What did Titchener do for psychology?

Edward Bradford Titchener, answered from the texts and cited to the page.

Edward Bradford Titchener answers

Psychology needed, first of all, a method — and a method that could be stated, taught, and held to account. What I gave the science was precisely that: a disciplined procedure for the analysis of consciousness into its elementary processes, together with the laboratory conditions under which such analysis could be conducted with something approaching scientific exactness.

The psychological experiment, as I insisted, is not a test of power or faculty or capacity — it is a dissection of consciousness, an analysis of a piece of the mental mechanism.1 The aim of that dissection is to split up a complex whole into simpler parts, and so ultimately to reduce it to its elements, the very simplest factors of which consciousness is compounded.2

Every section of consciousness — a memory, an imagination, a train of argument — when properly analysed, reveals itself as a complex of elementary processes; and those elementary processes are sensations, the structural units of mind, as the cell is the structural unit of bodily tissue.3 To reach those elements, one requires method. The special method of psychology is introspection — looking into the mind, each for himself, to find what processes are going on and how they are influencing one another.4

But I was equally insistent on what introspection is not. Direct observation of a process still running its course is entirely worthless; it defeats its own object — as anyone who has tried to examine his enjoyment of a piece of music in the very moment of enjoying it will have found, the putting of the question alters the consciousness one set out to observe.5

What the experiment requires instead is that the observer attend to the stimulus, and when it is removed, recall the sensation by an act of memory, then give a verbal account of the processes constituting his consciousness of the stimulus — an account written down by the assistant, so that the conditions and the experience together furnish data from which other psychologists anywhere in the world can work.6

And this is what the experiment secures: accuracy of observation, the connection of every result with its own conditions, and the possibility of investigators in all parts of the world working together upon one and the same psychological problem.7 The terms chosen to describe the experience must be definite, sharp, and concrete — the conscious process is like a fresco painted in great sweeps of colour, and words are little blocks of stone for a mosaic; if the mosaic is to represent the fresco, the blocks must be of small size and every obtainable tint.8

At the level of the elements themselves, analysis brings us in the last resort to pure sensations, constituted originally of intensity and quality — sensations that carry no reference, look neither before nor after, tell us nothing of their stimuli or their point of excitation, but simply run their course, qualitatively and intensively, and may be observed and described as they proceed.9

Ideas are originally constituted of these sensations; concepts and judgments, when psychologised, reveal only their substitutes in consciousness.10 The trend of all this analysis is clear: to describe mind, to show the stuff of which it is made, to reduce it to its lowest terms.11 That is what I did for psychology. I gave it the anatomist's programme — describe the structure before you ask about the function — and the laboratory discipline to carry that programme through.

Whether the science chose to follow that programme to its completion is another question; but the standards of controlled observation, the insistence on exact description, and the seriousness about the structure of experience that a later science of consciousness has had to recover — those came, in America, from Cornell.

Sources

  1. the psychological experiment is 'not a test of power or faculty or capacity, but a dissection of consciousness, an analysis of a piece of the mental mechanism.'
    Experimental Psychology Vol I Part 1 Students Manual Qualitative
  2. it is the aim of analysis or dissection to split up a complex whole into simpler parts, and so ultimately to reduce it to its elements, the very simplest factors of which it is compounded.
    Experimental Psychology Vol I Part 1 Students Manual Qualitative
  3. The sensation, then, is the structural unit or structural element of these consciousnesses, — just as the cell (so the anatomists and physiologists tell us) is the structural element of our bodily tissues.
    Experimental Psychology Vol I Part 1 Students Manual Qualitative
  4. The special method employed by psychology is that of introspection or self-observation. We 'look into' the mind, each for himself; or we observe ourselves, — in order to find out what processes are going on at the time, and how they are influencing one another.
    An Outline of Psychology
  5. Direct introspection — observation of a process which is still running its course — is, as a matter of fact, entirely worthless; it defeats its own object.
    An Outline of Psychology
  6. Attend to the stimulus, and, when it is removed, recall the sensation by an act of memory. Give a verbal account of the processes constituting your consciousness of the stimulus. The account must be written down by the assistant... His description of the conditions, and your description of the experience, furnish data from which other psychologists can work.
    An Outline of Psychology
  7. Experiment thus secures accuracy of observation, and the connection of every result with its own conditions; while it enables observers in all parts of the world to work together upon one and the same psychological problem.
    An Outline of Psychology
  8. The conscious process is like a fresco, painted in great sweeps of colour and with all sorts of intermediary and mediating lights and shades: words are little blocks of stone, to be used in the composition of a mosaic.
    An Outline of Psychology
  9. Analysis of the processes of the inner life brings us, in the last resort, to pure sensations, constituted originally of intensity and quality. Sensations carry no reference; they look neither before nor after; they tell us nothing of their stimuli... They simply run their course, qualitatively and intensively, and may be observed and described as they proceed.
    Systematic Psychology Prolegomena
  10. Ideas, in their turn, are originally constituted of these sensations... Concepts are not 'psychical formations' at all; if we psychologise them, we discover only their substitutes in consciousness, spoken or written words, accompanied by a vague and indeterminate feeling.
    Systematic Psychology Prolegomena
  11. The trend of all this analysis is clear: Wundt is trying to describe mind, to show the stuff of which it is made, to reduce it to its lowest terms.
    Systematic Psychology Prolegomena