Bertrand Russell, answered from the texts and cited to the page.
A definite description is not a name but an incomplete symbol, contributing to the meaning of the whole sentence and having none in isolation.1 "The present King of France is bald" asserts that exactly one thing is King of France and is bald; it is meaningful and false.234
Thus "the author of Waverly was Scotch" is: "There is a term such that (1) ' wrote Waverly ' is always equivalent to ' is, ' (2) is Scotch." And generally: "the term satisfying satisfies " is defined as meaning: "There is a term such that (1) is always equivalent to ' is, ' (2) is true." This is the definition of propositions in which descriptions occur.Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy
There are two sorts of descriptions, what one may call '"'ambiguous descriptions', when we speak of '"'a so-and-so'', and what one may call "definite descriptions'', when we speak of ''the so-and-so"' (in the singular). 20 Instances are: Ambiguous: Aman, a dog, a pig, a Cabinet Minister. Definite: The man with the iron mask. The last person who came into this room.DISCUSSION, p. 213
The fact that you can discuss the proposition ''God exists" is a proof that 40 "God", as used in that proposition, is a description and not a name. If ""God"' were a name, no question as to existence could arise. I have now defined what I mean by saying that a thing described exists. I have still to explain what I mean by saying that a thing described has a certain property.DISCUSSION, p. 219
It is false that the present King of France is the present King of France, or that the round square is the round square. When we substitute a description for a name, propositional functions which are "always true" may become false, if the description describes nothing.Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy
Canonical, and under sustained attack since 1950.