Affliction (malheur), decreation, and the void: is the doctrine of voluntary self-emptying a defensible spiritual-philosophical structure, or does it shade into masochism and self-hatred?

Simone Weil, answered from the texts and cited to the page.

The position in brief

Affliction (malheur) is structurally distinct from suffering. It is the triple structure of physical pain, social degradation, and psychic anguish that strips the subject of the protective sense of personhood. The Iliad is its great document; Christ on the cross is its theological centre. Decreation is the voluntary spiritual movement by which the moi — the self-protective gravitational ego — consents to be undone, so that there is room for God's existence in the soul.

Decreation is not destruction; it is the opposite of destruction, which would replace what God has created with the nothingness of the moi's negation. The void (le vide) is the space that remains when the soul has refused to fill with its own gravity what it has been given to bear.1 Grace can enter only through the void; attempts to fill the void with imagined goods are what Gravity and Grace calls the great spiritual error.2345

Sources

  1. DECREATION Decreation: to make something created pass into the uncreated. Destruction: to make something created pass into nothingness A blameworthy substitute for decreation. Creation is an act of love and it is perpetual. At each moment our existence is God's love for us. But God can only love himself. His love for us is love for himself through us.
    Gravity and Grace, pp. 32–33
  2. The first operation is one of reversal—Conversion. Except the seed die.... It has to die in order to liberate the energy it bears within it so that with this energy new forms may be developed. So we have to die in order to liberate a tied up energy, in order to possess an energy which is free and capable of understanding the true relationship of things.
    Gravity and Grace, pp. 35–36
  3. As he was chosen, this denial was made known to all men and to himself. How many others boast in the same way— and never understand.' It is easy to die for something forceful because participation in force produces an intoxication which stupefies us.
    Gravity and Grace, pp. xxiii–xxiv
  4. AFFLICTION Suffering: superiority of man over God. The Incarnation was necessary so that this superiority should not be scandalous. I should not love my suffering because it is useful. I should love it because it is. To accept what is bitter.
    Gravity and Grace, pp. 80–82
  5. It produces the absence of God. 'My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me? If the soul that falls into this affliction has partly abolished the 'I' in itself in order to make room for God, but not completely so, the affliction produces the double effect; both the destruction of the ''T from without and the absence of God; expiatory suffering and redemptive suffering.
    The Notebooks of Simone Weil Vol 2, pp. 342–343

Where the argument is made

  • 'The Love of God and Affliction' (1942, in Waiting for God and in On Science, Necessity, and the Love of God)
  • the entries on decreation, affliction, the void, and gravity in Gravity and Grace and across the Notebooks
  • 'The Implicit Forms of the Love of God' in Waiting for God
  • the late notebook material on the absent God and the void

How the argument was received

The doctrine of decreation is the most paradoxical centre of Gravity and Grace and the late notebooks; it is what readers find most distinctive and what some find most troubling. The biographical-psychological reading (Pétrement's Simone Weil: A Life 1976/88, Yourgrau's Simone Weil 2011) treats the doctrine and the life — including the voluntary undernourishment that contributed to her death — as continuous, sometimes pointing to anorexia or to a self-destructive drive. Feminist readers (Ann Loades, the broader gender-and-religion literature) have raised worries about a doctrine of self-emptying addressed to women already culturally trained to disappear. Defenders (Springsted, Chenavier, the American Weil Society tradition) argue that the structural claim is distinct from the biographical pathology and that decreation properly understood is the opposite of self-hatred — it is the consent to one's own finitude that makes love of the other possible.