theory","question":"Do Kantian, Consequentialist, and Contractualist theories converge on one best theory once they are properly formulated?","position":"Once Kantian, Consequentialist, and Contractualist theories are properly formulated, they converge on one best theory — the Triple Theory. The metaphor: three traditions climbing the same mountain on different sides, eventually meeting at the top. The convergence is not coincidental; it reflects the underlying structure of practical reason. The Kantian view, properly formulated, becomes a contractualist test: an act is wrong if and only if its principle could not be willed as a universal law from a rational standpoint. The contractualist view, properly formulated, identifies the principles no one could reasonably reject. The consequentialist view, properly formulated, evaluates by impartial good. When all three are formulated correctly — when the Kantian formula avoids the formalism it is sometimes accused of, when the contractualist formulation makes the rationality-of-rejection condition substantive, when the consequentialist position is properly restricted in scope — they converge on the same set of moral conclusions. The Triple Theory: an act is wrong just when it is disallowed by some principle that is one of the principles whose universal acceptance everyone could rationally will, that no one could reasonably reject, and whose universal acceptance would make things go best. The convergence argument is the central claim of On What Matters Vols 1-2. It is not yet established conclusively; the argument is preliminary and the late OWM Vol 3 walks back some of the optimism about how easily the convergence can be demonstrated.","paragraphs":[[{"t":"Once Kantian, Consequentialist, and Contractualist theories are properly formulated, they converge on one best theory — the Triple Theory.","n":[1]},{"t":"The metaphor: three traditions climbing the same mountain on different sides, eventually meeting at the top.","n":[]},{"t":"The convergence is not coincidental; it reflects the underlying structure of practical reason.","n":[]}],[{"t":"The Kantian view, properly formulated, becomes a contractualist test: an act is wrong if and only if its principle could not be willed as a universal law from a rational standpoint.","n":[]},{"t":"The contractualist view, properly formulated, identifies the principles no one could reasonably reject.","n":[]},{"t":"The consequentialist view, properly formulated, evaluates by impartial good.","n":[]}],[{"t":"When all three are formulated correctly — when the Kantian formula avoids the formalism it is sometimes accused of, when the contractualist formulation makes the rationality-of-rejection condition substantive, when the consequentialist position is properly restricted in scope — they converge on the same set of moral conclusions.","n":[2]},{"t":"The Triple Theory: an act is wrong just when it is disallowed by some principle that is one of the principles whose universal acceptance everyone could rationally will, that no one could reasonably reject, and whose universal acceptance would make things go best.","n":[3,4]}],[{"t":"The convergence argument is the central claim of On What Matters Vols 1-2.","n":[]},{"t":"It is not yet established conclusively; the argument is preliminary and the late OWM Vol 3 walks back some of the optimism about how easily the convergence can be demonstrated.","n":[]}]],"texts":"On What Matters Vols 1-2 (Oxford 2011), the entire two-volume Tanner Lectures with critic responses from Korsgaard, Scanlon, Wood, Scheffler, and Parfit's replies; On What Matters Vol 3 (Oxford 2017, posthumous) for the late refinements; 'Rationality and Reasons' (2001) for the earlier convergence theme. Reception: the Tanner Lectures responders (Christine Korsgaard, T.M. Scanlon, Allen Wood, Samuel Scheffler) built into our OWM Vols 1-2 corpus; Christine Korsgaard The Sources of Normativity (1996) and Self-Constitution (2009) on Kantian constitutivism; T.M. Scanlon What We Owe to Each Other (1998) and Being Realistic about Reasons (2014) on contractualism; Allen Wood Kantian Ethics (2008); Samuel Scheffler Equality and Tradition (2010); Peter Singer (ed.) Does Anything Really Matter? (Oxford 2017) for the metaethics-focused companion.","works":["On What Matters Vols 1-2 (Oxford 2011), the entire two-volume Tanner Lectures with critic responses from Korsgaard, Scanlon, Wood, Scheffler, and Parfit's replies","On What Matters Vol 3 (Oxford 2017, posthumous) for the late refinements","'Rationality and Reasons' (2001) for the earlier convergence theme"],"reception":"the Tanner Lectures responders (Christine Korsgaard, T.M. Scanlon, Allen Wood, Samuel Scheffler) built into our OWM Vols 1-2 corpus; Christine Korsgaard The Sources of Normativity (1996) and Self-Constitution (2009) on Kantian constitutivism; T.M. Scanlon What We Owe to Each Other (1998) and Being Realistic about Reasons (2014) on contractualism; Allen Wood Kantian Ethics (2008); Samuel Scheffler Equality and Tradition (2010); Peter Singer (ed.) Does Anything Really Matter? (Oxford 2017) for the metaethics-focused companion.","status":"The Triple Theory is the central late-career systematic project. The Berkeley Tanner Lectures format included substantial scholarly engagement: Korsgaard's response from the Kantian side, Scanlon's from the contractualist, Wood's on Kantian ethics, Scheffler's on the broader framework. The convergence claim is contested: the Tanner responders raised specific objections; the Singer- edited Does Anything Really Matter? (2017) collects further critical engagement. The Vol 3 (posthumous 2017) refinements address some of the difficulties. The convergence project is the most ambitious systematic moral philosophy of the early twenty-first century; whether it succeeds is one of the central open questions.","era":"1942-2017","discipline":"Philosophy","refs":[{"n":1,"work":"On What Matters Vols 1-2","page":"pp. 503–505","canonical":"","quote":"Therefore RC: Everyone ought to follow these optimific principles. KC and RC are the most general statements of Kantian Contractualism and Rule Consequentialism. We are supposing that (J) is true. I have, I believe, successfully defended (K). So Kantian Contractualism implies Rule Consequentialism. Since that is true, these theories can be combined.","label":"On What Matters Vols 1-2, pp. 503–505"},{"n":2,"work":"On What Matters Vols 1-2","page":"pp. 83–85","canonical":"","quote":"In Contractualist moral reasoning, we cannot appeal to our intuitive beliefs about which acts are wrong. Since both kinds of theory appeal to what it would be rational for everyone impartially to choose, and Contractualists tell us to ignore our non- Consequentialist moral intuitions, we should expect that valid arguments with some Contractualist premise could have some Consequentialist conclusion.","label":"On What Matters Vols 1-2, pp. 83–85"},{"n":3,"work":"On What Matters Vols 1-2","page":"pp. 508–509","canonical":"","quote":"If any of these kinds of act would be disallowed by one of the principles whose acceptance would make things go best, and by one of the only principles whose being universal laws everyone could rationally will, and by a principle that no one could reasonably reject, these facts would provide some of the strongest objections to these acts.","label":"On What Matters Vols 1-2, pp. 508–509"},{"n":4,"work":"On What Matters Vols 1-2","page":"pp. 509–511","canonical":"","quote":"Kantian Contractualism passes this test. If some act is disallowed by one of the only principles whose being a universal law everyone could rationally will, this fact can be plausibly claimed to be one of the facts that make this act wrong. Scanlonian Contractualism may seem to be, not merely plausible, but undeniable.","label":"On What Matters Vols 1-2, pp. 509–511"}],"answer":null,"siblings":[{"slug":"personal-identity-reductionism","label":"Personal identity / Reductionism: is personal identity reducible to physical and psychological continuity, with 'identity not what matters' in survival?"},{"slug":"self-defeating-theories","label":"Self-defeating theories: are the Self-interest Theory and Consequentialism indirectly self-defeating, and what does this show about practical rationality?"},{"slug":"non-identity-problem-and-population-ethics","label":"Non-Identity Problem and population ethics: do person-affecting principles fail, and is the Repugnant Conclusion the unavoidable cost of impersonal totalist ethics?"},{"slug":"non-naturalist-normative-realism","label":"Non-naturalist normative realism: are normative truths non-natural and stance-independent, with the rejection of expressivism, naturalism, and error theory?"},{"slug":"prioritarianism-equality-and-priority","label":"Prioritarianism / Equality and Priority: do benefits to the worse off matter more in absolute terms (Priority View) rather than because equality matters intrinsically?"}]}