{"agent_id":"russell","agent_name":"Bertrand Russell","slug":"the-theory-of-descriptions","label":"The theory of descriptions: is the 1905 analysis the paradigm of philosophy, or a misreading of how ordinary language refers?","topic":"The theory of descriptions","question":"Is the 1905 analysis the paradigm of philosophy, or a misreading of how ordinary language refers?","position":"A definite description is not a name but an incomplete symbol, contributing to the meaning of the whole sentence and having none in isolation. \"The present King of France is bald\" asserts that exactly one thing is King of France and is bald; it is meaningful and false.","paragraphs":[[{"t":"A definite description is not a name but an incomplete symbol, contributing to the meaning of the whole sentence and having none in isolation.","n":[1,2]},{"t":"\"The present King of France is bald\" asserts that exactly one thing is King of France and is bald; it is meaningful and false.","n":[3,4]}]],"texts":"\"On Denoting\" (*Mind*, 1905); *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy* (1919), ch. 16; *The Philosophy of Logical Atomism* (1918); *Principia Mathematica* on incomplete symbols. Reception: Strawson's \"On Referring\" (1950) and the presupposition objection; Donnellan's referential/attributive distinction (1966); Kripke's *Naming and Necessity* against descriptivism about proper names; Ramsey's description of the theory as \"that paradigm of philosophy\".","works":["\"On Denoting\" (*Mind*, 1905)","*Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy* (1919), ch. 16","*The Philosophy of Logical Atomism* (1918)","*Principia Mathematica* on incomplete symbols"],"reception":"Strawson's \"On Referring\" (1950) and the presupposition objection; Donnellan's referential/attributive distinction (1966); Kripke's *Naming and Necessity* against descriptivism about proper names; Ramsey's description of the theory as \"that paradigm of philosophy\".","status":"Canonical, and under sustained attack since 1950.","era":"1872-1970","discipline":"Philosophy","refs":[{"n":1,"work":"Part II","page":"p. 260","canonical":"","quote":"For instance, I should call \"The inhabi ant of London\" a definite description, although it does not in fact describe any definite individual. The first thing to realize about a definite description is that it is not a name. We will take \"The author of Waverley''. That is a definite description, and itis easy to see that itis nota name. A nameisa simple symbol (i.e.","label":"Part II, p. 260"},{"n":2,"work":"Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy","page":"","canonical":"","quote":"Thus \"the author of Waverly was Scotch\" is: \"There is a term such that (1) ' wrote Waverly ' is always equivalent to ' is, ' (2) is Scotch.\" And generally: \"the term satisfying satisfies \" is defined as meaning: \"There is a term such that (1) is always equivalent to ' is, ' (2) is true.\" This is the definition of propositions in which descriptions occur.","label":"Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy"},{"n":3,"work":"Part II","page":"p. 259","canonical":"","quote":"There are two sorts of descriptions, what one may call \"ambiguous descriptions\", when we speak of ''a so-and-so\", and what one may call \"definite descriptions\", when we speak of \"'the so-and-so\" (in the singular). 20 Instances are: Ambiguous: Aman, a dog, a pig, a Cabinet Minister. Definite: The man with the iron mask. The last person who came into this room. The only Englishman who ever occupied the Papal See.","label":"Part II, p. 259"},{"n":4,"work":"Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy","page":"","canonical":"","quote":"It is false that the present King of France is the present King of France, or that the round square is the round square. When we substitute a description for a name, propositional functions which are \"always true\" may become false, if the description describes nothing.","label":"Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy"}],"answer":null,"siblings":[{"slug":"why-i-am-not-a-christian","label":"Why I Am Not a Christian: do the standard arguments for God fail as decisively as the 1927 lecture claims?"},{"slug":"ethics","label":"Ethics: if value judgements express desire rather than state fact, what entitles the moral vehemence of the political writing?"},{"slug":"marriage-and-morals","label":"Marriage and Morals: was the sexual ethics a liberation, or the self-serving programme of a man who behaved badly?"},{"slug":"a-free-man-s-worship","label":"A Free Man's Worship: can a purposeless universe support the reverence and defiance the 1903 essay demands?"}]}