Alvin Plantinga, answered from the texts and cited to the page.
The model is conditional. If Christian belief is true — if there is an almighty, perfectly good, personal God who has provided a unique way of salvation through the incarnation, life, death, and resurrection of his divine son — then Christian belief, formed under the warranting conditions, has warrant sufficient for knowledge.12 The warranting conditions are the proper functioning of the sensus divinitatis repaired by grace, combined with the Internal Instigation of the Holy Spirit that produces faith and the testimony of Scripture that conveys the great things of the gospel.3
The model does NOT argue that Christian belief is true; it argues there is no successful de jure objection (one that grants the belief might be true but argues it is somehow epistemically defective regardless) independent of the de facto question of truth.45
From these two, of course, it follows that the target proposition is possible. In this chapter, I shall give a model of theistic beliefs having warrant: the Aquinas/Calvin (A/C) model. Then in chapters 7, 8, and 9, I will ex¬ tend the A/C model to a model in which specific and full-blooded Christian belief has warrant. I claim four things for these two models.Warranted Christian Belief, pp. 168–169
I'll argue that this is the most sensible construal of the objection we are considering. τη also argue that this version of the objection is really the claim that Christian belief doesn't have warrant, the property or quantity that distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief. In Chapter 'Three I'll look into the nature of warrant: just what is it?Knowledge and Christian Belief, p. 12
Further, some of what Christians believe (e.g., that a human being was dead and then arose from the dead) is as Hume says, contrary to custom and experience: it seldom happens. Of course it doesn't follow, con¬ trary to Hume's implicit suggestion, that there is anything irrational or contrary to reason in believing it, given the internal instigation of the Holy Spirit.Warranted Christian Belief, p. 285
Freud and Marx, therefore, do not give us a de jure objec¬ tion that is independent of the truth of Christian belief; their objec¬ tion presupposes its falsehood. I go on (in chapter 6) to offer a model, the Aquinas/Calvin (A/C) model, for theistic beliefs having warrant and argue that if theistic belief is in fact true, then something like this model is in fact correct.Warranted Christian Belief, p. 14
But the point here is that if Christian belief is true, then it could very well have warrant in the way proposed here. If there are no good philosophical objections to the model, given the truth of Christian belief, then any successful objection to the model will also have to be a successful objection to the truth of Christian belief. We can take the matter a step further.Knowledge and Christian Belief, pp. 68–69
Critics (Beilby, Silver, the wider secular epistemology community) routinely misread the conditional structure as if WCB were a truth- claim project. It is not. Beilby's three main critiques — that the model fails to argue its truth, that it focuses on the paradigmatic believer rather than actual believers, and that the theological details of how warranted Christian beliefs are formed are underdeveloped — are critiques OF the project, not critiques WITHIN it. The paradigmatic- believer focus is deliberate: the model shows what can happen epistemically if the warranting conditions obtain. Whether they obtain in any actual case is a separate question, properly answered by theology and by spiritual life rather than by epistemology.