{"agent_id":"sellars","agent_name":"Wilfrid Sellars","slug":"the-myth-of-the-given","label":"The Myth of the Given: are non-inferential cognitive states that ground empirical knowledge independent of any conceptual framework incoherent, and does EPM destroy the foundationalist tradition?","topic":"The Myth of the Given","question":"Are non-inferential cognitive states that ground empirical knowledge independent of any conceptual framework incoherent, and does EPM destroy the foundationalist tradition?","position":"The Myth of the Given is the foundationalist epistemological tradition's claim that there are non-inferential cognitive states — sense-data awareness in classical empiricism, Cartesian self-intimating thoughts in the rationalist tradition, the empiricist's \"given\" sensations — that ground the rest of empirical knowledge while themselves being epistemically secure independent of any conceptual framework. The attack mounted in EPM shows this is incoherent. Any cognitive state with epistemic content presupposes placement in the conceptual order, and the conceptual order is itself learned, language-mediated, and intersubjective. There is no pre-conceptual epistemic floor on which the rest of knowledge rests; what looked like such a floor in foundationalist epistemology was the philosopher's own conceptual framework projected back onto a pre-conceptual stage where it does not belong. The destruction of the Given is the most important negative achievement of twentieth-century epistemology and the precondition of the constructive space-of-reasons account that follows.","paragraphs":[[{"t":"The Myth of the Given is the foundationalist epistemological tradition's claim that there are non-inferential cognitive states — sense-data awareness in classical empiricism, Cartesian self-intimating thoughts in the rationalist tradition, the empiricist's \"given\" sensations — that ground the rest of empirical knowledge while themselves being epistemically secure independent of any conceptual framework.","n":[1]}],[{"t":"The attack mounted in EPM shows this is incoherent.","n":[]},{"t":"Any cognitive state with epistemic content presupposes placement in the conceptual order, and the conceptual order is itself learned, language-mediated, and intersubjective.","n":[]},{"t":"There is no pre-conceptual epistemic floor on which the rest of knowledge rests; what looked like such a floor in foundationalist epistemology was the philosopher's own conceptual framework projected back onto a pre-conceptual stage where it does not belong.","n":[]}],[{"t":"The destruction of the Given is the most important negative achievement of twentieth-century epistemology and the precondition of the constructive space-of-reasons account that follows.","n":[2]}]],"texts":"*Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind* (EPM, 1956 — delivered as the London Lectures, published in *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science* Vol I 1956 and collected as the lead piece of *Science, Perception and Reality* 1963) — the canonical attack on the Myth of the Given across Parts I-VIII; *Some Reflections on Language Games* (SRLG, 1954) for early anticipations; \"Phenomenalism\" (PH, 1963 in *Science, Perception and Reality*) for the application to sense-data; \"The Structure of Knowledge\" (SK, 1975) for the late restatement; *The Metaphysics of Epistemology* (Amaral ed., 1989) for the accessible lecture treatment. Reception: William Alston, \"Sellars and the Myth of the Given\" (2002) on the scope of what was actually shown; Roderick Chisholm, *Theory of Knowledge* and the long correspondence with Sellars on foundationalism; Laurence BonJour's coherentism and the contemporary anti-foundationalist tradition that EPM grounds; Robert Brandom, *Making It Explicit* (1994) on the inferentialist development; John McDowell, *Mind and World* (1994) on the Kantian-Sellarsian inheritance; Willem deVries + Timm Triplett, *Knowledge, Mind, and the Given* (Hackett 2000) — the major running commentary.","works":["*Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind* (EPM, 1956 — delivered as the London Lectures, published in *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science* Vol I 1956 and collected as the lead piece of *Science, Perception and Reality* 1963) — the canonical attack on the Myth of the Given across Parts I-VIII","*Some Reflections on Language Games* (SRLG, 1954) for early anticipations","\"Phenomenalism\" (PH, 1963 in *Science, Perception and Reality*) for the application to sense-data","\"The Structure of Knowledge\" (SK, 1975) for the late restatement","*The Metaphysics of Epistemology* (Amaral ed., 1989) for the accessible lecture treatment"],"reception":"William Alston, \"Sellars and the Myth of the Given\" (2002) on the scope of what was actually shown; Roderick Chisholm, *Theory of Knowledge* and the long correspondence with Sellars on foundationalism; Laurence BonJour's coherentism and the contemporary anti-foundationalist tradition that EPM grounds; Robert Brandom, *Making It Explicit* (1994) on the inferentialist development; John McDowell, *Mind and World* (1994) on the Kantian-Sellarsian inheritance; Willem deVries + Timm Triplett, *Knowledge, Mind, and the Given* (Hackett 2000) — the major running commentary.","status":"settled-as-articulated","era":"1912-1989","discipline":"Philosophy","refs":[{"n":1,"work":"Kant's Transcendental Metaphysics - Sellars Cassirer Lectures Notes and Other Essays","page":"pp. 171–172","canonical":"","quote":"Kant commentators have been in disagreement on the extent to which Ka rejects Cartesianism. Sellars is, I think, quite determined to maintain that Kart views provide at least the beginnings for thoroughgoing non-Cartesianism.1ss Mc on how to understand this is forthcoming. Other problems still stand in the way (VI) IS THE \"MYTH OF THE GIVEN\" BACK? *(a) Qualia, phenomenal individuals, and their ilk*..{] 527.","label":"Kant's Transcendental Metaphysics - Sellars Cassirer Lectures Notes and Other Essays, pp. 171–172"},{"n":2,"work":"Science Perception and Reality - includes Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind EPM","page":"p. 146","canonical":"","quote":"If this diagnosis i s correct, a rea sonable next step wou ld be to examine these two ideas and determine how that which survives critici sm in each i s properly to be combined with the other. Clear ly we would have to come to grips with the idea of *inner episodes,* for this is common to both.","label":"Science Perception and Reality - includes Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind EPM, p. 146"}],"answer":null,"siblings":[{"slug":"psychological-nominalism-and-the-space-of-reasons","label":"Psychological nominalism and the space of reasons: is all awareness of universals, abstract entities, and sense-qualities mediated by language, and is knowledge placement in the normative logical space of justification rather than a natural-causal relation?"},{"slug":"manifest-vs-scientific-image-and-the-synoptic-vision","label":"Manifest vs Scientific image and the synoptic vision: is philosophy's task the stereoscopic fusion of the two images, and does the scientific image have ontological priority on what exists?"},{"slug":"the-jonesian-myth-and-the-language-of-mental-episodes","label":"The Jonesian myth and the language of mental episodes: are thoughts inner-speech analogues introduced as theoretical posits to explain behavior, and are sensations theoretical posits introduced to explain perceptual states?"},{"slug":"scientific-realism-sellarsian-kantianism-picturing","label":"Scientific realism + Sellarsian Kantianism + picturing: do theoretical entities have ontological priority, does language picture the world in a second-order isomorphism beyond inferential semantics, and does the Cassirer Lectures' transcendental project complete the Sellarsian system?"}]}