Alvin Plantinga, answered from the texts and cited to the page.
Belief in God can be properly basic — formed non-inferentially in a properly functioning cognitive agent in the appropriate circumstances — and a properly basic belief in God can have full warrant, the special property that turns true belief into knowledge.12 The faculty producing it is the sensus divinitatis, the Calvinian cognitive capacity that responds to the majesty of nature, the encounter with moral law, the sense of guilt and gratitude, and the experience of the divine in ordinary life.
Classical foundationalism — the view that properly basic beliefs must be either self- evident or incorrigible to the subject — fails by its own standard, since the criterion itself is neither self-evident nor incorrigible on its own view. With the classical-foundationalist constraint set aside, the question of which beliefs can be properly basic must be answered from somewhere else; the answer comes from an account of proper function and design plan.345
According to the A/(] model I am presenting here, theistic belief produced by the sensus divinitatis can also he properly basic with respect to warrant.'^^ It isn't just that the believer in God is within her epistemic rights in accepting theistic belief in the basic way.Warranted Christian Belief, pp. 179–180
There are others that I have not mentioned: moral beliefs, for example, such as the belief that it is wrong to cause someone great suffering just because that affords you a certain mild pleasure. And in Warranted Chris- tian Belief, the sequel to this work, I shall argue that, from a theistic perspective, it is plausible to follow John Calvin in thinking belief in God can also be properly basic.Warrant and Proper Function, pp. 183–184
The same goes for memory. You ask me what I had for breakfast; I think for a moment and then remember: pancakes with blueberries. I don't argue from the fact that it seems to me that I remember having pancakes for breakfast to the conclusion that in fact I did; rather, you ask me what I had for breakfast and the answer simply comes to mind.Knowledge and Christian Belief, pp. 36–37
You think about the matter carefully and at length, considering the F&M complaint and all the rest, but it still seems clear or obvious (perhaps even overwhelmingly so) that there is such a jierson as (7od: how could someone sensibly claim that you were being irresponsible or derelict with respect to some epi¬ stemic duty? "Fhat would be a hard saying indeed. 3.Warranted Christian Belief, p. 178
That is fair enough; but the announcers often conclude that the demise of classical foundationalism means that we must reject all of epistemology, or even the very notion of truth itself.Warrant and Proper Function, pp. 182–183
The position has been the standing target of secular analytic epistemology since the 1983 Faith and Rationality essay. The standard charges are three: that it is fideism in technical dress; that it licenses any belief held immediately (the Great Pumpkin objection); and that it substitutes a controversial theological premise (the sensus divinitatis) for the evidence it refuses to require. The Great Pumpkin objection collapses once proper basicality is seen to require proper function, not arbitrary will; the controversial- theological-premise charge mistakes a conditional structure for an assertion. The position has held its ground; classical foundationalism is now widely conceded dead in mainstream analytic epistemology, and the Plantingan proper-functionalist alternative is one of several externalist proposals (reliabilism, virtue epistemology) competing for the space that collapse left behind.