{"agent_id":"sidgwick","agent_name":"Henry Sidgwick","slug":"philosophical-intuitionism","label":"Philosophical intuitionism: is utilitarianism itself grounded on self-evident rational axioms, rather than opposed to intuition?","topic":"Philosophical intuitionism","question":"Is utilitarianism itself grounded on self-evident rational axioms, rather than opposed to intuition?","position":"The word \"intuitionism\" has done me a disservice, for it is used for three quite different things and I hold only one of them. It is not the doctrine that we perceive the rightness of each particular act directly — that is perceptional intuitionism, and it cannot survive the conflicts of judgment. It is not the doctrine that the common maxims of morality are themselves the self-evident first principles — that is dogmatic intuitionism, and Book III shows the maxims failing the test. It is philosophical intuitionism: the doctrine that beneath the maxims lie a very few truly self-evident axioms, abstract and precise, which the maxims approximately embody and from which a rational morality can be built. I hold three: the axiom of justice, that what is right for me must be right for all in like case; the axiom of prudence, that mere position in time gives a good no greater claim; and the axiom of rational benevolence, that from the point of view of the universe no one's good matters more than another's, so that reason bids me aim at good generally. These meet the four conditions a genuine intuition must satisfy — their terms are clear, they survive reflection, they are consistent with one another, and they command the assent of competent judges. And note what follows: utilitarianism, so far from being the enemy of intuition, rests upon it. The greatest-happiness principle is not self-supporting; it stands on the axiom of benevolence, which is a rational intuition. I am an intuitionist in the foundations and a utilitarian in the superstructure, and there is no contradiction in that.","paragraphs":[[{"t":"The word \"intuitionism\" has done me a disservice, for it is used for three quite different things and I hold only one of them.","n":[]},{"t":"It is not the doctrine that we perceive the rightness of each particular act directly — that is perceptional intuitionism, and it cannot survive the conflicts of judgment.","n":[]},{"t":"It is not the doctrine that the common maxims of morality are themselves the self-evident first principles — that is dogmatic intuitionism, and Book III shows the maxims failing the test.","n":[]}],[{"t":"It is philosophical intuitionism: the doctrine that beneath the maxims lie a very few truly self-evident axioms, abstract and precise, which the maxims approximately embody and from which a rational morality can be built.","n":[]},{"t":"I hold three: the axiom of justice, that what is right for me must be right for all in like case; the axiom of prudence, that mere position in time gives a good no greater claim; and the axiom of rational benevolence, that from the point of view of the universe no one's good matters more than another's, so that reason bids me aim at good generally.","n":[1]}],[{"t":"These meet the four conditions a genuine intuition must satisfy — their terms are clear, they survive reflection, they are consistent with one another, and they command the assent of competent judges.","n":[]},{"t":"And note what follows: utilitarianism, so far from being the enemy of intuition, rests upon it.","n":[]},{"t":"The greatest-happiness principle is not self-supporting; it stands on the axiom of benevolence, which is a rational intuition.","n":[]},{"t":"I am an intuitionist in the foundations and a utilitarian in the superstructure, and there is no contradiction in that.","n":[2,3]}]],"texts":"The Methods of Ethics, Book III Chapter XIII ('Philosophical Intuitionism', the statement of the self-evident axioms of justice, prudence, and rational benevolence, and the four conditions a proposition must meet to be accepted as genuinely self-evident: clarity and precision of terms, self-evidence on careful reflection, mutual consistency, and the consensus of competent judges); the Concluding Chapter (the axioms as the rational foundation of utilitarianism). Reception: the contemporary revival of non-naturalist rationalist moral realism (Derek Parfit's On What Matters, which explicitly builds on Sidgwick's intuitionism about the axioms; T.M. Scanlon; the 'Sidgwickian' realists); the contrast with G.E. Moore's intuitionism about the good and with Ross's intuitionism about duties; the debate over whether the four conditions can be met by any substantive moral principle.","works":["The Methods of Ethics, Book III Chapter XIII ('Philosophical Intuitionism', the statement of the self-evident axioms of justice, prudence, and rational benevolence, and the four conditions a proposition must meet to be accepted as genuinely self-evident: clarity and precision of terms, self-evidence on careful reflection, mutual consistency, and the consensus of competent judges)","the Concluding Chapter (the axioms as the rational foundation of utilitarianism)"],"reception":"the contemporary revival of non-naturalist rationalist moral realism (Derek Parfit's On What Matters, which explicitly builds on Sidgwick's intuitionism about the axioms; T.M. Scanlon; the 'Sidgwickian' realists); the contrast with G.E. Moore's intuitionism about the good and with Ross's intuitionism about duties; the debate over whether the four conditions can be met by any substantive moral principle.","status":"Sidgwick's distinctive metaethical position and the reason he is the patron of the contemporary revival of non-naturalist, rationalist moral realism. Derek Parfit's On What Matters (2011) explicitly revives Sidgwick's philosophical intuitionism about self-evident normative truths, as do the \"Sidgwickian\" realists more broadly. It stands apart from G.E. Moore's intuitionism (which is about the non-natural property of goodness) and from W.D. Ross's (which is about a plurality of prima facie duties): Sidgwick's intuited axioms are abstract structural principles, not perceived goods or particular duties. The central objection is that no substantive moral principle can actually satisfy his four conditions — that the \"consensus of competent judges,\" in particular, is either unmet or question-begging. The position is the fault line between rationalist realism and its expressivist and naturalist critics.","era":"1838-1900","discipline":"Philosophy","refs":[{"n":1,"work":"The Methods of Ethics","page":"","canonical":"","quote":"And thus, starting with his own principle, he may be brought to accept Universal happiness or pleasure as that which is absolutely and without qualification Good or Desirable: as an end, therefore, to which the action of a reasonable agent as such ought to be directed. This, it will be remembered, is the reasoning that I used in chap. xiii.","label":"The Methods of Ethics"},{"n":2,"work":"The Methods of Ethics","page":"","canonical":"","quote":"That is, the distinction which he is really concerned to emphasise is that between the state of mind in which money is valued solely as a means of buying other things, and the state of mind--such as the miser's--in which the mere consciousness of possessing it gives pleasure, apart from any idea of spending it. *Utilitarianism*, chap. ii.","label":"The Methods of Ethics"},{"n":3,"work":"The Methods of Ethics","page":"","canonical":"","quote":"I think that a 'plain man,' in a modern civilised society, if his conscience were fairly brought to consider the hypothetical question, whether it would be morally right for him to seek his own happiness on any occasion if it involved a certain sacrifice of the greater happiness of some other human being,--without any counterbalancing gain to any one else,--would answer unhesitatingly in the negative.","label":"The Methods of Ethics"}],"answer":null,"siblings":[{"slug":"the-dualism-of-practical-reason","label":"The dualism of practical reason: are rational egoism and rational benevolence both self-evident, leaving practical reason divided against itself?"},{"slug":"common-sense-morality-as-unconscious-utilitarianism","label":"Common-sense morality as unconscious utilitarianism: do the maxims of ordinary morality reduce to the greatest-happiness principle?"},{"slug":"ethical-hedonism","label":"Ethical hedonism: is pleasure — desirable consciousness — the only thing good in itself?"},{"slug":"esoteric-morality","label":"Esoteric morality: can it be right to do and privately justify, on utilitarian grounds, what it would be wrong to recommend or profess openly?"}]}