{"agent_id":"plantinga","agent_name":"Alvin Plantinga","slug":"modal-metaphysics-transworld-identity-and-the-modal-ontologi","label":"Modal metaphysics, transworld identity, and the modal ontological argument: are possible worlds abstract states of affairs that the actual world instantiates, do individuals retain numerical identity across them, and does the modal ontological argument show theistic belief rational?","topic":"Modal metaphysics, transworld identity, and the modal ontological argument","question":"Are possible worlds abstract states of affairs that the actual world instantiates, do individuals retain numerical identity across them, and does the modal ontological argument show theistic belief rational?","position":"Possible worlds are maximal, possible states of affairs: an abstract entity exists for every possible way the actual world could have been, and the actual world is the maximal state of affairs that *obtains*. *Actualism* holds: only what exists actually exists, full stop; there are no merely possible individuals floating in non-actual worlds. *Haecceities* — individual essences — exist necessarily, and they are how individuals 'show up' in worlds where they themselves do not exist: Plantinga's *haecceity* is necessarily the property of being identical to Plantinga, and it exists in every world even where Plantinga does not. *Transworld identity* is preserved for individuals — Plantinga in one possible world is numerically the same individual as Plantinga in another. The *modal ontological argument* is sound if maximal greatness is possibly instantiated; whoever accepts the possibility premise must accept the conclusion, and the possibility premise is more plausible than its denial. The argument shows the rationality of theistic belief; it does not compel assent from one who finds the possibility premise less plausible than its denial.","paragraphs":[[{"t":"Possible worlds are maximal, possible states of affairs: an abstract entity exists for every possible way the actual world could have been, and the actual world is the maximal state of affairs that *obtains*. *Actualism* holds: only what exists actually exists, full stop; there are no merely possible individuals floating in non-actual worlds. *Haecceities* — individual essences — exist necessarily, and they are how individuals 'show up' in worlds where they themselves do not exist: Plantinga's *haecceity* is necessarily the property of being identical to Plantinga, and it exists in every world even where Plantinga does not. *Transworld identity* is preserved for individuals — Plantinga in one possible world is numerically the same individual as Plantinga in another.","n":[1,2,3,4]}],[{"t":"The *modal ontological argument* is sound if maximal greatness is possibly instantiated; whoever accepts the possibility premise must accept the conclusion, and the possibility premise is more plausible than its denial.","n":[]},{"t":"The argument shows the rationality of theistic belief; it does not compel assent from one who finds the possibility premise less plausible than its denial.","n":[5]}]],"texts":"*The Nature of Necessity* (1974) — the systematic statement, with Chapters I–IV on *de re* / *de dicto*, *haecceity*, and possible worlds; Chapter VIII on transworld identity; Chapter X on the modal ontological argument; *Essays in the Metaphysics of Modality* (2003, ed. Davidson) collects the journal papers — 'De Re et De Dicto' (*Nous* 1969), 'World and Essence' (1970), 'Actualism and Possible Worlds' (1976), 'The Boethian Compromise' (1978), 'De Essentia' (1979), 'On Existentialism' (1983), 'Reply to John L. Pollock' (1985), 'Two Concepts of Modality: Modal Realism and Modal Reductionism' (1987); the 'Self-Profile' (1985, *Profiles 5*) Sections 3C–G on the ontological argument, *de dicto*, *de re*, names, and possible worlds. Reception: David Lewis's *Counterfactuals* (1973) and *On the Plurality of Worlds* (1986) as the modal-realist rival; John Pollock's actualist alternative; Robert Adams's 'Theories of Actuality' and 'Actualism and Thisness' on existentialism; Kit Fine on the reduction of possibilist discourse; Peter van Inwagen on transworld identity (Plantinga's 1985 *Profiles 5* respondent); the Cambridge-volume chapters by John Divers ('The Modal Metaphysics of Alvin Plantinga') and Peter van Inwagen ('Plantinga's Replacement Argument').","works":["*The Nature of Necessity* (1974) — the systematic statement, with Chapters I–IV on *de re* / *de dicto*, *haecceity*, and possible worlds","Chapter VIII on transworld identity","Chapter X on the modal ontological argument","*Essays in the Metaphysics of Modality* (2003, ed. Davidson) collects the journal papers — 'De Re et De Dicto' (*Nous* 1969), 'World and Essence' (1970), 'Actualism and Possible Worlds' (1976), 'The Boethian Compromise' (1978), 'De Essentia' (1979), 'On Existentialism' (1983), 'Reply to John L. Pollock' (1985), 'Two Concepts of Modality: Modal Realism and Modal Reductionism' (1987)","the 'Self-Profile' (1985, *Profiles 5*) Sections 3C–G on the ontological argument, *de dicto*, *de re*, names, and possible worlds"],"reception":"David Lewis's *Counterfactuals* (1973) and *On the Plurality of Worlds* (1986) as the modal-realist rival; John Pollock's actualist alternative; Robert Adams's 'Theories of Actuality' and 'Actualism and Thisness' on existentialism; Kit Fine on the reduction of possibilist discourse; Peter van Inwagen on transworld identity (Plantinga's 1985 *Profiles 5* respondent); the Cambridge-volume chapters by John Divers ('The Modal Metaphysics of Alvin Plantinga') and Peter van Inwagen ('Plantinga's Replacement Argument').","status":"The actualist account is one of two dominant positions in modal metaphysics; the modal- realist rival is David Lewis's, on which possible worlds are concrete and we are the *actual*-world residents only indexically. Among actualists, the *existentialism* / anti- existentialism debate (with Robert Adams on the role of *haecceities* and propositions about non-existents) continues. The modal ontological argument has the standing of a formally sound argument whose possibility premise is contested; many philosophers find it begs the question, and many of those find that judgment less obvious once they have worked through it. The *Essays in the Metaphysics of Modality* (2003) collection gathers the technical record. The position has mostly held: actualism, transworld identity, and the broad shape of the apparatus survived Lewis's challenge and have been the working assumption of much subsequent modal metaphysics.","era":"1932-present","discipline":"Philosophy, Theology","refs":[{"n":1,"work":"Alvin Plantinga","page":"p. 101","canonical":"","quote":"On my account the former is true but the latter flatly false, in view of the existence of possible but unactual states of affairs. What the actualist holds is not that whatever there is, is actual — after all, there are merely possible states of affairs — but that whatever there is exists. Actualism should really be called 'existentialism'. By now, however, it is too late; 'actualism' is already entrenched.","label":"Alvin Plantinga, p. 101"},{"n":2,"work":"God, Freedom, and Evil","page":"pp. 119–120","canonical":"","quote":"Of course, the property in question, like the property being a unicorn, exists. It is a perfectly good property which exists with as much equanimity as the property of equininity, the property of being ahorse. But it doesn't happen to apply to anything. That is, in this world it doesn't apply to anything; in other possible worlds it does.","label":"God, Freedom, and Evil, pp. 119–120"},{"n":3,"work":"Alvin Plantinga","page":"pp. 97–98","canonical":"","quote":"My view may therefore be described as a sort of modal realism. Secondly, I took a possible world to be a way things could have been or a state of affairs — something like, for example, Socrates' being shorter than Plato or Quine's being a distinguished philosopher.","label":"Alvin Plantinga, pp. 97–98"},{"n":4,"work":"The Analytic Theist","page":"pp. 114–115","canonical":"","quote":"Hence there really does exist a being who is omniscient, omnipotent, and morally perfect and who exists and has these properties in every possible world. Accordingly these premises, (25), (27), and (28), entail that God, so thought of, exists. Indeed, if we regard (27) and (28) as consequences of a definition - a definition of maximal greatness - then the only premise of the argument is (25).","label":"The Analytic Theist, pp. 114–115"},{"n":5,"work":"Essays in the Metaphysics of Modality","page":"p. 215","canonical":"","quote":"Neither are they nearby. They are not at any spatial distance whatever from here. They are not far in the past or future, nor for that matter near; they are not at any temporal distance at all from now. They are isolated: there are no spatiotemporal relations at all between things that belong to different worlds.","label":"Essays in the Metaphysics of Modality, p. 215"}],"answer":null,"siblings":[{"slug":"belief-in-god-as-properly-basic","label":"Belief in God as properly basic: must theistic belief be grounded in evidence to be rational, or can it be a properly basic belief produced by a properly functioning sensus divinitatis?"},{"slug":"warranted-christian-belief-and-the-aquinas-calvin-model","label":"Warranted Christian Belief and the Aquinas/Calvin model: can specifically Christian belief — the trinity, incarnation, atonement, resurrection — be warranted in the same way generic theistic belief is, or does the move from theism to Christianity require a different kind of justification?"},{"slug":"the-free-will-defense-and-the-problem-of-evil","label":"The Free Will Defense and the problem of evil: is God's existence logically compatible with the evil there is, and does the evidential weight of horrendous suffering yield a probabilistic argument against theism?"},{"slug":"the-evolutionary-argument-against-naturalism","label":"The Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism: is the conjunction of metaphysical naturalism and contemporary evolutionary theory self-defeating, and does the inscrutability of P(R | N&E) yield a defeater for every belief the naturalist holds, including N&E itself?"},{"slug":"religious-exclusivism-in-the-face-of-religious-diversity","label":"Religious exclusivism in the face of religious diversity: can exclusivist Christian belief remain warranted when the believer is sincerely aware of equally devout adherents of other religions, or does pluralism defeat exclusivist warrant?"}]}