John Rawls, answered from the texts and cited to the page.
The original position is, at its core, a device of representation — a hypothetical initial situation designed to model the conditions under which free and equal persons would agree on principles of justice for the basic structure of society. The leading idea is that it connects a conception of the person and its companion conception of social cooperation with specific principles of justice, establishing that connection by describing parties as rationally autonomous representatives of citizens.1
The fairness of the circumstances under which agreement is reached transfers to the fairness of the principles agreed to — which is precisely why the name "justice as fairness" seems natural.2 To secure that fairness, the parties in the original position are deprived of certain morally irrelevant information: they do not know their place in society, their class position or social status, their fortune in the distribution of natural talents and abilities, their deeper aims and interests, or their particular psychological makeup.3
To insure fairness between generations, they are also denied knowledge of which generation they belong to, and thus of information about natural resources and the level of productive techniques.4 Since all are similarly situated and no one can frame principles to favor their peculiar condition, each reasons in the same way, and any agreement reached is unanimous.5
The question of justification is then settled by working out a problem of deliberation: we ascertain which principles it would be rational to adopt given this contractual situation, connecting the theory of justice with the theory of rational choice.6 One should not be misled by the somewhat unusual conditions that characterize the original position.
The idea is simply to make vivid to ourselves the restrictions that it seems reasonable to impose on arguments for principles of justice — one argues from widely accepted but weak premises to more specific conclusions, each presumption natural and plausible by itself, taken together imposing significant bounds on acceptable principles.7 What the original position incorporates, at the highest level, is pure procedural justice: there exists no independent criterion of justice antecedently given; what is just is defined by the outcome of the procedure itself.8
This contrasts with perfect procedural justice, where an independent standard already exists and the procedure is designed to satisfy it. The use of pure procedural justice means that the parties are not required to apply, nor are they bound by, any antecedently given principles of right; there is no standpoint external to the parties' own perspective from which prior and independent principles constrain them.9
The principles of justice are themselves constructed through a process of deliberation carried out by the parties, and the force of all reasons on balance is expressed by the agreement made.10 Two conditions must be satisfied simultaneously by the description of the original position: it must be a fair situation, and the parties must be conceived as members of a well-ordered society.11
The parties view themselves as having final aims and interests in the name of which it is legitimate to make claims on one another; they are adopting what is to serve as a public conception of justice and must therefore assess principles in part by their publicity effects and check for stability.12 So long as each part of the description has a legitimate pedigree, or we are prepared to accept certain conditions in view of their implications, the device is in order.13
The leading idea is that the original position connects the conception of the person and its companion conception of social cooperation with certain specific principles of justice.Political Liberalism, p. 281
Fairness of the circumstances under which agreement is reached transfers to the fairness of the principles agreed to; and since these principles serve as principles of justice, the name 'justice as fairness' seems natural.12 Reply to Alexander and Musgrave, pp. 251–252
they do not know their place in society, their class position or social status, their fortune in the distribution of natural talents and abilities, their deeper aims and interests, or finally, their particular psychological makeup.12 Reply to Alexander and Musgrave, pp. 251–252
to insure fairness between generations, we must add that they do not know to which generation they belong and thus information about natural resources, the level of productive techniques, and the like, is also forbidden to them.12 Reply to Alexander and Musgrave, pp. 251–252
Since all are similarly situated, and the parties do not know how to frame principles to favor their peculiar condition, each will reason in the same way. There is no need to have a binding vote, and any agreement reached is unanimous.12 Reply to Alexander and Musgrave, pp. 251–252
the question of justification is settled by working out a problem of deliberation: we have to ascertain which principles it would be rational to adopt given the contractual situation. This connects the theory of justice with the theory of rational choice.A Theory of Justice, pp. 15–16
The idea here is simply to make vivid to ourselves the restrictions that it seems reasonable to impose on arguments for principles of justice, and therefore on these principles themselves.A Theory of Justice, pp. 15–16
the essential feature of pure procedural justice, as opposed to perfect procedural justice, is that there exists no independent criterion of justice; what is just is defined by the outcome of the procedure itself.16 Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, pp. 325–326
there exists no standpoint external to the parties' own perspective from which they are constrained by prior and independent principles in questions of justice that arise among them as members of one society.16 Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, pp. 325–326
the principles of justice themselves are to be constructed by a process of deliberation, a process visualized as being carried out by the parties in the original position... the force of all reasons on balance is expressed by the agreement made.16 Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, pp. 325–326
The description of the original position must satisfy two conditions: first, it is to be a fair situation, and second, the parties are to be conceived as members of a well-ordered society.12 Reply to Alexander and Musgrave, pp. 251–252
the parties view themselves as having final aims and interests in the name of which they think it legitimate to make claims on one another; and that they are adopting what is to serve as a public conception of justice and must, therefore, assess principles in part by their publicity effects. They must also check for stability.12 Reply to Alexander and Musgrave, pp. 251–252
So long as each part of the description of the original position has a legitimate pedigree, or we are prepared to accept certain conditions in view of their implications, everything is in order.12 Reply to Alexander and Musgrave, pp. 251–252